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1. Objective of WP4 
The objective of WP4 of SMARTSPEC is to investigate ways and means to operationalize the S3 concept 
into a strategic policy process. This WP has a focus on the role of policy-makers in the quadruple helix that 
stands behind S3 design and implementation. It aims at clarifying methods, pitfalls and rules for designing, 
implementing and assessing S3 within a full policy cycle approach. It aims at producing a comprehensive, 
policy-friendly, action-oriented analysis of S3 policy process. WP4 addresses this objective for all policy 
aspects of the smart specialisation strategy process: Policy design, Policy implementation, Policy 
Assessment (covering monitoring and evaluation). 
This WP4 contributes directly to two of the six overall objectives of SMARTSPEC, namely; 
 Objective 5. Supporting the production of better metrics, evaluation and monitoring of smart 
specialisation strategies and the design of an asset-based multi-sectoral policy mix; 
 Objective 6. Development of processes of peer review assessment of strategies. 
 
2. D4.2 WP4 Research Paper: summary 
The WP4 Research Paper takes the form of five articles, written by seven individuals from five partner 
organisations of the SMARTSPEC project. These papers deal with the three themes of S3 strategy (design, 
implementation and assessment).  
Authors Title Status 
S3 DESIGN 
Blazek, J. and 
K. Morgan 
Institutional weaknesses and smart 
specialisation – day and night ? (chalk 
and cheese?) 
 
SMARTSPEC Working paper 
S3 IMPLEMENTATION 
Magro, E. and 
C. 
Nauwelaers 
Implementing territorial strategy: Smart 
competitiveness policies 
Accepted for publication as a 
chapter in Routledge Book 
“Territorial Strategies” 
S3 ASSESSMENT 
Magro, E. and 
J. Wilson 
Evaluating Territorial Strategies Accepted for publication as a 
chapter in Routledge Book 
“Territorial Strategies” 
McCann, P. 
and R. 
Ortega-
Argiles 
Smart Specialisation: Results-Oriented 
Policies and the Use of Results 
Indicators 
To be submitted for publication 
in Small Business Economics 
Journal 
Nauwelaers, The contribution of Peer Reviews to SMARTSPEC Working paper 
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C.  
 
Smart Specialisation Strategies 
 
Blazek and Morgan reflect on the first theme – S3 design - and confront the very high expectations set to 
smart specialization strategies as “the crisis exist strategy”, with the reality of institutions in less developed 
regions. They argue that the S3 concept presupposes an advanced level of institutional development and 
question the institutional readiness of many regions to embark in such demanding exercises. As the 
important role of institutions for regional development is now more generally accepted, the uneven quality 
of regional governance, as evidenced by recent studies, is seen as a challenge for S3. Looking at many 
specific features of institutional set up in regions with less developed research and innovating systems, and 
in particular the disjunction between private sector and public sector spheres, and the deep cleavage and 
mistrust between entrepreneurs and academics, combined with the unfavourable characteristics of their 
economies, Blazek and Morgan argue that institutionally weak regions need a specific approach to S3 and to 
the entrepreneurial discovery process concept. This involves two adjustments. First, the setting up of 
horizontal priorities, in addition to vertical priorities, aiming at reinforcing the institutional environment and 
fixing bottlenecks in the innovation system. Second, the establishment of suitable triple-helix innovation 
platforms (including national and regional authorities) as an intermediary step, a vehicle to kick off an 
entrepreneurial discovery process, before defining “smart specialisation domains”. 
The next paper by Magro and Nauwelaers addresses the theme of S3 implementation. The paper aims to 
shed light on two concepts that both literature and practice have been using in parallel: territorial strategy 
and competitiveness policies. It analyses the link between them and discusses how a possible disconnection 
might lead to problems in territorial strategy implementation. This implementation should not be considered 
a stage in a linear model, but an interactive space in which dialogue takes place among different actors. The 
chapter aims to deepen the understanding of competitiveness policies and their complexity. The analysis 
highlights the wide policy and instrument portfolio that current policy-makers have to deal with, and its 
implications for instrument choice. A key argument is that the missing link between strategies and policies 
consists in “goal-oriented” policy mixes, i.e. sets of interacting instruments which together are able to 
influence conditions and actors in a territory, to reach the goal of the strategy. Policy complexity leads to 
challenges for territorial strategy implementation as there is no optimum recipe and policy-mix for each 
territory. Taking a policy mix approach implies combining different types of policies, covering horizontal 
and vertical priorities, involving several levels and layers of government and following different theoretical 
rationales. In addition, policy path dependency and inertia make the change in instruments difficult and 
leads to greater challenges to manage policy mixes associated to specific strategic goals. The chapter 
concludes that policy mixes have to be adapted and aligned to strategic goals, which pleads for policy 
intelligence, coordination and coherence. The chapter ends in pointing to the importance of including 
evaluation tools and exercises in the design and implementation of strategies and policies as they help to 
assess the complementary effects of all types of policies and provide policy intelligence into the process, a 
theme that is taken up in the next paper. 
The last three papers address the third theme - assessment of RIS3.  
Magro and Wilson warn that, while there is a strong relationship between policy evaluation and strategy 
evaluation, they are not the same thing. This paper bridges the gap between the acknowledgement that 
evaluation should play an important strategic intelligence role in territorial strategy processes, and the 
practice that policy evaluations tend to remain isolated and not well-linked to the strategy process at 
territorial level. It presents an analysis of current state-of-the-art in competitiveness policy evaluation to 
reflect on the evaluation requirements of the ‘what for’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions that a territorial strategy 
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should answer. This leads to a proposed ‘territorial strategy evaluation framework’ that is learning centred. 
The framework makes a clear distinction between evaluation at different levels (strategy and policy) and 
emphasizes the powerful learning possibilities that lie between the two levels. The framework emphasizes 
the need to understand on the one hand how well the policy mix is aligned with both the content and the 
objectives of the strategy; and on the other hand how this policy mix interacts with the evolution of the 
content and objectives of the strategy over time. As such it constitutes the central arena for learning in the 
territorial evaluation sphere. A change in paradigm is required such that evaluations cease to be static pieces 
of information about individual policies’ effectiveness, and become integrated, dynamic learning processes 
which tie together competitiveness policies and territorial strategies. 
McCan and Ortega-Argiles discuss the fundamental issue of monitoring and evaluation of S3. Starting from 
the recognition that all policies arise from a complex bargaining process between different stakeholders, 
different parties, different interest groups and different constituencies, they emphasize the necessity for an 
encompassing vision and a translation of this vision into clear objectives. Uncovering policy intentions and 
making them explicit is necessary both in order to ensure that the policy is designed as well as possible and 
also to allow for the policy to be evaluated: the use of outcome/results indicators allied with monitoring and 
evaluation exercises are essential for assessing the impacts of innovation-related policies. However, in 
practice, many policy interventions even in advanced economies have little explicitly-measurable objectives 
in-built in their design and very few are therefore amenable to comprehensive monitoring and evaluation 
exercises. The paper goes in discussing the application of properties of outcome and results indicators, along 
with the features of good evaluation and monitoring exercises, to the smart specialisation agenda. A key 
discussion in the paper relates to the idea that S3, as a particular type of results oriented policy, would 
require an explicit theory of change to be articulated ex ante. Such new policy initiatives though, take place 
in a context of a certain degree of ex ante uncertainty, and therefore require experimentation and ‘self 
discovery’; they also tend to be based on partial, indirectly-related or incomplete data. Therefore, that kind 
of policy is not readily translated in tightly-specified analytical model ex ante and instead proceeds is a more 
iterative manner, assembling knowledge and evidence as it arises. This that new data must be constructed 
during the life of the policy in order for the policy to be evaluated ex post, and that these data must closely 
relate to the theory of expected change put forward as the basis for the policy. Smart specialisation is critical 
in articulating this theory of expected change. In order to commence the policy prioritization process, smart 
specialisation requires a detailed analysis of the current regional economic and industrial structure on the 
basis of the best available evidence currently available, i.e. baseline or profiling indicators. The 
results/outcomes indicators are designed to capture the changes in the intended results/outcomes, and the 
impact of the policy is the change in the results/outcome indicator which can credibly be ascribed to the 
policy intervention. The paper concludes that the logic of intervention, the theory of expected change, the 
indicators to be employed during the life of the policy, the data to be constructed, and the design of the 
policy, are all closely interrelated issues which cannot be divorced from each other. These results-orientation 
and policy monitoring and evaluation aspects have to be built into the policy design right from the 
beginning. 
Despite these perspectives to evolve towards much more robust, systematic and codified, monitoring and 
evaluation systems for S3, based on enhanced use of result indicators, the need for system-wide evaluations 
also leaves room for other, complementary approaches. The experimental character of smart specialization 
strategies reinforces the need for reliable and detailed assessments, addressing design and implementation 
issues. The paper by Nauwelaers argues that peer review methods, when used appropriately, can provide 
valuable contributions to support S3. These methods include elements that address the need for these 
strategies to be: open, well-informed, integrated, differentiated, shared and impact – oriented. Peer reviews 
are seen as effective mechanisms to lift policy learning, relying on a user-driven approach. Comparing the 
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peer review experiences run by the OECD and the European Commission, the paper identifies success 
conditions such as: strong political endorsement, wide stakeholders participation, quality of peer review 
panel composed of a balanced mix of peers and experts, attention to all stages in the three-step/six stages 
peer review process. The analysis underlines the specific value of this technique, that combines tacit and 
codified knowledge in a purpose-oriented exercise ending up in applicable and realistic policy 
recommendations. The conclusion underlines the potential, but also the limits of peer reviews to help this 
new wave of policies reaching their ambitious goal. It suggests a model for peer review which is adapted to 
the emerging needs of S3 in the near future. 
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Institutional weaknesses and smart specialisation – day and night?  (chalk and cheese?) 
Jiri Blazek and Kevin Morgan 
 
Introduction: The mission of RIS3 – the plea for a change 
The context for invoking and employing smart specialization strategy (RIS3) in the EU is well known and, 
therefore, can be at this place just briefly summarized in three main points. First, there are challenges 
stemming from profound impacts of the global economic crisis (e.g. unprecedented level of unemployment 
among the youth, esp. in southern Europe). Second, there is a general dissatisfaction with the effects 
achieved via Structural Funds, so far (for a recent example, see  Special Report of European Court of 
Auditors on effectiveness of business incubators, European Court of Auditors, No.7, 2014). Third, Europe is 
underperforming in long-term horizon on a global scale and is facing increasing competition esp. from Asian 
countries.  
Consequently, very high expectations are linked with RIS3, which can be illustrated by the following 
quotes:  „Smart specialisation is the Crisis exit strategy“ (H. van Rompuy, November 7, 2013, Brussels) or 
“Concept of smart specialisation should re-define innovation policy“ (J. Hahn, November 7, 2013, Brussels). 
High ambitions connected with putting the RIS3 concept into practice are reflected also by setting-up of a 
special vehicle by the EC in the form of the Joint Research Centre in Seville pursuing an extensive peer-
review process of emerging smart specialisation strategies of individual countries and regions in order to 
help to stakeholders to design and subsequently implement sound and ambitious RIS3 strategies.   
The aim of RIS3 has been defined by its proponents as a change of a sectoral structure of European 
economy towards branches with higher added value and lowering of unemployment rate (see e.g. Foray, 
Rainoldi, 2013). This should be achieved first of all by a new policy process deeply involving entrepreneurs 
aiming at discovering new business opportunities and by a set of other elements such as avoiding 
fragmentation of resources on R&D and better alignment of R&D institutions with the needs of the 
economy. However, surprisingly, the concept of smart specialisation seems to underplay the role of 
institutions, which role in promoting regional development has been considered as crucial, recently (Gertler, 
2010, Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). In particular, the concept of smart specialisation, which is based on a genuine 
bottom-up entrepreneurial discovery process that should involve not only entrepreneurs but also other 
stakeholders such as researchers and representatives of public administration implicitly expects a sort of 
maturity of formal institutions as well as of key stakeholders (e.g. well-developed collaboration culture, 
elimination of actors with mere rent-seeking strategy, etc.). In contrast, in regions with less developed 
research and innovation system, which would particularly need a fresh impetus to enhancing their research 
and innovation system via RIS3, the question of quality of institutional framework has been so far addressed 
empirically rather infrequently (for exceptions see esp. Charron et al, 2012, or  Blažek et al, 2013). 
Consequently, the question of institutional readiness for application of the smart specialisation concept 
presupposing advanced level of institutional development comes to the fore. 
Therefore, this paper tries to contribute to fill this gap by the examination of institutional context for steering 
the change as envisaged by smart specialisation concept in European regions with less developed research 
and innovation systems where the institutional bottlenecks are likely to be of largest scale. Secondly, on the 
basis of analysis of institutional weakness in these regions, some implications for design of entrepreneurial 
discovery process lying at the heart of smart specialisation strategy will be derived. 
The role of institutions in regional development       
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It has been recently persuasively argued that “the link between institutions and economic development had 
been fundamentally overlooked by mainstream economic theory, in general, and growth theory, in 
particular” (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013, p.1035). Consequently, according to the same author, a traditional recipe 
foresees that the economic development will be spurred by investment in infrastructure, education and 
training, innovation and industrial activities orchestrated from the national level, therefore disregarding the 
local institutional context. Such an approach has - inter alia – resulted in replication of development 
strategies among different regions curtailing their effects even further (cfr. Tödtling, Trippl, 2005). In 
contrast, in regional research, concern with institutions and governance and with their relation to economic 
development has been central to institutional turn recorded in geography already in 1990´s (Wood, Valler, 
2001). Nevertheless, the role of institutions has been recently more acknowledged even within the 
mainstream economic literature, which, however, brought about several important questions, namely, what 
do we mean by institutions, what sort of institutions matters for development and (how) can we intervene in 
institutions? (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). All these questions gained paramount importance by recently 
developed concept of smart specialisation, which revolves very much around its central concept – the 
entrepreneurial discovery process.  
Concerning the first question on the definition of institutions, there seems to be only a wide agreement in the 
literature that there is no single generally accepted definition of institution (e.g. Jessop, 2001, Rodríguez-
Pose, 2013). Instead, several conflicting alternative definitions were formulated. Especially dissonant proved 
to be the relation between institutions and organizations. While, on the one hand, there is stream of 
reasoning, which, due to influence of economics and sociology of organization regard institutions as 
organizations or bodies that exercise a distinctive influence upon wider society, on the other hand, other 
authors see institutions as “defining the rules and resources of social action, as defining opportunity 
structures and constraints on behaviour, as shaping the way things are to be done if they are to be done, as 
path-dependent path-defining complexes of social relations, ….” (Jessop, 2001, p. 1217). Consequently, this 
second approach to definition of institutions accords closely with that of D. C. North:  
“Institutions are humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They 
consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and 
formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Throughout history, institutions have been devised by 
human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange.” (North, 1991, p. 97).  
In the same stream of reasoning, Morgan (1997) succeeded in coining a brief definition of institutions as 
“recurrent patterns of behaviour – habits, conventions and routines” (p. 493). Nevertheless, keeping in mind 
the challenges related to application of the smart specialisation concept in policy practice, it seems 
reasonable to deal not only with the formal and informal institutions, but with organizational fabric as well. 
The relevance of the later (such as of intermediate institutions like trade association, chambers, professional 
associations etc) for regional development has been underlined by Morgan (1997) and endorsed in particular 
by the theory of regional innovation systems (Cooke et al, 1997, Cooke et al, 2004).  
Second question, what type of institutions matters most for regional development is a truly intriguing one. 
Relatively less controversial is a contribution of formal institutions such as rule of law to economic growth. 
Rodríguez-Pose (2013) insists that numerous studies come to fairly robust conclusion “that an absence of 
basic formal institutions has a detrimental effect on economic development.”  (p. 1038). According to the 
same author, unsurprisingly, given their vagueness and intangibility, there is much less solid evidence on the 
merits of informal institutions, nevertheless, by lowering uncertainty and information costs, informal 
institutions improve conditions for economic activity (ibid.). Fundamentally, D. North argues that both types 
of institutions “provide the incentive structure of an economy” (North, 1991, p. 97), which contribute to 
establish a suitable balance between coordination and competition mechanisms among economic actors thus 
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facilitating learning process (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). The question of a quality of regional governance has 
been recently for the first time addressed on a pan-European scale by a valuable research by Charron et al. 
(2012). The research by these authors showed not only a stunning scale of West-East gradient in quality of 
governance as perceived by local population, but also distinctive patterns of polarisation of quality of 
governance within countries with traditional large scale of regional disparities (esp. Italy). Unsurprisingly, 
Charron at al (2012) plea for a vigorous effort to improve the quality of governance in regions identified in 
their study as under-performers in order to stimulate economic development in those regions.  
This plea brings us to the third question, (how can we intervene in institutions?), which is a crucial one with 
regard to smart specialisation concept. Therefore, this question will be addressed in section “What sort of 
policy recommendation for institutionally weak regions?”. However, before that, to provide a suitable 
framework for answering this policy-relevant question, the key specific institutional features of the regions 
with less developed research and innovation systems, particularly those with post- state-socialism heritage 
will be elaborated.   The term regions with less developed research and innovation systems is used 
throughout this text instead of more established term less developed regions to stress that some regions can 
be according to conventional indicators such as GDP per capita considered as developed or even highly 
developed but still they suffer from severe bottlenecks in their institutional framework, which prevents them 
to realize their full potential (a prime example of regions of this type are metropolitan regions of some 
capital cities in new member states such as Prague – see Blažek, Uhlíř, 2007).   
Specific features of institutional set-up in regions with less developed research and innovation system 
State-of-the-art regional development theories emphasise an important role of informal institutional factors 
such as trust, responsibility, professionalism, partnership and shared leadership for regional development 
(see e.g. Sotarauta, 2010). This contrasts sharply with under-developed institutional framework in regions 
with less developed research and innovation system, which can be in case of public domain described as 
over-bureaucratic, over-politicised, unprofessional, unstable, non-responsive, non-transparent, lacking 
strategic vision, and, first of all, as a system that is short of trust (Blažek et al, 2014). Moreover, within all 
levels of public administration is highly embedded “play it safe” mentality, which limits the space for 
manoeuvre and flexibility in decision-making and other processes significantly.  
In addition, among public servants working in regions with less developed research and innovation system is 
highly embedded persuasion that activities of public sector on the one hand, and of private firms and 
academics on the other, are mutually “disjunctive”. This observation accords well with the concept of 
“disconnected region” (Foray et al, 2012). Consequently, regional authorities frequently lack any unit 
(department), which would be responsible for liaison with local businesses and/or academics and disposed 
knowledge about the needs and challenges of these crucial stakeholders. Therefore, in many cases, the 
cooperation among business, academic and public sector as envisaged by triple helix (and stretched by RIS3 
even further by its emphasis upon the quadruple helix encompassing civic society and users as well) have to 
start literally from a scratch.  
Accordingly, among private firms is a widespread rent-seeking behaviour and unrestrained individualism 
(see, for example, Blažek, Kuncová, 2011 for the anatomy of cumbersome process of setting-up and 
evolution of clusters in Czechia, which establishment had to be parachuted by the initiative of the national 
level). Therefore, in these regions is common individualistic behaviour among the key regional development 
actors (entrepreneurs, knowledge and even intermediary institutions) and existing platforms and networks 
are considered and used as a prima facie vehicle for lobbying for external support, instead of functioning as 
endogenous drivers of development as envisaged by the state-of-the-art theories.  
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Moreover, in these regions frequently exists a cleavage of mistrust and misunderstanding between 
entrepreneurs and academics as different value systems evolved among them. This was aptly expressed by 
one entrepreneur at the meeting facilitated by intermediate organisation in one of the Czech regions: „We 
(firm) would cooperate with universities provided the sphere is not vital to our competitiveness“. In 
addition, there is wide-spread dissatisfaction of entrepreneurs with academics as they are often uninterested 
in collaboration with businesses and the system of financing of academic institutions rewarding 
predominately academic publications widens this gap even further. Even in case that academics are willing 
to engage with businesses they are often unable to respect the time-span for the joint research effort and, 
moreover, academics are frequently not concerned with the price of the technological solution which they 
proposed within their contractual research. Given this context (disregarding the internal weaknesses of many 
of these mid-range universities - see Ptáček, Gál, 2011) it is unlikely that even the leading academics would 
have sufficient credit and respect among other stakeholders not only to perform a function of a leader or 
boundary spanner in line with smart specialisation concept, but even to be considered and accepted as 
serious partners within the entrepreneurial discovery process – the very heart of RIS3.    
In several NMSs, this tension between business and academic sphere has been recently even exacerbated by 
application of a supply-side solution to the lack of innovation, i.e. by construction of the top R&D facilities, 
which are (or are likely to be) massively under-utilised by local firms exactly as has been warned nearly two 
decades ago (Morgan, 1997). As an alternative Morgan argued that in the first place should be addressed the 
lack of innovation demand (ibid). Consequently, some of these facilities are - instead of becoming the 
drivers for regional economies - facing serious challenges concerning their sustainability requiring vast 
amount of public funding in time of severe austerity measures, which fuels the antagonism towards 
academics among entrepreneurs even further. 
In addition to above described weaknesses in formal institutions, in regions with less developed research and 
innovation system exist also significant bottlenecks given by imperfections of the formal institutions. First, 
the competence over R&D&I policy is frequently scattered among several national institutions, which 
hinders application of truly systemic measures that would enhance the overall R&D&I system and not just 
its partial components. In contrast, regional authorities in many of these countries lack any competence in 
the sphere of R&D&I, which represents a significant barrier for a more pro-active bottom-up approaches 
towards improving the overall R&D&I system. Another example of failures within the formal institutional 
framework is unstable and/or inadequate system of financing of R&D&I sphere, for example, one-sided 
stress on rewarding easily countable results such as the number of scientific articles without sufficient 
recognition of other forms of outputs of R&D&I institutions. Yet another example of imperfection of formal 
institutions is poorly designed system of protection of IPRs.  
Moreover, while there is a general dissatisfaction with bureaucratic load across various countries, this is 
especially true for post- state-socialism countries. Excessive bureaucratic load in these countries can be 
attributed at least to two specific factors. First, it is a fluid nature of legislation given by a need to change (in 
many cases fundamentally) the principles upon which these societies and economies functioned under the 
command economy. Even though it is now about 25 years since the state-socialism collapsed in these 
countries, the process of transformation of previous legislative framework is still far from being 
accomplished. Second, in some of these countries, there is a tendency to solve identified problems with 
application of legislation in practice by a more and more detailed legal specification of what is considered as 
legal and what sort of behavior is not. Therefore, some basic pieces of legislation, such as the business law, 
or the public tendering act are being amended several times a year in some of these countries.   
In addition to weaknesses in both formal and informal institutions, there are several specific features within 
economic structure of regions with less developed research and innovation system, which impinge directly 
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upon character of their R&D&I systems. Three of these specific features are well-known: i) branch-plant 
character of these economies, ii) local firms are often locked-in within the lowest tiers of GPNs/GVCs, iii) 
generally weak endogenous sector of SMEs. Importantly, all these factors imply limited innovation demand 
(for more, see e.g. Blažek et al, 2014).  
However, in regions with less developed research and innovation systems, there is at least one more 
fundamental factor, which has to be taken into account when designing RIS3 and esp. the entrepreneurial 
discovery process itself. The theoretical basis for RIS3 seems to assign quite high expectations with the 
recently developed concept of related variety, which is in principle based on argument that mutual learning 
among companies in the region is enhanced in cases when their production is technologically related 
(Frenken et al, 2007, Boschma, 2013). While this concept proved to be powerful in explaining economic 
development of regions with advanced research and innovation systems as their competitiveness is often 
based on knowledge that is mutually related (Boschma et al, 2009), the economies in regions with less 
developed research and innovation systems are less knowledge intensive and, even more importantly, 
frequently technologically unrelated. This sort of “unrelatedness” is especially typical in regions with post- 
state-socialism heritage as their economies have been for decades moulded by the command economy. 
Under the command economy, the location decisions were frequently based on overstating of the role factors 
such as natural resources while disregarding softer factors, such as local traditions, as it was primarily 
quantity and not the quality what mattered most under the state-socialism.  
Moreover, when these economies were after the collapse of state-socialism in the late 1980´s opened to 
foreign competition, their economic structure has been transformed fundamentally once more, this time 
upon the low-cost basis. Therefore, a vast number of foreign direct investments were motivated by reaping 
low-cost advantages, once again disregarding assets of softer nature such as local tradition or know-how. In 
consequence, the economic structure in many of these regions have become disconnected with local 
traditions, which resulted in development of a relatively broad spectrum of companies in unrelated industrial 
branches. Significantly, production of these companies is frequently focused on production of low value-
added components produced for export. Consequently, the “common denominator” among companies in 
these regions is unusually small and hinders significantly a potential for application of the concept of related 
variety as envisaged by the EC RIS3 Guide (Foray et al, 2012).  
In addition, the continuing tradition of confinement of basic research in Academies of Sciences built 
according to the Soviet model on the one hand, and privatisation of the former institutions of applied 
research, which frequently resulted in their closure, created a vast gap between businesses and research. As a 
result, economic specialisation of these regions - even if discernible - is barely reflected by existing R&D 
institutions. Therefore, all these factors limit the potential for application of the concept of related variety in 
this type of regions, and, consequently, these factors have to be considered carefully within the process of 
designing and implementing RIS3.   
To sum-up, the regions with less developed research and innovation systems are facing not only the 
challenge stemming from internal weakness of all pillars of triple/quadruple helix (i.e. low innovation 
capability of local business, under-performance and non-transparency of public administration, weak 
production of internationally recognized outputs of academic institutions, underdeveloped and in the best 
case just emerging fabric of civic society organizations), but, even more seriously, also deep cleavages 
among these pillars. Importantly, these cleavages exists not only due to low quality of informal as well as 
formal institutions, but also due to structural weaknesses of these regional economies such as low innovation 
demand given by branch-plant character of these regions (see Table 1). These limitations are even multiplied 
by a weakness of intermediate organisations (such as regional development agencies, innovation centres, 
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chambers of commerce etc.) that are frequently struggling just with their own live-on, which curtails 
severely their capability to enhance the research and innovation system in their regions.    
Consequently, countries and regions with less developed research and innovation system can be described as 
“low trust high red-tape societies”.  Therefore, the distance between the “ideal” situation and the everyday 
practice is - at least in case of some of these regions - of such a scale that is not stimulating but could lead 
rather to passivity or even to a hostile attitude towards “imported” concepts such as RIS3. Even though cases 
of highly positive approach towards RIS3 do exist in this type of regions as well, this unfavourable 
institutional context has to be taken into account in an effort to put the concept of smart specialisation into 
policy practice in such regions. 
Table 1: Key weaknesses in regions with less developed research and innovation system 
 Deficiencies of a „broad“ 
innovation system 
 
Deficiencies of a „narrow“ 
innovation system  
Formal 
institutions 
- - unclear or fragmented 
competence over R&D&I 
policy at the national level 
- - missing competence of 
regional authorities in the 
sphere of business support and 
R&D 
- - one-sided evaluation of 
R&D&I institutions (dominant 
stress on academic publications 
providing disincentives to 
cooperation with businesses) 
- - improper or unstable 
legislative framework 
- - high red-tape societies   
- instability of the model of 
financing of R&D institutions 
- academic institutions frequently 
lack the internal rules for 
cooperation with business sector 
or  design of these rules is 
improper forcing academics to 
cooperate with business as a 
physical persons giving rise to a 
“grey zone” of university – 
business cooperation. 
- Insufficient quality of education 
system (not only the deficiencies  
in tertiary education but, the 
overall system should be 
enhanced to spark the various 
talents of pupils and students) 
- the need to better align the 
education system with the needs 
of economy 
Informal 
institutions 
- low trust societies  
- non-professionalism,  instability 
or even unpredictability in 
decision-making of public sector 
- Individualism (reaction to forced 
collectivism under communism), 
missing leadership 
- Employees culture“ not 
„entrepreneurial culture“ among 
- Deficiencies within the innovation 
system (e.g. „Berlin wall“ between 
academic and business spheres - 
different values, expectations, time-
horizons etc.)  
- Cooperation with businesses is 
considered by some academics as a 
betrayal of academic values and 
“stealing” of academic know-how.  
- Envy among academics who do and 
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university graduates (preference 
for employment in TNCs) 
- Disregard for strategies – theses 
are often considered either as a 
kind of reincarnation of central 
planning or as a formal 
requirement without any practical 
relevance 
do not cooperate with business 
Organisational 
fabric 
- lack of strategic vision within 
public administration 
- high fluctuation of staff within 
public sector 
- missing or weak intermediate 
organisations,  
- universities often lack 
experienced staff for provision of 
support services for academics 
who seek to commercialize results 
of their research.  
Key structural 
weaknesses  
- Local firms are often locked-in 
within the lowest tiers of 
GPN/GVC;  
- branch plant economy syndrome 
(both these factors imply limited 
innovation demand). 
- low knowledge intensity and 
unrelatedness within the regional 
economies 
- Significant mismatch between 
research focus of R&D institutions 
and the needs of the economy.  
Source: own elaboration 
Towards policy implications for regions with less developed research and innovation system 
In this section, it will be argued, that as a consequence of immaturity of institutional set-up as well as due to 
specifics of economic structure in many of these regions and countries, a specific approach to RIS3 and, in 
particular, to key RIS3 driver – to entrepreneurial discovery process – is needed. While the RIS3 concept 
foresees the entrepreneurial discovery process as a key mechanism for identification and economic 
exploitation of new business opportunities (Getting started with the RIS3 KEY, 2012), in case of countries 
and regions with less developed research and innovation systems such an approach would be hardly feasible 
or even possible as it presumes a high quality of formal and esp. of informal institutions such as trust, 
collaborative culture, reciprocity and leadership. Thus, given the above described low level of quality of 
both formal and informal institutions as well as due to the specific features of economic structure of these 
regions, launching the entrepreneurial discovery process according to the lines drafted by the EC Guide to 
RIS3 might easily miss its main objectives or even fail.   
Importantly, the below proposed specific approach forwarded for regions with less developed research and 
innovation systems should not be considered as an alternative to overall process of building RIS3 outlined 
by its architects in six steps, but merely as a more detailed specification of the entrepreneurial discovery 
process, which represents a new form of policy process introduced by RIS 3 concept (Foray et al, 2012).  
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Consequently, given the above outlined specifics of regions with less developed research and innovation 
system, it can be suggested that the entrepreneurial discovery process should not start straight on with an 
effort to discover new business opportunities by stakeholders, which mutual trust is minimal (in some cases, 
entrepreneurs would meet with their colleagues for the first time ever), but rather with building of a mutual 
understanding among entrepreneurs (and if possible also academics) what are the key bottlenecks that hinder 
local business most. Therefore, an effort to identify, which of these bottlenecks could be addressed in 
cooperation with other regional stakeholders (public administration, educational and knowledge institutions 
etc.) should be exerted. This would not only raise the level of common understanding among entrepreneurs, 
but especially among entrepreneurs and representatives of regional administration and other relevant 
stakeholders such as educational institutions. This is an important phase as our experience shows that in case 
of some regions, entrepreneurs would meet with the representatives of their regional authority and 
educational institutions for the first time. Moreover, this phase could be relatively inclusive as the 
participation would not be restrained by a targeted focus on particular industrial branch. Thus, the quality of 
informal institutions could be enhanced significantly by such an approach.   Nevertheless, such relatively 
broadly conceived policy platform can represent a basis, upon which in due time more 
thematically/sectorally focused platforms could emerge. Therefore, before launching entrepreneurial 
discovery process as envisaged by the EC Guide for RIS3 (Foray et al, 2012), such an approach might help 
to form at least a basic form of partnership, which existence in all regions is far from pre-given, should not 
be skipped.   
Consequently, from a more conceptual point of view, in case of regions with less developed research and 
innovation system, two adjustments of RIS3 approach should be made. First, in addition to priorities, that 
are representing “tough” or “smart” choices made on the basis of bottom-up process reflecting availability of 
critical size and other factors as required by the EC RIS3 Guide, a special form of “horizontal” priorities 
should be introduced as well. Second, it will be argued below that the “vertical priorities” should be 
distinguished from “domains of possible economic specialisation” offering market niches with high value-
added as envisaged by Foray et al (2012).  
Let first turn to the horizontal priorities. While the EC Guide conceptualises horizontal priorities primarily 
as “the diffusion and/or application of Key Enabling Technologies” and only subsequently as “aspects 
related to social innovation, or the financing of the growth of newly established companies…”  (Foray et al, 
2012, p.51) we argue for a different definition of these priorities for the sake of regions with less developed 
research and innovation systems.  
In our view, in case of regions with less developed research and innovation systems, horizontal priorities 
should be conceptualised as cross-cutting priorities aiming at strengthening the overall institutional 
environment and innovation system (at either national or regional level or both). Thus the role of horizontal 
priorities would rest in fixing of at least the main bottlenecks in formal and informal institutional framework 
in both narrow and broad innovation system (for examples of these, see Table 1). It can be reasonable to 
expect, that without addressing at least the most important of these cross-cutting issues, the evolutionary 
trajectory of these regions would be hardly altered. Clearly, identification and reaching of an agreement 
upon the key bottlenecks hindering business activities in the region and, subsequently, discerning a suitable 
solution as well as finding “owner” of this task that would eliminate or mitigate these bottlenecks would 
represent a huge step forward compared to current situation in many of those regions. In particular, such an 
approach would demonstrate esp. to entrepreneurs that the commitment of involved stakeholders by far 
exceeds one-off exercise, which was so far common during the preparation of various strategic documents in 
these regions. Thus, such an approach might stimulate active involvement of entrepreneurs even in cases of 
regions where entrepreneurs are frustrated by underperformance of various public sector institutions and by 
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a chronic lack of practical relevance of various strategic documents (due to their poor strategic vision and 
esp. due to their meagre implementation in practice). Therefore, the quality of informal and perhaps even of 
some formal institutions could be improved by such an approach. However, to deliver such ambitions, also 
the composition of stakeholders for these early phases of entrepreneurial discovery process should be 
considered carefully. This issue will be addressed in a section upon the design of policy platforms.  
Concerning the priorities of perspective economic specialisation, it should be emphasized that there is a 
fundamental difference between relatively broad “vertical” priorities, which were in many countries and 
regions with less developed research and innovation systems so far selected for the sake of fulfilment of 
RIS3 ex-ante conditionality and the new domains of perspective specialisation as foreseen in relevant RIS3 
literature (see e.g. Foray et al, 2011, Foray et al, 2012, McCann, Ortega-Argilés, 2011). While the “vertical” 
priorities were in principle selected by responsible national authorities on the basis of predominately 
quantitative analysis of various statistical data on the level of relatively broad sectors (such as production of 
transport means encompassing automotive and aircraft industries) and them submitted for consultation 
process to businesses, the genuine entrepreneurial discovery process should in principle deal with much 
more fine-grained level of the economy. Consequently, one can argue that even though in most countries 
and regions vertical priorities have been already selected this should be considered rather as a point of 
departure for a much more focused entrepreneurial discovery process than as a final result. In consequence, 
in this type of regions, “vertical” priorities and “domains of perspective economic specialisation” should be 
distinguished carefully and not used interchangeably. Therefore, the main argument here is that the 
challenging process of searching for new domains of specialisation with high value-added cannot start from 
a scratch, but before such an advanced level of sophistication is reached, the effort should focus on 
identification and addressing of at least major deficiencies of systemic nature via horizontal priorities. 
Importantly, this approach would also help to create at least certain level of mutual awareness and of trust 
among stakeholders, i.e. would also enhance the quality of informal institutions. 
Design of policy platforms and of entrepreneurial discovery process in regions with less developed 
research and innovation systems 
From the above described arguments follows a need to propose a more detailed outline for building sound 
entrepreneurial discovery process, including careful selection of stakeholders to ensure truly participatory 
process, which would be really novel for most of the regions with less developed research and innovation 
systems.  
To start with, to facilitate the understanding of policy platforms (or working groups), which might be 
conceived as a prime vehicle for entrepreneurial discovery process, as broader platforms, and not as 
exclusive and narrowly focused groups of entrepreneurs, contemplating a suitable name for these policy 
platforms could be proposed. For example, these platforms might be called “Innovation platforms”, which 
would invoke clearly their mission to all relevant stakeholders and would open the space for interested 
academics as well. In order to facilitate mutual understanding among entrepreneurs, academics, educational 
institutions and public administration and esp. to guarantee “ownership” of identified problems of cross-
cutting nature, such as imperfections of educational system or a need for a more pro-active approach of 
regional government, it is indispensable that the membership of innovation platforms include representatives 
of these spheres as well. Moreover, given the immaturity of cooperative culture in such regions, it seems 
likely that despite all its weaknesses it will be upon the public administration (perhaps with some external 
support from consultants) to initiate setting-up and moderating these innovation platforms at least at the 
early phases of this process. This approach would provide valuable feedbacks to representatives of public 
administration and of educational institutions from the perspective of local entrepreneurs and would exert a 
considerable pressure upon them to deliver what is needed. Thus, there are strong arguments to involve not 
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only entrepreneurs and researchers, but representatives of public administration and education institutions as 
well. It should be underlined, that we are explicitly using the term “educational institutions” instead of 
“higher education institutions” as – according to our experience – among the most pressing problems 
hindering business activities in this type of regions is the lack of qualified labour force not only with tertiary 
education background, but more often with the secondary level education (i.e. qualified workers). 
Consequently, the following sequence of steps towards genuine entrepreneurial discovery process might be 
forwarded for consideration in those regions. First, the effort of stakeholders should focus upon 
identification of key bottlenecks for business and innovation activities (i.e. identification of horizontal 
priorities), agreeing the method for their elimination and assigning the responsibility for accomplishing this 
task. Importantly, this phase should not only result in creation of a common perception of key cross-cutting 
challenges in research and innovation system, but also enhance the mutual knowledge and understanding 
among stakeholders, i.e. informal institutions. Crucially, given the generally poor pace of implementation of 
innovation strategies in these regions, representatives of public sector should guarantee to entrepreneurs and 
academics that this time their inputs would be taken seriously. Therefore, the representatives of public sector 
have to prove that at least some progress in fixing of identified bottlenecks such as adjustment of some of 
formal institutions or improved mode of cooperation between businesses and educational institutions is 
achieved soon.  
Secondly, as one of the key principles driving the preparations of RIS3 strategies should be a thorough 
examination of comparative advantages of individual regions and full acknowledgement of the fact that “one 
size does not fit all” (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2011, Tödtling, Trippl, 2005), a search for comparative 
advantages of the region should be undertaken. Identification of comparative advantages should built-up the 
quality of informal institutions further and would also create a basis for the third step.  
Third, authentic entrepreneurial discovery process should be launched with the envisaged aim to identify 
new market opportunities offering high value-added (i.e. selection and economic exploitation of new market 
niches within broadly conceived vertical priorities that were often selected already at the beginning of the 
RIS3 process by a top-down method). Within this phase, an option of branching of original relatively 
broadly conceived innovation platforms into several more focused ones might be considered. Importantly, 
suitable mix of instruments (hopefully including also novel instruments to avoid “one size fits all” trap in 
case of instruments) should be contemplated and implemented to make maximum use of comparative 
advantages and of discovered market niches. Finally, and fully in line with RIS 3 Guide, this sequence of 
steps should be embedded within adequate monitoring and evaluation systems, which has nowadays became 
a standard requirement, which is, however, rarely delivered properly, at least in this type of regions and 
countries. Therefore, at the moments when particular solutions are being agreed within the innovation 
platforms, suitable milestones or targets should be defined as well.   
Importantly, in countries, which opted for a regional approach towards RIS3 design and implementation or a 
combination of regional and national RIS3 strategies, this policy process should be supported by a suitable 
design of interface among the key stakeholders within the  multi-level governance to ensure that at least the 
most fundamental bottlenecks identified by regional innovation platforms, but hindering the business 
activities from the national level will be addressed by the relevant national authority.  For example, such an 
interface can take the form of the National Coordination Board for RIS3, which membership could inter alia 
consist of representative(s) of regional innovation platforms. Thus, the voice from the regional level would 
gain a hearing at the national level among representatives of relevant national authorities.     
Fundamentally, if such a process is to succeed under immature institutional conditions existing in region 
with less developed research and innovation system, question of leadership of RIS3 and of innovation 
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platforms comes to the fore. In recognition of the fact that public administration suffers from many 
weaknesses and inter alia has, esp. at the regional level, limited or even no competence over businesses in 
many of these regions, it seems desirable to use a pragmatic approach towards the management of the RIS3 
process. Namely, while the public administration has a sort of authority to set-up innovation platforms and 
provide needed organizational backing of the process, it might be reasonable to let a representative of the 
business sector to lead the process as soon as such suitable personality is identified and engaged. Finding 
such a suitable and committed personality that would enjoy respect among key stakeholders is another 
challenge connected with entrepreneurial discovery process.    
Conclusions and future research challenges  
The main argument of this paper rests in assertion that a genuine entrepreneurial discovery process, which 
lies at the heart of RIS3 process, requires a high level of development of both formal and informal 
institutions, while the regions with less developed research and innovation system are typical inter alia by 
underdevelopment of these institutions. Consequently, to mitigate this evident contradiction, an attempt to 
outline a method of building entrepreneurial discovery process in this type of regions has been made.  
In a more conceptual sense, first, it has been argued that in the regions with less developed research and 
innovation system, in addition to R&D&I priorities, the horizontal priorities should be identified as well. In 
these regions, horizontal priorities should be conceived as cross-cutting priorities focused on elimination of 
key bottlenecks within the emerging innovation systems of these regions (i.e. low level of mutual knowledge 
and of mutual understanding among key stakeholders, inadequate educational system, improper legal 
framework etc.). Consequently, it has been argued that one-sided stress upon “smart choices” without 
enhancing the overall research and innovation system by horizontal priorities is not likely to deliver the 
foreseen benefits of RIS3 process, i.e. opening of new opportunities with high value-added and creation of 
better jobs.  
Second, given the frequently broadly conceived “vertical” priorities that have been selected so far in many 
of these regions and countries, these “vertical” priorities should be carefully distinguished from “domains of 
perspective specialisation” which should offer high value-added in newly discovered market niches (Foray 
et al, 2012). The “vertical” priorities were in principle selected by responsible national authorities on the 
basis of predominately quantitative analysis of various statistical data often at the level of broad sectors. In 
contrast, the genuine entrepreneurial discovery process should in principle deal with much more fine-grained 
level of the economy. Therefore, vertical priorities that have been already selected within the RIS3 process 
should be considered rather as a point of departure for a more focused entrepreneurial discovery process 
than as a sort of final result.  
Therefore, in practical terms, and with special regard to imperfections within both formal and informal 
institutions in this type of regions, the process of building of entrepreneurial discovery process has been 
elaborated. To start with, given limited level of mutual understanding among key stakeholders or even 
contradictions and cleavages among them, it has been proposed to avoid conception of policy platform (or 
better innovation platforms) not as exclusive and narrowly focused groups of entrepreneurs searching 
primarily for new market niches, but as broader platforms encompassing also academics and, crucially, 
representatives of public administration, who might often be in charge of fixing various imperfections, esp. 
within formal institutions.  
In reflection to specific institutional features, but also with regard to specifics in economic structure of these 
regions, the following sequence of steps towards authentic entrepreneurial discovery process has been 
proposed: i) identification of key bottlenecks for business and innovation activity (i.e. identification of 
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horizontal priorities) and agreeing the method for their elimination and assigning the responsibility for 
accomplishing this task, ii) searching for comparative advantages of the region, iii) launching 
entrepreneurial discovery process with the envisaged aim to identify new market opportunities offering high 
value-added (i.e. selection and economic exploitation of new market niches within broadly conceived 
vertical priorities that were often selected already at the beginning of the RIS3 process).      
Finally, two points for a possible future research agenda could be suggested. First, while it has been widely 
acknowledged that different types of imperfect regional innovation systems exist (see Tödtling, Trippl, 
2005), little effort has been devoted to designing novel specific instruments and their particular mixes to 
address these special challenges more adequately. Consequently, while the concept “one size does not fit 
all” has been widely accepted in the sphere of design of regional and innovation strategies, the evolution of 
particular instruments addressing specific needs lags behind significantly. In consequence, even though 
nowadays the strategic focus of various documents does differ already, similar set of instruments is being 
used to deliver these differing objectives across various regions and countries. Therefore, there seems to be a 
strong case for development of new policy instruments that would be able to address specific issues. One of 
possible vehicles for such a mission can be a properly designed and managed entrepreneurial discovery 
process, which could help to identify real roots of the problems and, consequently, could forward suitable 
novel solution(s) and instruments.   
Second, within the regional research, an important gap exists, namely, the detailed understanding of the role 
of various types of institutions in regional development is missing. Moreover, even the methodology for a 
suitable form of institutional analysis seems to be lacking. Therefore, much deeper understanding on the role 
of both formal and informal institutions as well as of organizational set-up in regional development is 
needed. Consequently, addressing these questions becomes an urgent research agenda for the future.     
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Reconciling territorial strategies goals and means: towards smart competitiveness 
policies 
 
Edurne Magro and Claire Nauwelaers 
Abstract: This chapter aims to shed light on two concepts that both literature and practice have been using 
in parallel: territorial strategy and competitiveness policies. We analyse the link between them and how a 
possible disconnection might lead to problems in territorial strategy implementation. This implementation 
should not be considered a stage in a linear model, but an interactive space in which dialogue takes place 
among different actors. The chapter aims to deepen understanding of competitiveness policies and their 
complexity. The analysis highlights the wide policy and instrument portfolio that current policy-makers have 
to deal with, and its implications for instrument choice. Policy complexity leads to challenges for territorial 
strategy implementation as there is not an optimum recipe and policy-mix for each territory. The policy mix 
has to be adapted and aligned to strategic goals, which pleads for policy intelligence, coordination and 
coherence.  
 
Introduction  
Faced with the lasting impacts of the financial crisis, adding to pre-existing structural weaknesses, European 
economies, and regions in particular, face the need to deploy new policies to enhance their competitiveness. 
In this perspective, new strategies and new policies are being designed across the European Union, notably 
within the context of EU Cohesion policy which is currently placing a greater emphasis on growth-oriented 
strategies. 
However, while a lot of efforts are being devoted to draw strategies including new visions and goals, many 
policies are not yet delivering the intended results. This chapter investigates a problem that lies behind this 
challenge: the disconnection between strategy and policy in general, and between territorial strategy and 
competitiveness policy in particular. As has been highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3, strategy is about setting 
goals and directions. Public policy on the other hand is about deploying public means to serve the strategy, 
and the risk is that the latter is not thought and implemented in line with the former. This chapter discusses 
how to ensure that such a link is effective. For doing so, it is structured as follows. 
Section 1 discusses differences and convergence between the concepts of strategy and policy and their 
application to territorial strategy. In essence, policy, deployed by governments, should serve strategy, which 
is the product of stakeholders’ interactions. Effective implementation requires an alignment between 
strategic goals and policy means. When it comes to territorial strategies a wide range of “competitiveness 
policies” are relevant. 
Section 2 investigates the rationales and components of policies for territorial strategy. Policies serving 
territorial strategies are place-based, focused on innovation and founded on a mix of “market and systems 
failure” rationales, with a greater emphasis on the latter. They are complex policies and the paper analyses 
several dimensions of complexity, due to: the widening and deepening of innovation policy; the multi-level 
and multi-layer dimensions of policy; and the diversity of policy instruments. We introduce the policy mix 
idea that calls for balance and synergies between individual policy instruments. Policy typologies are 
proposed to provide a broader picture of all policy instruments at play, something that is not easy in a 
fragmented policy environment. The discussion highlights the diversity in policy responses to strategies.  
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The conclusions focus on policy learning: this is needed to create the “missing link” between strategy and 
policy. There is no optimal policy mix but only one that is adapted to the strategic goals: the design of this 
mix needs to be based on robust evidence and requires enhanced capacities for policy-makers. 
What is the link between territorial strategy and competitiveness policy? 
Over the last years there has increasingly been an adoption of the notion of strategy as a substitute for the 
policy concept. Evidence for this can be found in European Commission documents and policies, such as the 
Europe 2020 growth strategy or the recent work on Regional Innovation Strategies, which goes from the 
initial innovation strategies (RIS) to the concept of research and innovation for smart specialisation 
strategies (RIS3). However, a clear understanding of the differences between strategy at any territorial level 
and public policy is still missing, both in the literature and in practice. Indeed, smart specialisation strategies 
have been understood by a wide range of scholars and policy-makers as a new generation of innovation 
policies which aim at affecting not only the intensity of innovation but also the direction of innovation 
efforts. That means that regions should focus not only on increasing R&D or innovation rates generally, but 
also prioritise the areas with the largest potential for innovation. We argue in this chapter that strategy and 
policies are different concepts but should be interlinked for an effective strategy-making process.  
Similarities and differences between territorial strategy and public policy 
Territorial strategy has borrowed concepts from the business field (Aranguren et al., 2012; Navarro et al., 
2014; and see also the three preceding chapters in this book), where the concept of policies refers to the 
guidelines and limits that help align the organization to reach strategic goals and objectives (Mintzberg and 
Quinn, 1991). Policies provide top-down guidance about how things should be done and facilitate strategy 
implementation (Thompson et al., 2008). Thus in both business and public policy fields, policies are there to 
serve a strategy. 
Public policy has been traditionally defined as the actions that governments take to reach certain goals 
(Howlett et al., 2009). From this definition differences and convergences between public policy and 
territorial strategy can be discussed. It will be shown that while the two concepts are different in theory, they 
tend to converge in practice. 
First of all, public policy has government as a key actor while territorial strategies involve a wider set of 
actors. Although there is a clear recognition of the importance of involving other actors in the different 
phases of the policy-making cycle, decisions on public policy are made by government (state, regional, local 
government) (Howlett et al., 2009). On the other hand, territorial strategy includes government strategy or 
positioning but also includes other intended and realized strategies embedded in the territory (i.e. individual 
firms’ strategies, knowledge infrastructures strategies’, etc.) (Mintzberg, 2000; Aranguren et al., 2012). In 
some specific strategies such as the smart specialisation strategies, government is seen as a facilitator or 
orchestrator of territorial strategies (Foray et al., 2012), and has a key role in the strategic process. The wider 
recognition in the policy literature of the role of other stakeholders in policy-making processes brings the 
two concepts of policy and strategy closer to each other. In fact, policy actors, policy systems or policy 
universes are terms used that broaden participation in the policy-making process beyond government 
(Howlett et al., 2009; Flanagan et al., 2011). This gives complexity to implementation due to lack of 
communication between actors involved in strategy and actors involved in policy. 
Secondly, both concepts include an agenda or goals setting phase, but their orientation can be interpreted 
differently. Whereas public policy goals have traditionally focused on a problem-solving framework 
(associated either to market or systemic failures or problems) (Howlett et al., 2009) and therefore respond to 
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certain rationales, strategic goals can be understood as the translation of the territorial vision, based on 
territorial assets. Therefore, territorial strategies might put more emphasis on reinforcing strengths and less 
on solving problems: this implies a proactive role for the government as it acts as catalyser of a vision, and 
not only reacts when a problem is already visible. However, these two approaches converge in practice as 
policy could also both target problems and strengthen assets of a territory. 
Another key characteristic in which territorial strategy differs from public policy in principle is the 
importance given to specific place or context. Whereas territorial strategy is place- and context-specific, we 
can distinguish between two types of public policy: the ones that are neutral from a territorial point of view - 
spatially blind policies - and those that take into account the territory in which they act - place-based 
policies (Barca, 2011; Rodriguez-Pose, 2011; Mc-Cann and Ortega-Argilés, 2013). These last types of 
policies are therefore closer to territorial strategy, as they consider that places really matter for regional 
growth and development (Mc-Cann and Ortega-Argilés, 2013). There is a consensus in the innovation 
systems literature that territory or place matters: public policy has to be context specific, i.e. there is not a 
single policy recipe (one size doesn’t fit all) for all territories (even at the same level, such as regions). The 
place-based policy approach has similarities to territorial strategies, leading to blurred boundaries between 
strategy and policy. The whole generation of regional innovation policies and strategies that both the 
literature and EU and OECD have been promoting belong to these last types of policies.  
Another difference between the two concepts is that strategy defines goals while policy defines means. 
According to Porter (1996) and Navarro et al., (2014), strategy is mainly a prioritization issue. It implies a 
basis on territorial assets but also taking into consideration weaknesses or problems. Policy is also related to 
choices or options, but these relate to the instruments or tools that could contribute to solve a specific policy 
problem and/or reach a specific goal (Howlett et al., 2009). But here too there is convergence between the 
two concepts: instruments are related to choices because public policy should be aligned to territorial 
strategy (Aranguren et al., 2012) and deploy means to serve it. Indeed, public policy can be understood as 
one of the possible means or instruments employed for implementing and operationalising territorial 
strategy. However, these are only one of the possible means that a territory has, and it is directly related to 
the role of government in territorial strategy, which is not the sole role that can be identified within a 
territorial strategy, as mentioned before. Other means could also include actions realized by private actors – 
or “private policies” – within a territory, which also constitute an important part of the strategy and need to 
be collectively articulated. Thus territorial strategies can be seen as the articulation of aims and objectives 
from a variety of private and public actors (Sugden and Wilson, 2002) where public policies are 
government’s means to implement these strategies. 
In the public policy case the main means are policy instruments or tools that are usually defined as “(T)he 
actual means and or devices governments have at their disposal for implementing policies, and among 
which they must select in formulating a policy” (Howlett et al., 2009), but also as the “techniques of 
governance that, one way of another, involve the utilization of state authority or its conscious limitation” 
(Howlett, 2005). While the former definition shows a more instrumental way of understanding tools, the 
latter demonstrates that instruments and tools could be broadly understood and incorporates governance 
elements in them.  
To conclude, territorial strategy and public policy can be understood differently but they show overlaps or 
similarities that blur the boundaries between the two concepts (Table 5.1). Moreover, when territorial 
strategy refers to government strategy and does not include other actors’ strategies the overlaps are even 
bigger and therefore, strategy could be considered as a new generation of public policy and some of the key 
characteristics and elements would be therefore common to both strategy and policy. Strategy could be 
defined as “a guiding pattern for the everflowing stream of single actions” (Sotarauta, 2004: 16) and 
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therefore is considered as an “umbrella” while policy often refers to delivering concrete actions or 
programmes.   
<TABLE 5.1 HERE> 
Territorial strategy and public policy: the implementation question 
The above discussion makes clear that public policy and territorial strategy are not the same concepts and 
that, in fact, policies are one, and maybe the most important means for operationalising territorial strategy. 
From this, it is important to understand what is meant by implementation in both concepts and which the 
main challenges are that both face with regard to implementation.  
It is common to divide territorial strategy into several phases in the public policy cycle. These phases go 
from strategy design to implementation and evaluation, as in public policy literature. However, we argue 
that it is inaccurate to consider strategy or policy as linear processes: they should rather be seen as 
continuous or evolving processes in which some elements are continuously reconsidered. 
The linear conceptualisation of strategy is usually linked to the classical approach of strategy (Mintzberg, 
2000). According to Whittington (2001) this approach is rooted in planning and therefore several phases 
could be defined. First of all, there is a formulation stage, result from a conscious planning process. Action 
is not taking during this phase, and it is assumed that action and implementation will follow when the 
strategy is formulated (Mintzberg, 2000). There is no specific interest on how this implementation is carried 
out as theoretically this approach considers that implementation will succeed if planning or strategy 
formulation is well done. However, territorial strategy implementation is not an easy task, as it is not only a 
government duty but implies involvement of several actors of the territory (Sotarauta, 2004). Strategy 
implementation following the classical approach may fail as it is difficult to operationalise strategic thinking 
into concrete or operative actions as a consequence of the separation of these two stages and the lack of 
communication between people involved in these two tasks (Mintzberg, 2000; Sotarauta, 2004). Within this 
approach, evaluation and monitoring is not stressed out as an important phase.  
In the non-linear view in contrast, strategy is seen as a “communicative process, in which different aims and 
strategies of many actors are reconciled and various interests balanced and touching-points and concreted 
means between many objectives are constantly looked for and coordinated (…) (Sotarauta, 2004). 
Here design and implementation are not separated. The linear approach offers analytical tools to strategy but 
lacks continuous communication spaces (beyond the planning phase) in which different actors can reflect, 
negotiate and enter in dialogue within the strategic process (see Chapter 4). In order to reduce the 
implementation gap, learning and communicative processes should take place in a continuous strategic 
process. Therefore a more effective approach to strategy combines analytical tools from the classical school 
and communication spaces (Aranguren et al., 2012). In this interactive approach, there is no clear distinction 
between strategic phases so that the implementation gap in the classical approach is reduced.  
In line with strategy literature, policy theory also considered the implementation phase unproblematic until 
the 1970’s (Howlett el al., 2009). Subsequently there has been a huge debate around two policy 
implementation approaches: top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down approach assumes that 
implementation is effective when the implementation mechanisms are defined from the design stage, while 
the bottom-up approach defends that implementation will be more effective when it takes into account the 
view of the agents that are affected by it. In addition, as Howlett et al. (2009) point out, implementation 
implies decisions dealing with instrument choice, which are intrinsically related to policy design. Policy 
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science literature has evolved and criticised the stages model of policy-making. Therefore, in policy science 
there is also recognition that design and implementation are not separated and that policy-making is an 
interactive process. However, stages models help to simplify the complex reality in which policy-making 
processes are embedded and are a useful tool for policy learning processes (John, 1998). In these models, the 
evaluation stage completes the design and implementation phases and it is recognised as a critical phase for 
policy-learning purposes (Raines, 2002).  
While in strategy development the communicative approach has arisen in opposition to the linear one, in 
policy sciences too there is an increasing recognition of the importance of stakeholders’ involvement in 
policy-making processes. This is especially visible in the design and evaluation phases with the use of more 
participatory approaches in both cases. However, policy implementation still lacks communication spaces 
and is considered in many territories as a mechanical issue in which only officials and policy-makers are 
involved.  
Summarising, implementation in both strategy and policy-making needs to be more connected to design and 
should involve communication, dialogue and participation of actors in the territory. The role of government 
is crucial as it could act as an orchestrator and catalyser of actors’ dialogue in strategy. There is a consensus 
among scholars that strategy and policy-making are not linear processes, which lead to blurred boundaries 
between phases. It is therefore preferable not to see implementation as a separate phase. In this chapter, we 
consider implementation as a concept that refers to the operationalisation of strategy (government-led) and 
leads to policy and policy instruments, and how these are chosen and delivered. In this sense, taking into 
account that strategy and policy are interlinked, we focus on how strategic goals and policy means are 
reconciled.  
Policies for territorial strategy: Policy complexity and policy-mixes 
Given that policy is intrinsically related to territorial strategy when this is led or facilitated by government, it 
is necessary to understand the main policy concepts, which means answering among others the following 
questions: how should policies be articulated to be in line with strategic goals and vision? Which policy 
domains are important for territorial strategy? What are the rationales behind these policies that justify their 
use? What types of policy instruments are the key elements for territorial competitiveness?  
Territorial competitiveness is linked to firms’ behaviour and the political and institutional environment in 
which these firms are embedded, according to evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This theory 
has contributed to literature and policy practices stressing the importance of knowledge and innovation for 
territorial competitiveness. Innovation constitutes therefore a key element that has been articulated through 
different theories, such as the innovation systems theories (national/ regional) (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 
1993) that have been widely adopted in practice among policy-makers. These have led to the emergence of 
innovation policies at many territorial levels, including at regional level, especially among the European 
Union countries (OECD, 2011).  
Innovation policy is not a new concept. The origins of science, technology and innovation policy could be 
found in the Second World War, when some countries such as the United States decided to foster certain 
science fields as a national duty, such as defence or aerospace. The main policy aim was to fast develop 
science and the focus was mainly on scientific infrastructures. This stage of policy evolution, which was 
called policy for science, was followed in the 70’s by a science in policy stage (Gibbons et al., 1994), 
focused on the development of key technologies, taking advantage of the previously established research 
infrastructures. In the 80’s innovation policy came onto the scene along with the theoretical contributions of 
innovation systems theories (Edquist, 2001), and a new interactive conception of innovation. In the last 
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decade, innovation policy has experimented a process of widening and deepening (Borrás, 2009), which can 
be seen both in theory and in practice. Innovation policy widening is reflected by the fact that innovation 
policy is spread over several policy domains and not only confined to science, technology and innovation, 
whereas deepening refers to the sophistication of policy instruments, such as new forms of collaborations, 
partnerships, demand side instruments, etc.. This widening and deepening of innovation policy is at the core 
of the strategies adopted by international organisations, namely the European Union and the OECD 
(European Commission, 2010; and OECD, 2010a). This phenomenon has led to a higher complexity in the 
design of innovation policies, which is also reflected in higher complexity in their implementation. But other 
trends are at play that contribute to the complexity of policy.  
Policy complexity: four dimensions 
Four dimensions of policy complexity can be identified (Borrás, 2009; Flanagan et al., 2011; Magro and 
Wilson, 2013; Magro et al., 2014): a) the widening and deepening of certain policy domains, such as 
innovation; b) multi-level governance, c) multi-layer context and d) policy-mix concept. These four 
elements are present in competitiveness policies and impact on territorial strategy.  
Other policy domains beyond innovation policies stricto sensu are related to territorial competitiveness: e.g. 
internationalisation, cluster and entrepreneurship policy. Given the widening and deepening of innovation 
policies, most of them, and especially cluster and entrepreneurship policies, could be considered (and are in 
practice) included or closely related to innovation policy.  
Both innovation policy and cluster policy are policies that share the common objectives of enhancing 
productivity and innovation-driven strategies for competitiveness and fostering regional development 
(Ketels et al., 2013). Although there is a broad literature stream that focuses on the specificities of clusters 
and cluster policy (Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2008; Uyarra and Ramlogan, 2012; Ketels, 2013; Aranguren 
and Wilson, 2013), it is also acknowledged that cluster policy could be considered as a demand side tool for 
fostering an interactive and systemic type of innovation (Georghiou et al., 2003; Edler and Georghiou, 
2007). 
Entrepreneurship policy is another policy domain that could be individually analysed or either included in a 
broader concept of innovation, if we consider that corporate entrepreneurship is one of the possible 
innovation outputs within firms, as well as being part of context conditions for innovation. Therefore, while 
recognising its specificities, entrepreneurship policy shares innovation policy groundings. 
Although it might seem that internationalisation and innovation in firms are disconnected issues, some 
studies have demonstrated that innovative firms have a greater internationalisation activity, while the 
contrary effect does not seem to happen. That is to say, innovation and exports activities in firms are related 
but only in one direction as firms do not experiment a learning-by exporting that leads to innovations 
(Monreal-Pérez et al., 2012). This implies that exports do not lead to a learning process and innovation but 
innovative firms tend to export more. Other studies have put in evidence a correlation between 
internationalisation and the type of innovation profile of firms: high-profile science- and research-based 
innovators tend to display higher internationalisation rates than low profile innovators (Peeters et al., 2004). 
Summarising, innovation policy, understood in a broad and wide sense is the key policy area for territorial 
competitiveness, but due to this broadness it brings complexity to the policy-making process.    
The second dimension that gives complexity to policy is multi-level governance. This is a key issue 
especially for regions or sub-national units, as it refers to the situation in which, due to processes of both 
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decentralisation and devolution, a given territory could be impacted by policies administered at different 
levels (Magro and Wilson, 2013; OECD, 2011). This gives complexity to policy-making processes and 
poses challenges to government and policy-makers that should set their own strategy and policies taking into 
account the ones that are also being put in place by other territorial levels. This leads to greater challenges in 
policy coordination (Magro et al., 2014).  
The third dimension that gives complexity to policy-making processes is the existence, at each territorial 
level, of different policy layers (OECD, 1991; Boekholt et al., 2002; Lindner, 2012): political, 
administrative and operative. According to Magro et al. (2014), the political layer (governmental bodies) is 
in charge of policy definition and priority setting; the administrative layer is in charge of policy 
implementation and management of programs and instruments (research councils, public agencies, etc…); 
and the operational layer includes ‘performing’ actors involved in the translation of policy priorities into 
concrete action (firms, knowledge infrastructures, investors, etc.). This distribution of actors in different 
layers in a given territory or policy system does not facilitate the connectedness and dialogue among all the 
actors in view of reaching a communicative strategic and policy-making process. This poses, once again, 
challenges to strategic and policy coordination, in order to avoid misalignment between strategic goals and 
policy means.  
Finally, probably the most important dimension of complexity relates to the policy mix concept. Policy mix 
has become a fashionable concept in the innovation policy debate in the last years (Nauwelaers et al., 2009; 
OECD; 2010b; Flanagan et al., 2011; Borrás and Edquist, 2013; Magro and Wilson, 2013). However, it is a 
concept that was already used and applied to other policy fields and policy studies in general. Its origin 
could be dated in Mundell’s (1962) contributions on the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy and 
it is also a term that can be found in public policy literature (Howlett et al., 2009).  
The policy mix concept reflects the complexity of instrument choice in public policy. Policy mix refers to 
the combination of instruments a government implements to respond to a specific problem or rationale. It is 
a useful concept to understand innovation policy complexity as it reflects both processes of widening and 
deepening referred to before and their implications for implementation. 
A useful definition of policy mix is the one provided in Nauwelaers et al., (2009) referring to policy-mix for 
R&D, which defines the term as the combination of policy instruments, which interact to influence the 
quantity and quality of R&D investments in public and private sectors. Taking into account that policies for 
competitiveness might include other non-innovation related domains and instruments, such as infrastructures 
and taxation, we could define the policy mix for competitiveness as the combination of instruments that 
might alter the competitiveness conditions and/or performance of a territory. Most of them will target 
innovation but others belong to other policy domains and impact on territorial competitiveness. 
The policy mix concept embodies the idea of interactions between different instruments from different 
policies. These interactions might bring positive, negative or neutral effects but in any case these have to be 
taken into account in the policy-making process, leading to higher complexity. These interactions come from 
the combination of different instruments, corresponding to different types of policies responding to different 
rationales. These elements and their implications for policy implementation in territorial strategy are further 
explained below. 
Rationales for competitiveness policies 
Rationales in economic theory are defined as the theoretical justification for government intervention. Two 
approaches are commonly used to justify policy intervention: neoclassical and evolutionary-systemic theory. 
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They often appear as contradictory and mutually exclusive arguments but in practice those rationales coexist 
in policy mixes or combination of instruments (Flanagan et al., 2011; Magro and Wilson, 2013).  
In a neoclassical approach policy intervention can only be justified when market failures appear. 
Neoclassical theory assumes that markets are perfect, and any imperfections are labelled as market failures. 
These market failures could be a justification for innovation policy as well as for other policies important for 
territorial competitiveness. The most common market failures are information asymmetries, externalities and 
appropriability, indivisibilities (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz, 1989). Other failures corresponding to this approach 
include more strategic questions and link to “infant industry” justifications: strategic trade, competition 
policy and national missions (Niosi, 2010; Dasgupta , 1987). 
Market failure arguments underpin some policy interventions in the policy fields related to territorial 
competitiveness, such as Science, Technology and Innovation policy, internationalisation or cluster policy. 
In the first case, technology and innovation are made of knowledge and therefore uncertainty and 
appropriability failures might appear as an inherent result of such innovation process. Internationalization 
policy might rely on information asymmetries and the uncertainty derived from those asymmetries as well as 
indivisibilities associated to the size needed to start internationalization activities. In addition, other policies 
important for territorial competitiveness, such as cluster policy also might respond to market failures such as 
externalities, and appropriability justifies government’s intervention towards the promotion of firm 
agglomerations or clusters.   
The neoclassical approach has been the main theory for justifying government intervention until the last 
decades, especially since the 90s, when evolutionary and systemic approaches came into scene. In 
evolutionary theory learning plays a key role and therefore this approach pays attention to learning processes 
that take place within different types of actors: public and private.  
In the evolutionary approach the key idea is that innovation is a collective action and the focus lies on the 
cognitive capabilities of the actors and on the key role of institutions in promoting interactions among actors 
in a system in order to facilitate collective learning. The systemic approach thus breaks with the linearity of 
neoclassical approaches and recognizes the importance of (national and regional) territorial systems for 
innovation (Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 1993). The regional approach for innovation is widely referred to by 
policy makers in Europe. It acknowledges that the firm cannot have all the knowledge needed to innovate in-
house, and maintains that therefore connections with other agents, such as knowledge actors, should be 
promoted. In the same line, other SME-related policies, such as internationalization or cluster policies are 
based on these systemic rationales, especially those instruments associated to the promotion of firm 
agglomerations or alliances for certain activities such as internationalization, diversification or training. 
Within this approach, proximity gains relevance as partnerships and agglomeration effects might be more 
effective in geographical proximity and therefore regional policy plays a key role in these policy fields.  
There are several classifications of systemic failures for innovation policy and some of them specifically 
directed to regional policy (Smith, 2000; Edquist, 2001; Laranja et al., 2008; Chaminade et al., 2009; 
Malerba, 2010), but there is not a general consensus about which are the main systemic failures. Chaminade 
et al. (2009) distinguish between failures regarding the components of the system (lack of or failures of 
components) such as knowledge infrastructures or firms, and failures regarding inter-linkages among these 
components. The most common failures that justify government intervention under this approach are 
network problems, institutional problems, transition or lock-in problems and learning problems.  
In spite of the acceptance of theoretical rationales that justify policy intervention, in public policy literature 
this is considered as a deductive approach (Howlett, 2005), which has been rejected by policy scientists. 
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These argue that theory rationales are not based on what policy-makers and politicians really do. 
Practitioners base their decisions on multiple factors, including political factors, context related factors, and 
decisions taken in the past. That leads to a situation where policy rationales (inductive approach) do not fit 
with theory rationales (Mytelka and Smith, 2002; Flanagan et al., 2011). This would lead to challenges in 
policy implementation due to the different interpretation of rationales and policy goals from different policy 
actors and therefore strategic alignment would be affected. 
Competitiveness policy typology  
Several typologies of policies for competitiveness can be established that are useful to understand their 
contribution to strategy according to different criteria.  
The first criterion is related to policy rationales. We distinguish between policies responding to market or 
systemic failures. Traditionally we can find in the literature the distinction made by Ergas (1987) between 
mission-oriented policies and diffusion-oriented policies. The former are characterised by high R&D 
investments in a few key technologies in an early development of the sector life-cycle, whereas the latter 
give emphasis to promoting cooperation among actors within a scientific and technology system. At first 
sight, mission-oriented policies could seem closer to neoclassical approaches and diffusion oriented policies 
to evolutionary-systemic approaches (Cartner and Pyka, 2001; Bach and Matt, 2002). However, both types 
of policies are also recognised by the evolutionary theory (Niosi, 2010). Mission-oriented policies do not 
only respond to neoclassical failures as its fundamentals are also based on looking for international strategic 
leadership (Ergas, 1987). Additionally, although these policies are focused on a few technologies, these 
could constitute the basis for developing cognitive capabilities and knowledge in firms, which is closer to an 
evolutionary framework (Bach and Matt, 2002). 
Both mission-oriented and diffusion-oriented policies target the two different types of priorities set out in 
Chapter 2: thematic priorities and structural/functional priorities (Gassler et al., 2004; Navarro et al., 2014). 
The former refers to S&T areas, activities or industries that are crucial for territorial development and 
competitiveness, whereas the latter are related to the systemic failures or problems the policy wants to 
overcome. In a strategy it is important to have a combination of both thematic (vertical) and functional 
(horizontal) policy as they have different aims. In the regional innovation systems approach, there was a 
prioritisation of horizontal policies, which are useful for “building the system” but the lack of vertical 
priorities has been one of the weaknesses that smart specialisation strategies are trying to overcome. Smart 
specialisation strategies give emphasis to the combination of types of policies, assuring that it is not only 
important to affect the innovation climate (for example by promoting R&D investment), but also to alter the 
direction of innovation (i.e. subsidising research centres oriented to biosciences) in a certain region or 
territory.  
For example, in a less-developed territory in which there is lack of knowledge infrastructures, policies 
directed to build the innovation system would have to be stressed over policies oriented towards certain 
activities, such as cluster policies or mission-oriented policies. This is the option taken for example in the 
Czech Republic smart specialisation strategy, which combines horizontal priorities to support the innovation 
system as a whole with vertical priorities that are domains with growth potential and specific assets in the 
country. Examples of policies in the first group include the introduction of pro-innovation support schemes 
to strengthen cooperation between research organizations and the corporate sector (innovation vouchers, 
mobility support schemes between the triple-helix spheres, technology transfer) and human capital 
enhancement and accumulation specifically in technical fields. Examples of supported domains in the 
second group include transport, engineering industries, ICT and automation and health care instrumentation. 
In contrast, in a more advanced region such as Flanders, the focus of the smart specialisation strategy is 
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more heavily on vertical themes, such as “nanotechnology for health” and “sustainable chemistry”, as the 
infrastructure is already well developed. 
Some authors (Gassler et al., 2008; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012) have been referring to this 
phenomenon as a return to the so called mission-oriented policies, the “new mission oriented policies”. 
However, more than new mission oriented policies, these policies do not deny inputs from previous streams 
and combine them into a new approach. In smart specialisation strategies, for example, it is common to find 
references to selecting and promoting activities in a region (vertical/thematic priorities), which are related to 
mission-oriented policies, but also towards capacity building (horizontal/functional priorities), which are 
closer to evolutionary-systemic approaches.  
Another interesting classification of policies is the ones that follow the narrower view of “one policy - one 
domain” or that takes into consideration that one policy might be influenced by several domains (broader 
view). If we take the innovation policy case, the narrower view would consider Science, Technology and 
Innovation policy domains (Lundvall and Borrás, 2005) as the only relevant ones for policy intervention in 
these areas. The broader view considers that innovation policy is a systemic and holistic policy framework 
that might affect and be affected by interventions that traditionally “belong” to other policy domains, which 
was called “third generation innovation policy” (Remoe, 2008). In this case it implies recognising that a 
huge range of policy fields in a certain territory influence the direction of innovation and therefore territorial 
competitiveness. This not only happens in the innovation field, as it has been characterised by some authors 
such as Nauwelaers et al. (2009), but it is something that it is also applicable to other policies which are 
highly relevant for territorial competitiveness, such as education policies, environmental policies or 
internationalisation policies.  
This broader view gives complexity to the strategic process at all stages, but especially at implementation 
and evaluation stages. Practitioners acknowledge the need for an integrated and holistic view for setting a 
strategic vision or objectives and even for policy design, according to the settled strategic objectives. 
Governments have started to include all departments or ministries in their agenda setting and even other 
actors and stakeholders from the territory are included in this task. However, one of the most common 
mistakes is to leave implementation (and also evaluation) in each of the ministries’ or departments’ duties, 
assuming that it is a straightforward task. Therefore it is common to find situations in which strategies and 
policies are defined and discussed following a broad and holistic view but then, the actions and policy 
implementation is left to officials from different domains, without putting in place the corresponding 
coordination mechanisms needed across the different layers (political and administrative) and domains. In 
the following table there is an attempt to classify key policies for territorial competitiveness directed towards 
thematic or functional priorities in different policy domains.  
<TABLE 5.2 HERE> 
In addition to these distinctions, policies can be categorised according to their target group. Here, we can 
distinguish among framework policies, mixed policies or blanket policies (Lipsey and Carlaw, 1998). 
Framework policies are horizontal policies with no specific target group, mixed policies are directed to a 
certain technology or industry and blanket policies are a hybrid type from the previous types and are 
directed to a specific group of firms. 
Types of instruments for competitiveness policy 
Several taxonomies of policy instruments have been proposed, either from the public policies perspective or 
specific for innovation policies.  
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Some of the most known approaches in public policy literature differentiate between regulatory, economic 
or financial instruments and soft instruments (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 2003, Borrás 2009). Regulatory 
instruments refer to law and binding regulations such as the regulation of intellectual property rights or 
competition policy, etc. Economic and financial instruments are the most commonly implemented in some 
policy arenas such as Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (Borrás; 2009). Examples of those 
instruments are tax incentives, grants, loans, etc. In addition to these, soft instruments are characterised by 
being voluntary and non-coercive measures and provide information, recommendations and offer contractual 
agreements: the most commonly used are the international or national standards, partnership agreements, 
public communications, etc..  
Another useful classification is the one provided by Howlett (2005), who classifies policy tools into two 
types. The first is composed of the substantive instruments, which are those that affect the nature, types, 
quantities and distribution of goods and services (loans, grants, regulation, etc.) and the second is procedural 
instruments (treaties and political agreements). The most interesting assumption in this approach is that 
these two types do not constitute a dichotomy of policy instruments but tend to be implemented together 
(Howlett, 2005). Several policy tools classifications are adapted to the specific policy arenas of Science, 
Technology and Innovation (STI) policy or to specific policy levels (i.e. regional level). In the STI policy 
field Georghiou et al. (2003) and Edler and Georghiou (2007) provide a taxonomy, which differentiates 
between supply side instruments (grants for R&D; tax incentives, support to research infrastructures) and 
demand side instruments such as innovative public procurement. In fact, this is a simplistic picture as there 
are some instruments, such as cluster policies, that can work on both the supply and demand side, which 
have been called in the literature as systemic instruments (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). A more extended 
typology is the one provided by the European Commission (2013), which gives an exhaustive list of policy 
instruments according to different policy objectives. Additionally, we can mention the categories provided 
by the OECD (2011) and Foray et al. (2012) referring to STI policy or strategy field at regional level. These 
include traditional (i.e. R&D grants), emerging (i.e. vouchers) and experimental instruments (i.e. cross 
border research centres).  
The distinction between policies oriented to firms or policies oriented to the system made by Nauwelaers 
and Wintjes (2002) is also useful. It is important, first, to have a clear view on the target group of the policy 
in order to choose the relevant policy instruments and second to assess whether there is a gap in terms of 
instruments and policies as it would be necessary to include both types of measures for implementing a 
territorial strategy. This typology can be combined with one that distinguishes orientations as focusing either 
on thematic or vertical priorities, on the one hand or on horizontal or functional priorities, on the other hand, 
as mentioned in the previous section (see Table 5.3).  
<TABLE 5.3 HERE> 
Policy mix composition and instruments choice 
A lot of documents and guides are available, that provide insights on menus of instruments governments can 
choose from for designing policy mixes (OECD, 2011; European Commission, 2012, European 
Commission, 2013). However, these do not solve the issue of instrument choice, i.e. which combination of 
instruments might be most effective for solving certain problems or rationales.  
One reason for this is that instrument choice is context specific and therefore it is impossible to give a recipe 
applicable for all territories (one size does not fit all). For example, establishing technology centres in less 
developed regions including only firms with little absorptive capacity for new technology might result in 
“cathedrals in the desert” rather than in the creation of growth poles. Likewise, the creation of hubs for 
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creative entrepreneurs in e-mobile business is a good instrument in Estonia which is booming with such new 
entrepreneurs and provides a favourable demand context for such innovations, but such hubs might remain 
empty houses in more traditional environments which lack such dynamisms and openness to new ICT 
applications.   
Another reason is that one instrument might be responding to different failures. For example, the creation of 
cluster associations in order to promote cooperation within a sector responds to both market and systemic 
failures as its aim is to overcome networking failures or problems but also externalities failures. The same 
would happen with R&D subsidies to collaborative projects that respond both to market failures 
(indivisibilities, uncertainties and externalities) and system failures (networking failures). Therefore, it is not 
possible to assign one instrument to a specific type of failure or problem. This goes in line with the argument 
that alternative instruments could be employed to achieve the same objective (Landry and Varone, 2005; 
Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2003). However, we can also find some instruments that try to overcome only one 
type of failures, as for example tax incentives to R&D, which are only related to market failures.   
There may be a good understanding on the functioning of individual policy instruments from a technical 
point of view, but it is often forgotten that instrument choice takes place in a certain political context and 
therefore, the best technical solution might not be the optimum from a political point of view (Peters, 2005). 
For example, cross-border applied research centres are being established between Flanders and the 
neighbouring Dutch region, but such an initiative is much more difficult to implement between Belgian 
regions, where the political context does not favour such cooperation. 
In addition to this, there are other important factors that affect instrument choice. Path dependence is one of 
them, and it refers to the importance of past decisions in the present ones. Path dependence affects public 
policy processes in general, and instrument choice in particular, as it is a source of continuity of some policy 
instruments whatever the goals of public policy of strategy are. However, path dependency can also be a 
source of change in institutional context, as Martin (2010) and Valdaliso et al. (2014) argue. In this 
literature, path dependence is seen as a source of change, especially through three different mechanisms: 
layering (creation of new rules, instruments or actors, which are added to the old ones), conversion 
(reorientation of an existing institution towards new roles) and recombination (new institutions and 
organizations are introduced while old ones are removed from the system). The first two are responsible of 
incremental changes in a system, while the last one is more related to radical breakthrough. These three 
mechanisms are applicable also to instrument choice.  
Another important factor that Peters (2005) highlights is legitimacy. Some instruments are more legitimate 
in some territories than in others, which is also a sign of how much context matters and how this affects 
instrument choice. An example of this can be seen in Europe where vouchers or innovative public 
procurement are instruments more commonly accepted in Northern and Central than in Southern countries. 
Other dimensions important for instrument choice might include economic factors (for example, in budget 
constraint situations or financial crises, financial instruments might be restricted), administrative or even 
ethical dimensions (Peters, 2005).  
Given the complexity of policy systems a combination of instruments needs to be designed to form a policy 
mix. There is no best instrument for each situation, problem and context but a search for an effective 
combination of instruments (Peters, 2005). Hence, it is not only difficult to provide guidelines for individual 
instrument choice, but also almost impossible to provide recipes for policy mix choice (Nauwelaers et al., 
2014). In fact in a recent study made by the European Commission (2013), there is recognition that there is 
not an optimum policy mix model.  
Conclusions 
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Territorial strategy and public policy are different concepts that are often mixed and used interchangeably, 
both in literature and practice. Even if their definition and conceptual backgrounds differ, in practice the 
boundaries between the two concepts are sometimes fuzzy. In a nutshell, public policy is there to serve 
strategy and therefore is one of the possible means to reach the strategic goals and vision set for a territory. 
Territorial strategy relies on individual strategies of a range of actors. If these are disconnected there is no 
“territorial strategy”: a strategy exists when the various agendas/strategies are put in synergy. Working 
towards such synergies is a key role of the public actor as orchestrator, not top-down organizer. In addition, 
public policies are to provide the right incentives and correct the market and systemic failures that act as 
barriers to the achievement of a territorial strategy once it is emerging.  
Most of the literature and documents studying strategy have a stronger focus on their design, assuming that a 
good design will lead to a straightforward implementation and therefore, policies defined and implemented 
to reach the strategic goals will be perfectly aligned with them. This is not the reality due to several reasons 
and challenges, which we have tried to identify alongside this chapter, all of them related to complexity. 
Competitiveness policies (the ones more influential to territorial competitiveness and strategy) are complex, 
both in their definition (rationales, domains and instruments) and in their governance. In this last issue, 
complexity is seen, not only in the different levels under which policies are administered, but what it is more 
important for strategic purpose’s, policies are designed and implemented by different and usually 
disconnected policy actors (at different layers). Therefore, one of the main challenges that governments have 
to face is how to establish communication spaces to better align public policy and strategy. 
The missing link between strategies and policies consists in “goal-oriented” policy mixes, i.e. sets of 
interacting instruments which together are able to influence conditions and actors in a territory, to reach the 
goal of the strategy. 
Taking a policy mix approach implies combining different types of policies, covering horizontal and vertical 
priorities, involving several levels and layers of government, following different theoretical rationales, 
which might be seen by some practitioners and academics as contradictory. In addition, policy path 
dependency and inertia make the change in instruments difficult and leads to greater challenges to manage 
policy mixes associated to specific strategic goals. Hence it is important to include evaluation tools and 
exercises in the design and implementation of strategies and policies as they will help to assess the 
complementary effects of all types of policies and will provide policy intelligence into the process, a theme 
that is taken up in the next chapter. 
Government capacities and capabilities to overcome these challenges is the key issue for providing policy 
and strategy coherence. In addition, it is also necessary to see implementation and policies not at stages 
following policy design but as integral components of the whole strategic process. 
In conclusion, to tackle the implementation gap between strategy and policy, there is a need for more 
communication, more coherence and more coordination. 
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Table 5.1. Main elements in territorial strategy and public policy  
Territorial strategy Public policy 
Strategic goals based on territorial assets 
and problem-solving 
Goals oriented towards problem-solving and 
assets exploitation 
Government as one of the actors Government as the main actor 
Territory oriented It can be place-blind 
Based on strategic choices Based on policy options 
Policies as one of the possible means Instruments as means 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Table 5.2. Policy domains and instruments for territorial strategy 
Policy domains Thematic priorities Functional priorities 
Innovation 
Domain 
Sectoral innovation 
policies 
Strategic Innovation 
Arenas 
General innovation 
policies (direct 
business innovation 
support, innovation 
vouchers schemes, 
etc..) 
Science and 
Technology 
domain 
Sectoral and GPT 
based policies, 
including support to 
certain sectoral 
oriented research 
centres, such as 
competence centres.  
Human resources 
policies related to 
science 
Science and 
Technology policy 
(funding of basic 
science and 
technology 
infrastructures 
(science and 
technology parks, 
etc..) 
 
Industrial domain Cluster policies Human resources 
policies related to 
industry 
Internationalisation 
policies 
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Financial domain   Macroeconomic 
policies 
Fiscal policies 
Source: Own  elaboration based on Nauwelaers et al. (2009).  
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Table 5.3. Examples of policy instruments according priorities and level of support 
Target of support  Thematic priorities Functional priorities 
Firm oriented R&D grants for firms 
in specific sectors 
Investment in 
sectoral-based 
knowledge 
infrastructures 
Public procurement 
for innovation 
focused on specific 
sectors 
 
Training and mobility 
programmes  
Science parks 
Incubators 
Innovation Vouchers 
 
System oriented Cooperative schemes 
research-industry  
Cluster policies 
Network policies 
Training and mobility 
programmes between 
industry and 
academia 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Nauwelaers and Wintjes (2002). 
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Evaluating territorial strategies 
Edurne Magro and James R. Wilson 
 
Abstract: While there is a strong relationship between policy evaluation and strategy evaluation, they are 
not the same thing. This chapter bridges the gap between the acknowledgement that evaluation should play 
an important strategic intelligence role in territorial strategy processes, and the practice that policy 
evaluations tend to remain isolated and not well-linked to the strategy process at territorial level. It brings 
analysis of current state-of-the-art in competitiveness policy evaluation to reflect on the evaluation 
requirements of the ‘what for’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions that a territorial strategy should answer. This 
leads to a proposed ‘territorial strategy evaluation framework’ that is learning centred. The framework 
makes a clear distinction between evaluation at different levels (strategy and policy) and emphasizes the 
powerful learning possibilities that lie between the two levels. A change in paradigm is required such that 
evaluations cease to be static pieces of information about individual policies’ effectiveness, and become 
integrated, dynamic learning processes which tie together competitiveness policies and territorial strategies. 
 
Introduction 
The monitoring and evaluation of public policies has garnered increasing attention over recent years for two 
fundamentally different reasons. Most obviously, the scarcity of public resources characterizing many 
economies since the 1997 financial crisis has provided a strong stimulus for public administrations to ask 
more searching questions around their policies. As such, policy-makers increasingly need to justify the 
impacts or ‘return on investment’ of the policies that they implement to ensure future funding in an era of 
austerity. Alongside these concrete pressures, however, there has been a second less obvious force at work 
in pushing forward the evaluation agenda. This concerns the centrality of evaluation for processes of policy 
learning. While the two are of course related – evaluation for accountability purposes can also help us learn 
about policy – a policy learning imperative takes us in a different direction. In particular, in the systemic 
context in which today’s public policies are designed and implemented the boundaries between policy-
makers and policy-recipients are increasingly fuzzy.
i
 Thus in referring to policy learning it is not only the 
so-called policy-makers who are the focus of this learning, but rather the whole collective of stakeholders in 
the policy process (Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2008). In this context it is widely 
recognized that monitoring and evaluation can play a critical role in fostering learning as an integral and 
ongoing part of the policy process (Sanderson, 2002; Howlett et al., 2009; Aranguren et al., 2013; Aragón et 
al., 2014). 
Unsurprisingly there is also strong acknowledgement that evaluation should play an important role in 
territorial strategies for shaping competitiveness. In the European context, for example, the European 
Regional Development Fund has played a role in spreading monitoring practices among the regions, and the 
combination of ‘monitoring and evaluation’ are explicitly recognized by Foray et al. (2012) as the ‘sixth 
step’ in developing Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation (RIS3). Despite this, it 
remains the case that evaluation is something that is spoken about a lot, and with great agreement on its 
importance, but actually done very little. Combining this with the rapid translation into practice of the smart 
specialization concept, we shouldn’t be surprised that there is very little research on how territorial strategies 
should be evaluated in practice. While it is logical to argue that a core part of any strategy should be the 
mechanisms that enable evaluation of its success (or not) and facilitate learning to generate improvements, 
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we need to understand more about the type of monitoring and evaluation that is most appropriate for 
territorial strategies. Indeed, as highlighted in previous chapters in this book, much of the novelty in the 
current focus on territorial strategy is based on the underlying processes of entrepreneurial discovery that 
might lead to better ways of prioritizing certain activities over others. This would suggest a priori an 
evaluation focus that is dynamic rather than static, that is learning-focused, and that can therefore contribute 
to and help shape these underlying processes. 
While there is a strong relationship between policy evaluation and strategy evaluation, they are not the same 
thing. As suggested by Magro and Nauwelaers in the previous Chapter, territorial competitiveness strategy 
can be seen as a framework for guiding overall direction, within which policies and policy mixes are 
designed and implemented to give impetus to that direction. In the European context, therefore, the key 
relationship is between research and innovation strategies at territorial level (RIS3) and the mix of science, 
technology and innovation policies that are implemented within the territory (the ‘policy mix’ step in Foray 
et al., 2012). It is this relationship that is our focus in this Chapter. In particular, we aim to bridge the gap 
between acknowledgements that evaluation should play an important strategic intelligence role in territorial 
strategy processes, and the practice that policy evaluations tend to remain isolated and not well-linked to the 
strategy process at territorial level. Building on analysis of the ‘what’, ‘what for’ and ‘how’ of territorial 
strategy in previous chapters, and in particular on the policy complexity issues raised in the preceding 
chapter, we bring together perspectives on competitiveness policy evaluation, policy learning and 
competitiveness benchmarking. This leads to a learning-centred framework that makes a clear distinction 
between evaluation at different levels (strategy and policy) and emphasizes the powerful learning 
possibilities that can be uncovered through effectively linking these two levels. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next Section we explore the current state-of-art in 
competitiveness policy evaluation, which we argue is characterized today by the need to deal with increasing 
policy complexity and to be learning focused. This leads us in the following Section to explore the 
differences between competitiveness policy evaluation and territorial strategy evaluation with reference to 
the ‘what for’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions that should be answered by a territorial strategy. Building from 
these reflections, we propose an evaluation framework that articulates the relationships between the 
evaluation of territorial strategy and the evaluation of the competitiveness policies designed to give that 
strategy impetus. In the final section we make some concluding comments, highlighting the likely 
challenges in moving towards a coherent and learning-focused evaluation of territorial strategy.   
Competitiveness Policy Evaluation: Complexity and Dynamism 
Public policy in the economic sphere has traditionally been strongly related to the concept of market failure. 
Mainstream economics analysis builds on the seminal work of Arrow and Debreu (1954) in taking as a 
starting assumption the existence of a complete set of perfect markets that will deliver an efficient allocation 
of resources to different activities within the economy. As such, market failure was first defined as “the 
failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain “desirable” activities or to 
stop “undesirable” activities” (Bator, 1958: 351). Under this still-dominant perspective government 
intervention in the economy is seen to be justified only in cases where markets fail to provide an optimal 
outcome, which they may do for a number of reasons including the existence of externalities, public goods, 
indivisibilities, information asymmetries and market (or monopoly) power (Arrow, 1962; Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1986; Tirole, 1988). Furthermore, the notion that governments also fail is widely accepted, 
especially but by no means exclusively in the context of less developed countries (Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990; 
Krueger, 1991). This provides a further caveat to the mainstream view of policy intervention: it should only 
take place when the market fails and the government is capable of improving the situation.
ii
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Unsurprisingly this dominant perspective on the case for government intervention in the economy has 
marked the practice of evaluating public policies for competitiveness. The mainstream focus on ‘failure’ to 
provide an ‘optimal’ outcome has given birth to the neoclassical concept of ‘additionality’, whereby public 
policy interventions are judged on their ‘additional’ effect (in input and/or output) over that which would 
have occurred without the intervention. This approach generally takes place ex-post and with the aim of 
evaluating past interventions in terms of their correction (or not) of a market failure, hence providing 
accountability and supporting long term decision-making around future interventions. Moreover, this focus 
understandably puts a premium on the quantifiable impacts of policy in order to demonstrate additionality, 
and as such evaluations are usually carried out at the level of individual programmes. It commonly results, 
for example, in much-demanded (by politicians) and easy-to-interpret ‘return on investment’ statistics of the 
type: “for each € invested in policy intervention X, the additional impact on Y is …”. 
To give an example from one key area of competitiveness policy, the typical neoclassical rationale for 
innovation policy intervention is rooted in markets failing to provide for optimal knowledge creation given 
externalities and appropriability concerns. Essentially, firms invest less than is optimal for society in R&D 
because they can’t capture all of the societal benefits from their investments, and therefore the associated 
innovation outputs are sub-optimal for society. A common public policy response, therefore, is to intervene 
to correct this failure by boosting firm-level investment in R&D inputs, using instruments such as R&D 
subsidies or tax credits for firms that conduct R&D. This leads to an evaluation of such subsidy or tax credit 
programmes that seek to determine: (i) whether firms have in fact invested more in R&D than they would 
have done without the intervention or whether government spending has in fact ‘crowded out’ existing firm 
spending (input additionality); and (ii) the extent to which the intervention has had an impact on the desired 
innovation outcomes, however these might be measured (output additionality).
iii
 
While these types of programme-based evaluations remain commonplace, there are two important trends 
that have been changing how we approach the evaluation of competitiveness policy: (i) the emergence of 
evolutionary alternatives to the linear, market failure rationales of neoclassical analysis; and (ii) a large 
increase in policy complexity such that competitiveness policies increasingly overlap in rationales, domains, 
space and time. These trends are inter-related, and in combination they provoke challenging technical 
questions for competitiveness policy evaluation as well as suggesting a more fundamental need for 
evaluation to be much more learning focused.  
The rise of evolutionary rationales is closely associated with policy interventions that respond to ‘system 
problems’ inhibiting the creation and transfer of knowledge within ‘innovation systems’ (Metcalfe, 1995; 
Smith, 2000; Edquist, 2001; Laranja et al., 2008).
iv
 This trend has strong relevance for the whole range of 
competitiveness policies given the acknowledged centrality of knowledge and innovation to competitiveness 
and following a broad conception of the innovation system.
v
 Most importantly, however, these rationales 
represent a marked difference from the linearity of neoclassical rationales for policy intervention in that they 
are not concerned with reaching an ‘optimum state’ in terms of an input and/or output. Rather they are based 
on the centrality of system relationships for innovation and economic development, and the possibility that 
there are barriers to the flourishing of such relationships that justify policy support. As such they don’t 
replace neoclassical rationales based on market failure, but have emerged alongside them in a ‘policy mix’ 
(Flanagan et al., 2011). Indeed, the policy complexity highlighted by Magro and Nauwelaers in the previous 
chapter is a result of this process, combined with others such as the increasing significance of multiple 
geographical scales of policy governance and multiple operational layers of policy decision-making (Magro 
and Wilson, 2013; Magro et al., 2014).  
In terms of implications for the evaluation of competitiveness policies, the emergence of new policy 
rationales has necessitated the application of different techniques. While traditional quantitative evaluation 
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tools easily fit rationales that are relatively linear, they are more difficult to apply to systemic innovation 
policies due to the difficulty of capturing complex cause-effect relationships and intangible benefits. As a 
consequence ‘softer’ policies such as networking or cluster policies have tended to be approached using 
qualitative, case-based analysis (Aranguren et al., 2008; Borras and Tsagdis, 2008; Konstantynova and 
Wilson, 2014; Pitelis et al., 2006). 
There have also been more fundamental changes in approach to evaluation associated with the emergence of 
new concepts. In particular, different approximations of additionality have emerged to reflect the changes in 
behaviour among agents in a system that policies under evolutionary rationales are trying to provoke. 
Commonly grouped together under the broad concept of ‘behavioural additionality’ (Buisseret et al., 1995), 
several different interpretations have been employed, ranging from an extension of input additionality to 
cover scale, scope, acceleration and the like, to changes in the general conduct of the firm (Gok and Edler, 
2012). While the growing use of this concept, particularly in the innovation policy field, demonstrates the 
importance being attached to understanding and measuring the changes in behaviour sought by today’s 
competitiveness policies, Gok and Edler (2012) maintain that it remains a fuzzy concept with both 
theoretical and methodological shortcomings. In particular, their analysis of its use in a large number of 
innovation policy evaluations finds that “the methods used are not appropriate and the multiple dimensions 
of behaviour and the cascade effects of changes in behaviour on innovation performance and management 
more generally are not conceptualised” (ibid.: 315).  
This fuzziness and these methodological challenges are unsurprising given that when policy seeks explicitly 
to change certain types of behaviour in a systemic context, the necessary engagement between the policy 
and the agents of the system fundamentally blurs the line between policy and its evaluation. As Arnold 
(2004: 14) suggests, “evaluation, like the policy-making process, becomes increasingly evolutionary, no 
longer seeking an overall optimum” and “in a certain sense less rigorous (because it is less complete) as we 
move to higher levels”.  
Today’s evaluation challenges are also accentuated by the fact that policy systems typically include both 
neoclassical and systemic instruments targeted at the same group of agents; for example, targeted R&D 
subsidies alongside generic networking or cluster policies. Thus an overall understanding of the functioning 
of the policy system requires the integration of different approaches to additionality (input, output and 
behavioural). This implies both an underlying approach that appreciates the systemic context of innovation 
policy, alongside a triangulation of the evaluation methods appropriate for different elements of the policy 
mix (Diez, 2002; Magro, 2012; Aranguren et al., 2014). In this regard there is emerging consensus on the 
need for better understanding of policy interactions and their impacts, through for example systemic 
evaluations (Arnold, 2004; Molas-Gallart and Davies, 2006; Edler et al., 2008). Magro and Wilson (2013), 
for example, propose an evaluation mix protocol as a series of steps designed to take on board the different 
elements of complexity in arriving at a connected set of evaluations. 
In summary, we find ourselves at an interesting juncture in the evaluation of competitiveness policies. 
Increasing demand for evaluation is emerging at a time when there is also increasing policy complexity that 
makes evaluation more challenging. In this context evaluations are evolving from being static pieces of 
information about individual policies’ effectiveness towards being integrated, dynamic learning processes 
which themselves interact with policy-making practices.
vi
 In the next Section we turn to consider how this 
scenario relates to the challenges of evaluating territorial strategies.  
From Policy Evaluation to Strategy Evaluation: Exploring the Differences 
As argued in the previous chapter of this book, strategy and policy are not the same. While strategy concerns 
the goals and vision of a territory, public policy is an important means to support that strategy and arrive at 
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those goals. There should therefore be a strong link between them, although in practice there is often either a 
disconnection or an unconscious assumption that both concepts are the same. When thinking about the 
evaluation of territorial strategy, therefore, we should expect differences with respect to the evaluation of 
competitiveness policy, but we should also expect them to be interconnected. To understand this relationship 
it is useful to turn to the general framework introduced and deepened in the preceding chapters, which 
conceives territorial strategy with respect to three core questions: ‘what for’; ‘what’; and ‘how’. We can ask 
ourselves how evaluation relates to each of these questions, with the aim of drawing a picture of the 
relevance of evaluation to territorial strategy as a whole.  
Evaluating the ‘what for’ 
The first of these questions, the ‘what for’, must be at the core of territorial strategy evaluation because it 
represents the ultimate goals of the strategy. If a territory is not progressing towards these ultimate goals, 
then what value does the strategy have? In Chapter 2 Ketels talks about the ambition of the region as akin to 
the ambition of the firm in the business strategy literature. In the regional context he associates this with 
creating an environment in which citizens can be prosperous and companies can successfully compete, and 
he suggests that this should be context-specific, not simply reflecting an average European ambition, for 
example. We would strongly echo this. The ‘what for’ of a territorial strategy must be context specific 
because it should reflect the underlying socioeconomic development objectives of the people within a 
territory; if not then resulting processes and activities will move the territory in an erroneous direction, 
generating socially inefficient outcomes (Sugden and Wilson, 2002; Bailey et al., 2006). These objectives 
are likely to be multiple and to be slowly evolving over time, and while they will have many common 
elements it is impossible to imagine that they will be the same across different territories. In this sense the 
very notion of the ‘prosperity’ or ‘type of competitiveness’ sought will differ from place to place (Branston 
et al., 2006; Wilson, 2008).  
Given the balance of different objectives likely to characterise the desired development of a territory, 
evaluating the ‘what for’ of the strategy is very much related to the concept of competitiveness 
benchmarking, which typically takes on board a range of different elements (Niosi, 2002; Iurcovich et al., 
2006). In this sense there are essentially three benchmarking approaches that could be followed by a 
territory seeking to evaluate how well it is progressing towards the objectives of its strategy (Edquist, 2008; 
Navarro et al., 2014). First of all, the territory can be compared to itself over time, tracking the evolution of 
a set of indicators that reflect the ‘what for’ of the strategy. Secondly, the performance of the territory in this 
set of indicators can be compared with a set of specific targets that the strategy establishes as part of its 
ambition. Finally, progress in this set of indicators can be compared against other territories.  
The latter of these approaches is problematic given the difficulty of finding territories for which it makes 
sense to make such a comparison; i.e. territories that share similar characteristics and that share similar 
strategic goals. Nevertheless, if such comparisons are carried out intelligently, with a careful selection of 
reference regions, then they can offer learning opportunities in terms of identification of competitive 
advantages, mapping of international context, search for examples to learn from or mark a difference from, 
and setting the basis for policy benchmarking (Navarro et al., 2014; Iurcovich et al., 2006). The most 
powerful benchmarking approach for evaluating the ‘what for’ of territorial strategy, however, is likely to be 
a combination of the first two options: a benchmarking of the territory itself over time in indicators that 
reflect defined objectives of the strategy, combined with evaluating the achievement of desired targets 
within the evolution of those indicators.  
Although not linked to an explicit territorial strategy, one of the most striking examples of a self-
benchmarking exercise in areas that explicitly reflect the underlying development aims of a territory can be 
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found in the Canadian Index of Wellbeing (Michalos et al., 2011). This composite index – itself a set of 
composite indices in different domains – was first published in 2011 following over a decade of discussions, 
interaction and research into what really matters to Canadians for their wellbeing.
vii
 It is built around eight 
domains of life (community vitality, democratic engagement, education, environment, healthy populations, 
leisure & culture, living standards and time use), each of which is the subject of detailed analysis resulting in 
a composite indicator that is tracked over time. It purports to ‘measure what matters’ to Canadians and to 
provide evidence to steer Canada in the right direction, and we would suggest that much can be learned for 
territories that are seeking to evaluate progress towards the objectives that mark the ‘what for’ of their 
territorial strategy.   
Evaluating the ‘what’ 
While achieving the ‘what for’ of a strategy must be linked to the overall objectives that a territory seeks to 
move towards, progress in the ‘what’ is fundamentally linked to the policy choices that are made to support 
the priorities (or content) identified and being pursued in that strategy (see Chapters 1 and 4). It must be the 
case therefore, that evaluating the ‘what’ is closely related to ongoing practices of policy evaluation. 
However, one thing is evaluating policies for their own effectiveness, and another is evaluating them in 
terms of their alignment to the content of the strategy that they are supporting (and ultimately linking this to 
the benchmarking of objectives reflected in the ‘what for’ of that strategy). In particular, we need to question 
what the evaluation of policies and their constituent programmes tell us about the ability to support the 
priorities identified in the strategy. How well are they aligned? How can we adjust this alignment? How 
might these policies be interacting with the strategic process, leading to changes in the strategy over time?  
In this sense while evaluating the ‘what for’ is about evaluating (or benchmarking) desired strategy 
outcomes, evaluating the ‘what’ is about evaluating desired policy outcomes, where these policy outcomes 
are linked to the content of the strategy itself. One of the main failures that might occur in strategy 
evaluation is to assume that policies have to be evaluated in terms of their own effectiveness, and forget 
their evaluation in terms of their contribution to the prioritizations identified in the strategy. It is important to 
do both to get a true understanding of whether policies are actually supporting what is set out in the strategy. 
Moreover these two questions should also link back to the evaluation/benchmarking of the ‘what for’, 
because the achievement of desired policy outcomes must ultimately contribute to desired strategy 
outcomes, which themselves may be slowly evolving with the interactions between agents that are part of 
the strategy and policy processes. This complex scenario poses challenges to policy evaluation in two ways. 
First of all, how to evaluate effectiveness alongside alignment, and in an evolving context? Secondly, and 
maybe most challenging, how to ensure that the results of this evaluation feed into the strategic process and 
provide intelligence for the ongoing evolution of the strategy? 
As argued in the previous section, policy evaluation has traditionally taken place for accountability 
purposes, with a strong emphasis on effectiveness and on demonstrating the existence of different types of 
additionality. Without denying that much of this evaluation, such as impact evaluation, might be useful for 
strategic purposes, it is clear that it is not the most adequate for evaluating policy in a dynamic context. In 
particular, to conduct a good impact evaluation it is normally important to consider a time lag between the 
policies implemented and the analysis of the results, especially in areas such as innovation in which results 
take time to flourish. This time lag makes it difficult for impact evaluations to play a role in a strategy that is 
‘alive’ and constantly evolving. While it is not valid to discard such impact evaluations from our 
considerations of how to evaluate territorial strategy – we know that they can provide results that support 
learning both in policy and potentially in strategy – this limitation does mean that we have to be careful in 
how we interpret the results of impact evaluations for a fundamentally dynamic context. In line with our 
arguments in the preceding section, it also suggests that quantitative impact-type evaluations should be 
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complemented with other more qualitative approaches that are more useful in changing contexts. A 
triangulation of evaluation techniques – bringing in case-based analysis and participatory approaches – can 
help to better understand the reasons behind the impacts and to capture the more intangible elements present 
in the policy-strategy interface. 
Participatory approaches are likely to be particularly important in strategy evaluation because they rely on 
the involvement of different stakeholders and as such respond directly to the challenges associated both with 
the alignment of policy to strategy content and with the dynamism of strategic processes. They might be 
applied in a continuous way, and alongside more traditional impact evaluations, in order to conduct a 
continuous policy evaluation that could monitor alignment and feed intelligence on what is working and 
how into the strategy process. This would be a break from much traditional practice, where policy evaluation 
is tended to be seen as a process or a task that involves external experts and programme managers as 
opposed to the whole collective of agents implicated in the policy. As highlighted in Chapter 4 the 
separation between policy-makers and programme managers, for example, might generate an 
implementation gap, and one that is likely to be exacerbated in the case of evaluation given its common 
association with accountability. Participatory approaches can help to reduce this gap by establishing policy 
evaluation as a tool for both policy- but also for strategy- learning, and most importantly as a route to 
understanding the links between them.  
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Evaluating the ‘how’ 
Evaluation of the ‘how’, like the ‘what’, is also strongly linked to policy, given that policy seeks to impact 
on ‘how’ the strategy is developed and articulated as well as the actual substance of the strategy. Most 
critically, and as we have argued when addressing evaluation of the ‘what’, evaluation cannot itself be 
separated from the strategy process. The entrepreneurial discovery process that is at the core of a territorial 
strategy is an alive and evolving process involving a wide range of stakeholders from the so-called 
‘quadruple helix’ of business, government, research and civil society. Through this process the activities that 
form the content of the strategy are first identified, then explored/developed, and then likely altered as new 
knowledge emerges from ongoing interactions. In Chapter 3 of this book Aranguren and Larrea highlight 
three dynamic capabilities that appear critical for this process of developing territorial strategy: capability to 
learn and innovate; capability to generate networks and relationships; and strategic capability for vision 
generation and leadership. This focus in the ‘how’ on learning and relationships (and the vision and 
leadership associated with these) is strongly consistent with the changes in policy evaluation practice that we 
have suggested is starting to take place. As evaluations evolve from being static pieces of information about 
individual policies’ effectiveness towards being integrated, dynamic learning processes which themselves 
interact with policy-making practices, they become more consistent with what is required for the ‘how’ of 
territorial strategy. 
In other words, the question is not really how we should evaluate the ‘how’ of territorial strategy, but rather 
about seeing evaluation as an integral part of that ‘how’. Territorial strategy is not a linear process and in 
consequence evaluation cannot be an after-thought. It has to be integrated in a continuous process that feeds 
the strategy, and in which learning becomes the core element of the evaluation task. But learning about 
what? In the last subsection, we mentioned that learning was important for evaluating the ‘what’ of 
territorial strategy, and mainly we were referring to learning about what has worked and what has not 
worked, in terms of effectiveness, and in terms of the alignment of policy to priorities. This is most closely 
associated with the concepts of input and output additionality. But learning about processes, learning about 
the ‘how’, means going beyond inputs and results, and puts the focus on what happens throughout the 
strategic process in terms of changes in behaviour. It thus implies a greater focus on the concept of 
behavioural additionality, and recourse to qualitative evaluation methods and tools that help us to capture the 
more intangible effects of the strategy process. 
Seeing evaluation as an integral part of ‘how’ a territorial strategy takes place also implies a continuous 
evaluation of the involvement of different agents in the strategy process. This is a very complicated task. 
Even employing the participatory evaluation techniques suggested in the previous sub-section it is almost 
impossible and very time- and cost- inefficient to constantly involve all of the key strategic stakeholders in 
such processes. Moreover, overkill and/or badly organised processes can stifle participation. The key, 
therefore, is in finding the right balance; understanding when and how to involve different agents in 
evaluation exercises; and above all knowing how to combine evaluation with other strategic processes core 
to entrepreneurial discovery so that they fit together in ways that create benefits for participants without 
taking too much time. In this way evaluating the ‘how’ will complement and support the evaluation of the 
‘what for’ and the ‘what’ in a seamless fashion. All of this implies that the best evaluation is not a single 
one, but a combination of evaluating the three elements, which will actively contribute to strategic learning 
processes.  
 
A Learning-Centred Territorial Strategy Evaluation Framework 
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In the previous section we have argued some principles around the evaluation of the different questions of a 
territorial strategy – the ‘what’, the ‘what for’ and the ‘how’ – and suggested the need to integrate these in a 
comprehensive and balanced way. In this section we bring these arguments together in a territorial strategy 
evaluation framework that we propose as useful for understanding the links between the different evaluation 
elements and therefore as a guide for the evaluation of territorial strategies in practice. It is important to 
stress that following the well-accepted principle of territorial policy that “one size does not fit all” (Tödling 
and Trippl, 2005), there is no unique valid recipe for evaluating territorial strategy. What we propose here is 
designed as a guideline for territorial strategy evaluation to be adapted to the specificities of different 
contexts.  
In order to establish a sound evaluation framework that can be adapted to different specific territorial 
realities, it is important to first make some assumptions about the hierarchy of elements that exist within a 
territorial strategy. As illustrated in Figure 5.1 there are four levels that are likely to be important when 
considering how to evaluate territorial strategy.  
[FIGURE 5.1 HERE] 
The top two levels make a subtle distinction between a general strategy and more specific strategies. A 
general strategy is built around the overall ambition of the territory and the corresponding strategic goals. As 
such it reflects what we have talked about above in terms of the ‘what for’ question, the answer to which 
must be in line with the underlying socioeconomic development objectives of the people that live in the 
territory. There is a sense in which this is quite an abstract concept, and in many cases it will be easier to see 
territorial strategy come alive in more specific strategies that focus on certain domains. In the European 
regional context, for example, this is clear in the development of ‘research and innovation strategies for 
smart specialisation’ (RIS3) as promoted by the European Commission, and we can also imagine other 
domains where more specific strategies might be developed (environment, energy or health, for example). 
These specific strategies make concrete the general ambition of the region and corresponding strategic goals 
in certain domains, thus presenting a more focused response to the ‘what for’ question. 
The bottom two levels move into the concrete operational aspects of the territorial strategy process; into the 
‘what’ and the ‘how’ questions. Sitting below the specific strategies are the priorities that are established 
within each strategy; the priorities established within a RIS3, for example. Following Navarro’s analysis in 
Chapter 1, here we can distinguish between vertical priorities (the main economic, technological and 
scientific activities to be prioritised) and horizontal priorities (the capabilities of the territorial system as a 
whole to be prioritised). In both cases, these priorities are related to the ‘what’ question; they refer to the 
content of the strategy. In turn, and following the analysis of Chapter 4, these priorities are normally 
articulated through policy instruments and programmes. We refer to the concrete policy measures that 
support the content of the strategy as the policy-mix. This mix of instruments can be related to both the 
‘what’ and the ‘how’ questions of the territorial strategy. The policy mix must be oriented towards the 
priorities identified in the strategy and therefore aligned with the ‘what’; and the way in which the policy 
mix works in pushing the territories towards these priorities is a core element of the ‘how’.viii  
Having established this hierarchy of elements we can draw a clearer picture of how the different evaluation 
principles discussed above might fit together in working towards a holistic evaluation of a territorial 
strategy. Figure 5.2 sets out our proposed framework. Following from the discussion of the previous sections 
the central concept is learning. In particular we distinguish two types of learning: learning at the strategy 
level, or strategy learning; and learning at the policy level, or policy learning. Each of these types of 
learning is closely linked with a certain type of evaluation (strategy evaluation and policy evaluation), 
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although the most critical element of the framework concerns the links between these two levels of 
evaluation and learning.  
[FIGURE 5.2 HERE] 
The strategy evaluation at the top of the framework refers essentially to the ‘what for’ of the strategy; to 
understanding whether the territory is moving towards its underlying socioeconomic development 
objectives. The policy evaluation at the bottom of the framework refers both to the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of 
the strategy; to understanding the workings of the policy mix that is being employed to give impetus to the 
direction of the strategy. As such, strategy evaluation relies on the benchmarking techniques discussed in the 
previous section; on identifying a set of indicators that best reflect the underlying objectives of the general 
strategy and/or of the specific strategies, and benchmarking these over time (and potentially also in 
comparison with others where relevant comparators can be found). In contrast, policy evaluation relies on 
the triangulation of techniques identified as important in previous sections; on weaving together quantitative 
studies geared at evaluating different types of additionality (input, output, behavioural), with other methods 
(case-based, participatory, meta-evaluations) better suited to understanding certain more intangible elements 
and/or capable of bringing a more systemic and dynamic perspective to understanding the policy mix.   
The key contribution of this framework, however, is to emphasize the link between these two levels of 
evaluation, in what we have termed adequacy evaluation. This refers to the need to understand on the one 
hand how well the policy mix is aligned with both the content and the objectives of the strategy; and on the 
other hand how this policy mix interacts with the evolution of the content and objectives of the strategy over 
time. As such it brings together the ‘what for’, the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ and constitutes the central arena for 
learning in the territorial evaluation sphere.  
While strategy evaluation in isolation can lead to some strategy learning, this will be limited to learning 
around whether or not the territory is progressing towards its objectives; not how this is happening. 
Likewise, while policy evaluation in isolation can lead to some policy learning, this will be limited to 
understanding the policies in their own right and at most how different policies interact among themselves; 
not how they are contributing to the strategy of the territory, and how the evolving strategy in turn shapes 
them. Bringing the two together unlocks a powerful new level of both strategy and policy learning. Based 
fundamentally on participative stakeholder processes that are built around inputs from policy and strategy 
evaluation (with the potential to also inject external knowledge through, for example, peer-review 
processes), adequacy evaluation brings dynamism in evaluation to what we have argued is a fundamentally 
dynamic territorial strategy process. As such it boosts our understanding of the interactions between the 
policy mix (the ‘how), the development of the content of the strategy (the ‘what’) and progress towards the 
underlying aims of the strategy (the ‘what for’). Indeed, we suggest that recognising the need for processes 
that support such adequacy evaluation, and experimenting with them so as to tie together strategy learning 
and policy learning, represents the key challenge for evaluating territorial strategies.    
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have sought to bridge the gap between the acknowledgement that evaluation should play 
an important strategic intelligence role in the territorial strategy processes that are so en vogue today, and the 
practice that policy evaluations tend to remain isolated and not well-linked to the strategy process at 
territorial level. Policy evaluation in the innovation field, for example, typically focuses on the evaluation of 
specific policies per se, or at most their combination in a policy mix. Evaluating territorial strategies, 
however, implies more than the evaluation of the effectiveness of policy portfolios; these are just one part of 
the territorial strategy process and must fit together with the content of the strategy and the objectives of the 
strategy, both of which are evolving over time.    
 50 
Rooted in an analysis of the state-of-the-art in competitiveness policy evaluation, our proposed framework 
has identified what we call adequacy evaluation as a critical gap between the fairly prevalent practices of 
competitiveness policy evaluation and strategy benchmarking. Most territories already evaluate some of the 
policies that are put in place to boost competitiveness, and most also carry out some form of benchmarking 
of their progress with respect to a set of core socioeconomic outcomes. On the one hand we are suggesting 
here that improvements are necessary in each of these to make them more suitable for serving the dynamic, 
evolving, stakeholder-centred discovery processes that are at the core of a territorial strategy. But most 
critically we are suggesting that they need to be woven together in order to unleash a new set of learning 
possibilities in the context of the territorial strategy process. 
In making these arguments, however, it is important to recognise the limitations of evaluation, which apply 
equally to strategy as they do to policy or to any other process. In particular, often the desire for a perfect 
answer is simply unrealistic. Rigorously carrying out a full range of impact evaluations or establishing an 
ideal set of socioeconomic indicators that reflect the objectives of the territory require large amounts of 
resources, and in many cases a partial coverage or imperfect analysis is the best that can be hoped for. 
Likewise, the processes that we have highlighted in this chapter as critical for linking together policy and 
strategy evaluation and generating powerful new learning opportunities require the ongoing involvement and 
time of many stakeholders.  
Just as prioritisation is a core principle of territorial strategy, therefore, evaluation of territorial strategy also 
requires prioritisation. It is impossible to do everything. In this sense we suggest that our territorial strategy 
evaluation framework, and the arguments contained in this chapter, can help in supporting this prioritisation 
and finding an appropriate balance in each specific case. It is important to understand when and how to 
involve different agents in evaluation exercises and here many synergies are possible with other strategic 
processes that are core to territorial entrepreneurial discovery processes. The key is in seeing evaluation as 
an integral part of the strategic process at the territorial level. Rather than putting all of our evaluation focus 
on impact studies or on benchmarking, for example, this means prioritising elements of adequacy evaluation 
alongside these often existing elements.   
 
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported by the Basque Government Department of Education, Language and Culture under 
Grant number IT629-13; and by the European Commission (FP7 SSH.2012.1.1-3) under Grant number 
320131. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
 
References 
Aragón, C., Aranguren, M-J., Iturrioz, C. and Wilson, J. R. (2014). ‘A Social Capital Approach for Network 
Policy Learning: The Case of an Established Cluster Initiative’, European Urban and Regional 
Studies, 21(1): 128-145.  
Aranguren, M-J., De La Maza, X., Parrilli, M. D. and Wilson, J. R. (2014). ‘Nested Methodological 
Approaches for Cluster Policy Evaluation: An Application to the Basque Country’, Regional Studies, 
forthcoming: DOI:10.1080/00343404.2012.750423. 
 
Aranguren, M-J., Iturrioz, C. and Wilson, J. R. (2008) Networks, Governance and Economic Development. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 51 
 
Aranguren, M-J., Magro, E., and Wilson, J. R. (2013). ‘La evaluación como herramienta para transformar 
las políticas de competitividad’, Economía Industrial, 387: 159-168. 
 
Arnold, E. (2004). ‘Evaluating research and innovation policy: A systems world needs systems evaluations’, 
Research Evaluation, 13(1): 3-17. 
 
Arrow, K. (1962). ‘The Economic Implications of Learning-by-Doing.’, Review of Economic Studies, 
XXIX(June): 155-173. 
 
Arrow, K. J., and Debreu, G. (1954). ‘Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy’, 
Econometrica, 22(3): 265-290. 
 
Bach, L., and Matt, M. (2002). ‘Rationale for science & technology policy’, in L. Georghiou, J. Rigby & and 
H. Cameron (Eds.) Assessing the Socio-Economic Impacts of the Framework Programme (ASIF), 
Report to European Commission DG Research. 
 
Bailey, D., De Propris, L., Sugden, R., and Wilson, J. R. (2006). ‘Public policy for economic 
competitiveness: An analytical framework and a research agenda’, International Review of Applied 
Economics, 20(5): 555-572. 
 
Bator, F. M. (1958). ‘The anatomy of market failure’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72(3): 351-379. 
 
Bennett, C. J., and Howlett, M. (1992). ‘The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy learning and 
policy change’, Policy Sciences, 25(3): 275-294. 
 
Borrás, S., and Tsagdis, D. (2008). Cluster Policies in Europe: Firms, institutions and governance. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Branston, J. R., Tomlinson, P. R., and Wilson, J. R. (2012). ‘“Strategic Failure” in the Financial Sector: A 
Policy View’, International Journal of the Economics of Business, 19(2): 233-25. 
 
Branston, J. R., Rubini, L., Sugden, R., and Wilson, J. R. (2006). ‘The Healthy Development of Economies: 
A Strategic Framework for Competitiveness in the Health Industry’, Review of Social Economy, 
LXIV: 3, 301-329.  
 
Buisseret, T. J., Cameron, H. M., and Georghiou, L. (1995). ‘What difference does it make - Additionality in 
the public support of R&D in large firms’, International Journal of Technology Management, 10: 
587–600. 
 
Cerulli, G. and Potí, B. (2008). ‘Evaluating the effect of public subsidies on firm R&D activity: An 
application to Italy using the Community Innovation Survey’, CERIS-CNR Working Paper No. 9 / 
2008, Rome: CERIS-CNR.  
 
Chen, H-T. (1990). Theory-Driven Evaluations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
 52 
Chen, H-T. and Rossi, P. H. (1983). ‘Evaluating with sense: The theory-driven approach’, Evaluation 
Review, 7(3): 283-302. 
 
Datta-Chaudhuri, M. (1990). ‘Market failure and government failure’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
4(3): 25-39. 
 
Edler, J., Ebersberger, B.,  and Lo, V. (2008) ‘Improving policy understanding by means of secondary 
analyses of policy evaluation’, Research Evaluation, 17(3): 175-186. 
 
Edquist, C. (2001). ‘Innovation policy – a systemic approach’, in D. Archibugi and A. A. Lundvall (Eds.) 
The Globalizing Learning Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Edquist, C. (2008). ‘Design of Innovation Policy through Diagnostic Analysis: Identification of Systemic 
Problems (or Failures)’, CIRCLE Electronic Working Paper 2008/06. Lund: Lund University. 
 
Flanagan, K., Uyarra, E., and Laranja, M. (2011). ‘Reconceptualising the ‘policy mix’ for innovation’, 
Research Policy, 40: 702-713. 
 
Foray, D., Goddard, J., Goenaga Beldarrain, X., Landabaso, M., McCann, P., Morgan, K., Nauwelaers, C., 
and Ortega-Argilés, R. (2012). Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation, 
Brussels: European Commission. 
 
Gok, A., and Edler, J. (2012). ‘The use of behavioural additionality in innovation policy making’, Research 
Evaluation, 21(4): 306-318. 
 
Greenwald, B., and Stiglitz, J. (1986). ‘Externalities in economies with imperfect information and 
incomplete markets’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(2): 229-264. 
 
Howlett, M., Ramesh, M., and Perl, A. (2009). Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles & Policy Subsystems, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (third edition). 
 
Iurcovich, L., Komninos, N., Reid, A., Heydebreck, P., and Pierrakis, Y. (2006). Blueprint for Regional 
Innovation Benchmarking. Mutual Learning Platform. Regional Benchmarking Report. 
 
Klette, T. J., Moen, J., and Griliches, Z. (2000). ‘Do subsidies to commercial R&D reduce market failures? 
Microeconomic evaluation studies’, Research Policy, 29: 471-495. 
 
Konstantynova, A., and Wilson, J. R. (2014). ‘Comparing cluster policies: An analytical framework’, 
Orkestra Working Paper No. 2014-R01, San Sebastian: Orkestra.  
 
Krueger, A. O. (1991). ‘Government failures in development’, NBER Working Paper No. 3340, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: NBER.  
 
Laranja, M., Uyarra, E., and Flanagan, K. (2008). ‘Policies for science, technology and innovation: 
Translating rationales into regional policies in a multi-level setting’, Research Policy, 37(5): 823-835. 
 
 53 
Lundvall, B-A. (2007). ‘Innovation system research: Where it came from and where it might go’, Globelics 
Working Paper Series, No. 2007-01, www.globelics.org.   
 
Magro, E. (2012). Evaluation in a systemic world: The role of regional science and technology policy. PhD 
thesis, University of Deusto. 
 
Magro, E., Navarro, M., and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, J. M. (2014). ‘Coordination-mix: The hidden face of 
STI policy’, Review of Policy Research, 31(5), pp. 367-389. 
 
Magro, E., and Wilson, J. R. (2013). ‘Complex innovation policy systems: Towards an evaluation mix’, 
Research Policy, 42: 1647-1656. 
 
Metcalfe, J. S. (1995). ‘Technology systems and technology policy in an evolutionary framework’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19(1): 25–46. 
 
Michalos, A.C., Smale, B., Labonté, R., Muharjarine, N., Scott, K., Moore, K., Swystun, L., Holden, B., 
Bernardin, H., Dunning, B., Graham, P., Guhn, M., Gadermann, A.M., Zumbo, B.D., Morgan, A., 
Brooker, A.S., and Hyman, I. (2011). The Canadian Index of Wellbeing. Technical Report 1.0., 
Waterloo, Ontario: Canadian Index of Wellbeing and University of Waterloo. 
 
Molas-Gallart, J., and Davies, A. (2006) ‘Toward theory-led evaluation: The experience of European 
science, technology and innovation policies’, American Journal of Evaluation, 27(1), 64-82.  
 
Nauwelaers, C., and Wintjes, R. (2008). ‘Innovation policy, innovation in policy: policy learning within and 
across systems and clusters’, in C. Nauwelaers, and R. Wintjes (eds.), Innovation policy in Europe: 
Measurement and strategy. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. 
 
Navarro, M., Gibaja, J., Franco, S., Murciego, A., Gianelle, C., Hegyi, F. B., and Kleibrink, A. (2014). 
‘Regional benchmarking in the smart specialization process: Identification of reference regions based 
on structural similarity’, S3 Working Paper Series No. 03/2014, Seville: European Commission, Joint 
Research Centre. 
 
Niosi, J. (2002). ‘National Systems of innovations are “x-efficient” (and x-efective). Why some are slow 
learners’. Research Policy 31: 291-302. 
 
Pawson, R., and Tilley, N. (1997). Realistic Evaluation. London: Sage. 
 
Pitelis, C., Sugden, R., and Wilson, J. R. (2006). Clusters and globalisation: The development of urban and 
regional economies. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Sanderson, I. (2002). ‘Evaluation, policy learning and evidence-based policy making’, Public 
Administration, 80(1): 1-22.  
 
Smith, K. (2000). ‘Innovation as a systemic phenomenon: Rethinking the role of policy’, Enterprise and 
Innovation Management Studies, 1(1): 73-102. 
 
 54 
Streicher, G., Schibany, A., and Gretzmacher, N. (2004). ‘Input additionality effects of R&D subsidies in 
Austria’, Vienna: Austrian Institute for Economic Research (WIFO). 
 
Sugden, R., and Wilson, J. R. (2002). ‘Economic development in the shadow of the consensus: A strategic 
decision-making approach’, Contributions to Political Economy, 21: 111-134. 
 
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organisation, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Todlting, F., and Trippl, M. (2005). ‘One size fits all? Towards a differentiated regional innovation policy 
approach’, Research Policy, 34(8): 1203-1219. 
 
Wilson, J. R. (2008). ‘Territorial competitiveness and development policy’, Orkestra Working Paper No. 
2008-02, San Sebastian: Orkestra.  
  
 
  
 55 
Figure 5.1. Hierarchy of elements in territorial strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration. 
Figure 5.2. Evaluation framework for territorial strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration. 
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1. The Rationale for Results-Oriented Policies 
Recent years have seen a burgeoning of analysis focused on the role played by institutional and governance issues in 
shaping economic and social behaviour. The work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Rodrik (2007, 2014) 
amongst others has heavily influenced contemporary thinking regarding the nature of economic policy, its 
possibilities and limitations. Much of the analysis has focused on understanding how the behaviour of elites and the 
ways in which institutional ‘insiders’ are typically driven by their wish to capture policy-related rents. In particular, 
much research focuses on the ways in which the behaviour of elites and powerful interest groups can shape, alter, 
distort, oppose or even subvert the policy context (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). The rise in awareness of the role 
played by these complex governance (rather than simply government) issues has lead to a re-thinking of many 
aspects of contemporary industry policy debates.  
 
One of these aspects which has undergone significant rethinking concerns the case for multi-level governance 
activities. In order to be effective, a policy such as regional policy necessarily involves multiple partners operating at 
different spatial scales and different hierarchical jurisdictions. Finding ways to build complementarities between 
different policy arenas is essential and in the case of regional policy there are many arguments which suggest that it 
is at the local and regional levels where such complementarities can best be built (OECD 2011). Yet, mobilising 
different stakeholders in order to build such complementarities is a complex challenge, and requires a consideration 
of the various incentives mechanisms operating. Policy agendas such as smart specialisation face these challenges.  
 
Another issue concerns the role of ideas and narratives. In order to overcome institutional opposition and rent 
seeking it is necessary to develop a concept or idea whose narrative can engage directly with a range of different 
elites and constituencies and can persuade them to cooperate with and align themselves with the policy initiatives 
(Rodrik 2014). Smart specialisation has the potential to do exactly this because it derives from the insights and 
understanding of variety of different files spanning innovation, science policy, regional development, and economic 
geography. Such a broadly-based consensus on which the smart specialisation agenda builds offers the possibility to 
develop an overarching framework on which policy prioritisation decisions can be based in a variety of different 
settings. 
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One of the issues which has arisen from this re-thinking relates to the role played by the objectives and intentions of 
a policy. All policies arise from a complex bargaining process between different stakeholders, different parties, 
different interest groups and different constituencies, and any policy to some extent necessarily represents a 
compromise between diverging interests and views. Agreement between differing groups is essential in order for a 
policy to be decided upon and to operate (Stiglitz et al. 2008) and as such the motivations underlying each policy 
reflect a dialogue spanning a complex patchwork of perceptions, incentives and interests. However, each actual 
policy which is implemented should have an overall umbrella and encompassing vision in order for there to be any 
agreement between different parties and this vision should also reflect the fundamental and underlying intentions of 
the policy. Moreover, there should also be a clear set of sufficiently narrowly-defined objectives which the policy is 
focused on achieving, in order to observe the effects of the policy action. Clarity is therefore required both in terms 
of the ‘big picture’ and also in terms of the specific picture. However, the political economy complexity and multi-
faceted nature of policy making often means that this clarity is lacking or obscured, either at the level of the big 
picture or at the level of the specific picture. Yet, finding a way to uncover such intentions and too make them 
explicit is necessary both in order to ensure that the policy is designed as well as possible and also to allow for the 
policy to be evaluated. Without such a clarity of intentions, neither an optimal policy design nor a policy whose 
impacts are in any way measurable, can be realistically attained1.  
 
In order to provide such clarity and to facilitate better policy design and delivery, policies which are amenable to 
monitoring and evaluation exercises are increasingly advocated. One of the key components of such policies is that 
they permit the use of outcome indicators or results indicators. There is a wide-ranging literature (Rodrik 2004, 
2007; World Bank 2010) which argues that developing a results-oriented policy setting is generally perceived as 
being an important topic in any type of industrial policy or regional development policy, and within this policy 
portfolio innovation-related policies are increasingly seen as being essential for all aspects of growth (McCann and 
Ortega-Argilés 2013). Nowadays, leading-edge policy-related research generally regards the use of outcome/results 
indicators allied with monitoring and evaluation exercises as being essential for assessing the impacts of innovation-
related policies. The reason for this is that the arguments for the use of indicators and monitoring and tied up with 
the intentions and objectives of the policy and also to the institutional and political economy issues in which a policy 
is situated. The use of indicators allied with monitoring and evaluation exercises are key elements which allow 
policies to be framed as closely as possible to the agreed societal objectives which the policy is seeking to influence. 
Without such key elements, policies or policy-settings can be influenced primarily by other political economy criteria 
which are not necessarily related to the policy intentions or objectives, and as such, the policy will be diverted or 
even subverted in terms of its efficacy. 
 
In terms of the field of public policy analysis, the idea of results-oriented policies is generally regarded as being a 
sensible and meaningful way of thinking about policy design. Yet, in reality it is surprising how few policies are really 
results-oriented in terms of both design and delivery. Many policy interventions even in advanced economies have 
little explicitly-measurable objectives in-built in their design and very few are therefore amenable to comprehensive 
monitoring and evaluation exercises. Many policies appear to have multiple – and often too many – goals, while 
others have stated objectives - such as raising GDP - which are realistically too far away from the policy to be 
meaningful. Instead, what are needed are a small number of clearly-stated objectives and intended outcomes which 
are realistically close enough to the policy actions to be connected to those same actions, and which are also directly 
amenable to tracking via the use of indicators. Otherwise, it will be impossible to identify whether the apparently 
observed outcomes of the policy are actually due to the policy actions. Yet in each specific case, in order to provide 
                                                          
1
 This paper suggests using a COTE framework for policy formulation. In this, the letter “C” stands for both policy clarity and 
policy coherence; the letter “O” stands for objectives of policy; the letter “T” stands for targets and the letter “E” stands for 
evaluation.  
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sound underpinnings to these monitoring and evaluation activities there are also many issues relating to the 
intended objectives of the policy which first need to be addressed in each specific policy action or intervention. The 
reason is that the goals of the policy, the possible actions or interventions, along with the specifics of the context, all 
influence the choice and ways in which results/outcome indicators are used in the service of these monitoring and 
evaluation activities. This is very much the case for regional policies as it is for any other type of industrial policy. 
 
There is now a growing literature on the requisite properties of outcome indicators and results indicators, along with 
the features of good evaluation and monitoring exercises, which are desirable in modern industrial policy 
interventions. These principles which are emerging from this literature needs to be applied directly to the smart 
specialisation agenda. Within EU Cohesion Policy, the importance of monitoring and evaluation for smart 
specialisation actions and interventions is largely related to the importance of these activities for regional 
development policies in general. The principles according to which outcome indicators or results indicators are to be 
designed have been set out in the guidance documents for a reformed EU Cohesion Policy provided by the European 
Commission. Yet, in the case of smart specialisation, and more specifically the ways it is being employed in the 
service of EU Cohesion Policy, requires some additional issues to be reflected upon. In particular, there are features 
and challenges associated with smart specialisation relating to the pan-European heterogeneity of the institutional 
and regional context which require careful consideration.  
 
All smart specialisation actions, as is the case for all Cohesion Policy interventions in general, must connect with one 
of more of the Europe 2020 strategy thematic dimensions of ‘smart’, ‘sustainable’ or ‘inclusive’ growth. These 
different dimensions are each broken down into various sub-categories and all Cohesion Policy actions or 
interventions must connect directly with one or more of these sub-categories. The thinking underlying the Europe 
2020 strategy reflects a more general worldwide shift in thinking regarding the nature of growth and development 
which has lead to a growing consensus that growth and development not only have multiple dimensions, but that all 
growth trajectories must involve all three dimensions in order to be truly sustainable in the long run on all 
understandings of sustainability, and this thinking also underlies the OECD growth strategy of stronger, cleaner and 
fairer growth (OECD 2011). At the same time, in order to be effective actions related to smart specialisation must 
also dovetail with many other elements of Cohesion Policy, according to the logic of what is known as the Common 
Strategic Framework. This sets out the legal framework regarding the ways in which different policy actions and 
funding steams associated with Cohesion Policy can be integrated and bundled together. 
 
As well as this, all smart specialisation actions in each country must fit within the overall Cohesion Policy logic, as it is 
applied in each particular country. EU policies operate according to principle of ‘subsidiarity’, by which policy actions 
are intended to be taken at the lowest and most local levels feasible, in order to be effective (Bachtler and Turok 
1997). The institutional and governance structure of each member state differs and as such, the exact ways in which 
EU Cohesion Policy is both designed and applied differs markedly according to the national context. These issues are 
set out in the partnership agreements between the European Commission and each member state along with the 
‘operational programme’ under which all specific policy actions and projects are undertaken. In each member state 
the design of smart specialisation actions and interventions therefore needs to be consistent with the institutional 
and governance arrangements operating in each country regarding Cohesion Policy as well as with the provisions of 
the CSF. 
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2. The Importance of a Theory of Change for Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
The approach to evaluating very large scale or mega infrastructure types of projects tends to closely follow a classic 
textbook type approach to costs benefit analysis (Brent 2009; Farrow and Zerbe Jr 2013; Link and Scott 2011; 
Priemus et al. 2008). In these cases the scale for the project allows for meaningful direct links to be drawn between 
the project and its impacts on the local or regional economy, for secondary to be readily used in its design, and for 
appropriate project-evaluation data to be constructed during the life of the project. In contrast, in the case of 
innovation-related, entrepreneurship-related, or skills and social inclusion-related projects, the theoretical links 
between the individual project interventions and the wider societal impacts are rather more diffuse. Moreover, 
many of these types of policies involve small individual interventions and this makes the assessment of the wider 
impacts of these types of policies more difficult. As such, the tracking these impacts of these types of  innovation or 
entrepreneurship policies, is often rather more difficult than in the case of large infrastructure-related projects. The 
scale of the public expenditure is disguised because it is spent by a wide range of government departments, regional 
organisations and non-government agencies. In these cases it is necessary to adopt a rather more of a realist type of 
methodology (Pawson 2006; Davies et al. 2000; Storey, 2008) which builds various indicators and tracking devices 
and approaches in order to get insights into the impacts of the policy, and this is particularly the case with 
innovation-related policies (Gault 2013) and entrepreneurship-SME policy (Storey, 2008). As we have formulated in 
the previous section, evaluation cannot take place adequately until the objectives and targets of the policy are 
clearly defined. But, additionally, these type of policies are unlikely to be “coherent” where they are delivered by 
many different government departments without clear co-ordination and without an adequate dialogue between 
them.  
 
Results oriented policies require monitoring and evaluation exercises to be a natural part of the policy process. 
Evaluation needs to be understood as a process and should not be undertaken solely as a historic accounting 
exercise to determine whether public money has been spent wisely. Results oriented indicators are required in the 
long run in order to allow for the ex post evaluation of the impacts of the policy. More immediately, however, 
monitoring is required for the ongoing steering of the policy and to facilitate policy feedbacks and learning during 
the life of the policy. Monitoring tracks the implementation and progress of an intervention in order to support 
programme administration. Evaluation assesses the design, implementation, or results of an intervention in order to 
support new planning (Hempel and Fiala, 2011). However, both monitoring and evaluation exercises are essential 
parts of results oriented or outcome oriented policies, and the reason why they are so critical is because these types 
of results oriented policies demand an explicit theory of change to be articulated in each case ex ante. The demand 
for an explicit theory of change to be articulated ex ante breaks away from a purely political logic to policy design 
and instead introduces outcome based or results based criteria for policy design and delivery. In this way policies 
become designed as far as possible according to what effects they have on people’s lives rather than on any political 
logic governed by the distribution of political rents. However, in order for this to be case, what this implies is that 
there must be a logical and well-substantiated set of expected links between particular policy actions and 
behavioural responses on the part of different actors and institutions which is articulated ex ante. Such a theory of 
expected change is essential, because the development of results oriented policies – including the use of 
results/outcome indicators and the associated monitoring and evaluation activities - cannot proceed unless there is a 
well-defined and clearly articulated theory of change in place which forms the underlying rationale not only the 
policy as a whole but also for each of its particular elements. Moreover, unless there is such a clearly articulated 
theory of expected change, then it will be impossible to reach agreement on the part of different actors as to the 
preferred policy and its priorities, as is necessarily required (Stiglitz et al. 2009). 
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Yet, this does not imply that theory of change underpinning the policy has to be watertight. All policies operate in a 
context of risk and uncertainty, and new policy initiatives, by definition, do not operate in a context whereby the 
policy has been pre-trialed, tested, adjusted, and evaluated over a long period. This is particularly the case for 
policies relating to entrepreneurship and innovation which by definition are dealing with phenomena associated 
with newness and novelty (Gordon and McCann 2005). While on the one hand we have general models which 
demonstrate the critical role played by innovation in aggregate growth (Aghion and Howitt 1992, 1996, 1998) and 
we also have econometric models (Crépon et al. 1998) demonstrating how innovation proceeds via a series of 
linkages between stages, these models and econometric results are at a level of aggregation and generality which 
precludes them from providing specific guidance as to what to do in any particular case or context (Hughes 2012). 
Yet, this does not imply that a policy operates in a knowledge vacuum. Rather, the theory of change underlying the 
policy logic is derived both from the higher-level aggregate analytical framework plus consideration of the 
experience of other examples and any recent analytical evidence relating to similar issues elsewhere. As such, while 
in some specific policy initiatives there may indeed have some previous pilot projects on which to justify the 
approach, in reality most new policy initiatives therefore take place in a context of a certain degree of ex ante 
uncertainty, and therefore require experimentation and ‘self discovery’ (Haussmann and Rodrik 2003) in order to 
identify what works in each specific context. In other words, part of the theory of change underpinning the policy 
logic is something to be experienced as a learning-by-doing phenomenon rather than as something which is 
constructed entirely ex ante.  
 
New policy initiatives to some extent therefore work in the opposite methodological direction of formal economic 
models. Formal models typically proceed by in a primarily top-down deductive manner by building an analytical 
framework and constructing an ex post appropriate dataset followed by the econometric testing of these data in the 
light of the hypotheses derived from the model framework. In terms of policy design the pure logical positivist 
approach requires ex ante that a well-specified model can be constructed and that data already exist on which to 
test such models ex ante. In contrast, in the case of new policy initiatives, the data on which to base a 
comprehensive ex ante analysis are typically not available in advance, and can only be acquired at some point in the 
future. New policy initiatives therefore tend to be based on partial, indirectly-related or incomplete data. This is 
because either the arena into which the policy engages is new, or alternatively because the particular approach to 
engagement with the policy arena is new. By definition, in almost all such cases there will be no perfectly-
constructed and ideally-fitted dataset prepared in advance on which to base all aspects of the new policy design and 
delivery. Therefore, the policy process for new policy initiatives tends to proceed in a rather more inductive manner 
reliant on the use of the available data alongside bottom-up observations and experience and a monitoring and 
evaluation of those observations and experiences. This largely realist type of perspective (Davies et al. 2000; Pawson 
2006), rather than a pure logical positivist perspective, eschews any assumption as to an overall tightly-specified 
analytical model ex ante and instead proceeds is a more iterative manner, assembling knowledge and evidence as it 
arises. This also implies, however, that new data must be constructed during the life of the policy in order for the 
policy to be evaluated ex post, and that these data must closely relate to the theory of expected change put forward 
as the basis for the policy. Key issues to be assessed include the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of policy and 
whether it can be improved (European Commission, 2013). Again, this type of data-generation process also reflects 
something of a more bottom-up inductive approach than a top-down deductive approach. 
 
A similar set of issues arises in terms of ex post evaluation and counter factual analysis. For any subsequent ex post 
policy evaluation a purely logical positivist approach simply requires that the requisite appropriate data for testing 
will be made available and that the underlying model remains valid (Pawson 2006). According to a more extreme 
instrumentalist argument (Blaug 1992) whether the actual details of the underlying model closely reflect reality is 
not especially important as long as the model ex ante provides the correct ex post predictions. Yet, if a correct 
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underlying model exists and appropriate data exist ex ante on which to base policy design, then an ex post 
evaluation tends to become largely redundant, unless we also assume that the policy-makers have an underlying 
model which is valid, but which is also subject to statistical variations across individual cases. Testing then becomes 
meaningful as a means of understanding the degree of variation around the model, rather than assessing the 
underlying model itself. That is, of course, unless exogenous circumstances change significantly during the life of the 
policy, whereby the ex ante data on which the policy design was tested and the underlying model itself are no longer 
appropriate for assessing the policy. This is typically the case where significant structural transformations associated 
with fundamental institutional, macroeconomic, political or technological changes take place. There is a large 
literature which suggests that entrepreneurship and innovation are not only closely associated with such structural 
changes but also that they may drive such changes. In cases where innovation and entrepreneurship policies are very 
successful they may often be associated with major structural changes, thereby rendering the original model on 
which they were based somewhat problematic. As such, ex ante expectations regarding the veracity of the 
underlying nature of the innovation model need to be treated with caution, as all systems-type analyses of 
innovation are always stressing. This is further complicated by the fact that if innovation system features vary by 
location, as is posited by the thinking underpinning smart specialisation, then again the concept of a valid underlying 
model applicable in all cases becomes even more problematic. Yet, if we adopt a logical positivist type of approach 
amenable to ex post counter-factual and econometric analysis, whatever is the nature of the innovation-generating 
system or process, a clearly-articulated theory of expected change derived from a formal model is still essential in 
order to distinguish between statistical variation around a stable underlying model and exogenous changes which 
change the underlying model. 
 
In contrast, in the case of a realist (Pawson 2006) perspective, there are no assumptions regarding the veracity of 
any underlying universal model of innovation and entrepreneurship, and this approach works on the basis that is 
enough partial and incomplete knowledge on which to base a policy but which also relies on knowledge emerging 
and being revealed during the life of the policy. From this vantage point there is obviously no assumption regarding 
fully-comprehensive and ideally-suited underlying secondary data being available ex ante on which to base policy 
design and testing, because if there were such data, then there would no real need for self-discovery or 
experimentation. Instead, both the features of the model – or rather proto-model or a heuristic model are better 
descriptions - and the data for any ex post evaluations of the policy must be derived from the policy actions 
themselves. The proto- or heuristic-model on which the policy is based depends crucially on the theory of expected 
change underlying the policy. This is framed in terms of a series of expected links and a likely chain of events 
involved in the innovation and entrepreneurship process, which allowing for significant variation is still understood 
to capture the major features of the phenomenon which the policy is intended to engage with. Such a theory of 
change also outlines the types of data which would be needed in order to some extent evaluate the policy, including 
any counter-factual-type evaluations. Indeed, the ex post evaluation of the performance of the policy can only be 
feasible not only if such data can be constructed and made available but also if the indicators used and the data 
complied conform to certain key properties and principles described below. Again, the need for a clearly-articulated 
theory of expected change and the associated links underpinning any policy intervention alongside the generation of 
data reflecting these expected links is therefore still critical in a realist perspective, even if no formal model akin to a 
pure logical positivist or instrumentalist framework can be specified.  
 
Whatever the actual model is which is widely understood by stakeholders to best describe the innovation system, 
this needs to be as clearly articulated as possible in order that a agreed understanding of the likely chain of links and 
events in response to the policy interventions can be arrived at. Only with such an agreement can a theory of 
expected change be articulated which forms the basis both for the expected behavoural responses engendered by 
the policy and also therefore the means of evaluation.  
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3 The Logic of Intervention for Results-Oriented Policies 
 
Smart specialisation is critical in articulating this theory of expected change. In order to commence the policy 
prioritization process smart specialisation requires a detailed analysis of the current regional economic and industrial 
structure on the basis of the best available evidence currently available. For this we need baseline or profiling 
indicators. No evidence will be complete or ideally constructed but working with the best evidence and indicators 
available is essential for smart specialisation. If activities, technologies, inter-institutional linkages, sectors, or a mix 
of these are to be prioritised as part of a smart specialisation agenda, then there have to be clear arguments as to 
why these are being prioritised and these depend on the theory of expected change which is being articulated. 
Smart specialisation helps to establish these priorities, but once they have been established then there needs to be a 
clear logic for assessing the progress of the intervention.  
 
The evaluation approach to be employed in the context of EU Cohesion Policy interventions is discussed in detail by 
the European Commission Evalsed2 guidebook along with other detailed policy evaluation guidance documents.3 In 
terms of assessing the progress of the policy via monitoring and evaluation, the logic of intervention to be adopted 
is: 
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs              Outputs            Results/Outcomes 
 
                                           impact 
 
In this logic of intervention framework, the inputs are the financial resources employed in the policy interventions, 
the outputs are the directly measurable actions whose intention it is to produce results, and the results/outcomes 
are the changes in behaviour which the policy is intended to influence. The results/outcomes indicators are designed 
to capture the changes in the intended results/outcomes, and the impact of the policy is the change in the 
results/outcome indicator which can credibly be ascribed to the policy intervention such that the movement towards 
the desired outcomes can be confidently related to the policy. 
 
                                                          
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/guide/guide_evalsed.pdf  
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information/evaluations/guidance_en.cfm  
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information/evaluations/guidance_en.cfm#1  
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Table 1 Logic of Intervention Features 
 
 
 
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
INPUTS → ACTIVITIES→ OUTPUTS→ OUTCOMES→ HIGHER-LEVEL 
OUTCOMES 
 
Resources 
mobilized 
What the 
programme does 
Products or 
services 
Direct short to 
medium-term 
effects on the 
beneficiary 
population 
resulting from the 
project outputs. 
 
Long-term effects 
in the living 
standards / 
performance of 
the targeted 
population 
Budget 
Staff 
Partners 
Equipment 
Actions 
Processes 
Techniques 
Tools 
Events  
Technologies of 
the programme 
Products and 
services directly 
under the control 
of the 
implementing 
organization 
Immediate 
changes in 
attitudes, 
knowledge, skills, 
as well as, late 
changes in 
behavior, status 
and the like  
They can be 
influenced by a 
variety of factors 
and are typically 
not under the full 
control of the 
programme 
   Often defined in 
the project 
development 
objective as 
targets 
Often described 
as impacts 
 Provide, facilitate, 
deliver, organize 
Trained, used, 
funded, 
participated – 
Complete actions 
Increased, 
improved, 
reduced, etc. 
 
Source: adaptation of Hempel and Fiala (2012) 
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There are various different uses of these types of terminology and Table 1 provides examples of how these types of 
terms are used in the case of various innovation and R&D-related programmes, and Figures 1 and 2 provide a more 
detailed and nuanced diagrammatic schema of the logic of intervention in innovation-related interventions. For 
clarity and consistency, however, here we use the terminology exactly as it is employed by the European 
Commission in the specifications and regulations for Cohesion Policy. 
 
Using this framework, smart specialisation provides the ex ante policy prioritisation principles which underpins the 
logic of the overall strategy design. Ex ante evaluation is key to assess whether the proposed actions are relevant 
and coherent and whether the expected impacts are realistic. Ex ante evaluation is important to design indicators 
and procedures for subsequent monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring is used to observe the ongoing behaviour of 
the results/outcome indicator as the policy progresses and evaluation is the ex post activity by which the impact is 
assessed. Program and project evaluation approaches typically use a combination of a realist perspective alongside 
an ex post counter-factual analysis based on logical positivist principles.  
 
However, evaluation cannot be undertaken unless targets exists. This is because evaluation can only take place in a 
framework in which the expected policy impacts are clearly specified. Hence, considerations of how policy is 
evaluated should therefore be incorporated into policy formulation when new ideas are being developed. In order to 
coherently link the logic of intervention to the monitoring and evaluation activities we need different types of 
indicators. As already mentioned, the ex ante regional profiling which is essential for smart specialisation uses 
profiling or baseline indicators. These establish both the features of the regional economy which are relevant to the 
policy decision-making process and also the baselines from which any subsequent policy interventions will be 
evaluated.  
 
During the life of the programmes in order to tack the progress of the policy it is essential to use results/outcome 
indicators. These indicators must be chosen by the policy-making authorities so that they not only dovetail with the 
intended objectives of the smart specialisation agenda but also best capture the behavioural changes which are 
intended to be engendered by the policy interventions. The desired properties of these results indicators are 
discussed in detail by Barca and McCann (2011a) and examples of such indicators are discussed relating to 
innovation, research and development (Barca and McCann 2011b) and to environmental issues (Barca and McCann 
2011c). Adherence to the principles outlined in these documents is not only important in terms of responding to the 
conditionalities inherent in the new Cohesion Policy4 arena but more generally also in order to avoid the use of 
indicators which either fail to capture the policy effects or alternatively are reduced to tautologies. There are also 
specific examples provided by Technopolis and MIOIR (2012) and by Gault (2013) showing how such indicators 
relating to innovation which contain all of the desired properties can be easily embedded within the design of the 
innovation policy logic.  
 
Result indicators are the reflection of policy objectives. Policy objectives are something that we plan to achieve, 
change, influence or facilitate. The results indicators should capture what we plan to achieve, change, influence or 
facilitate in a variable. Results/outcome indicators are normally metrics (with a necessary clear measurement unit) 
but they can also be supported with qualitative indicators. Indeed, the most robust and sophisticated monitoring 
and evaluation systems are those which incorporate both quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodologies 
which are intended to complement each other and to respond to different issues and provide insights. Qualitative 
                                                          
4
 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/working/sf2000_en.htm  
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and case study techniques (Vanclay 2012) allow for a detailed understanding of how the expected links within the 
theory of change operated and performed while quantitative indicators more readily permit ex post and counter-
factual type evaluation approaches (Scarpa 2012). Qualitative evaluation methodologies engage participants in the 
policy learning; offer a deeper understanding of processes leading to impacts; can assess against a wide range of 
evaluation criteria and allow to pick up unintended consequences. However, qualitative evaluation methodologies 
also have disadvantages such as respondents and interviewers may be biased or poorly informed; rarely provide a 
clear answer; tend to “describe’ rather than “evaluate”; have the risk to including “unrepresentative” groups and 
present difficulties in judging efficiency and effectiveness or establishing cause and effect. On the other hand, 
quantitative evaluation techniques also have advantages and disadvantages associated to the situation: among their 
advantages, they provide clear answers on impact or can be independently verified; among the disadvantages: they 
have a higher associated costs related to data collection and technical demands; lack information on context and 
mechanisms behind policy impacts; absence of pure control group; possible false impression of precision; narrow 
focus on effectiveness and efficiency and are difficult to use on indirect interventions that seek to influence the 
business environment. Realist approaches to evaluation (Davies et al. 2000; Pawson 2006; Link and Vonortas 2013; 
OECD 2007; Stockmann 2011; Sedlacko and Martinuzzi 2012) aim to combine these different techniques in order to 
produce a portfolio of evidence including outcome indicators (Abreu 2012) which ideally largely point in the same 
direction. A result indicator will always have associated a baseline value that is related with the value of the indicator 
before intervention linked with a number or description of situation and a target that is the intended value or the 
quantification or desired development trend after intervention in a particular year or period5. Table 4 provides 
examples of these types of mixed-methods approaches employed by various OECD regions aiming to enhance their 
entrepreneurship and innovation performance. 
 
In general, there are four main types of evaluation exercises over the policy cycle: ex ante evaluations, interim and 
ongoing evaluations, terminal evaluations and ex post evaluations.  
Ex ante evaluations are performed before a policy intervention is implemented in order to assess its relevance and 
coherence and its  implementation arrangements. It can be used to set up targets and milestones for activities, 
outputs and outcomes and to set up procedures for subsequent evaluations over the lifetime of the intervention.  
Interim and ongoing evaluations occur during implementation of a policy intervention in order to assess how the 
policy is progressing over time. They help to manage the intervention and to ensure that there is warning if targets 
are not going to be met. 
Terminal evaluations occur immediately on the closure of a programme and ensure that there is institutional 
memory and that statistics and qualitative information from those immediately involved in implementation are 
preserved. Such evaluations also give policymakers an understanding of immediate next steps, particularly when 
quick decisions are needed on continuation or closure of policy measures. 
Ex post evaluations take place after implementation is complete and when the final impacts are known or can be 
estimated. They give a more detailed view of the impact of particular measures and whether the actions delivered 
the expected results effectively and efficiently. They should be used in designing future interventions based on 
concrete knowledge of what has worked and what has not.  
 
What is most important here is that for smart specialisation innovation and entrepreneurship policies to be results-
oriented, it must be the case that the logic of intervention, the theory of expected change, the indicators to be 
                                                          
5
 Main source: European Territorial Cooperation Strategic Approach 2013+ (Anna Burylo, Evaluation Unit, DG for Regional Policy, 
European Commission) 
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employed during the life cycle of the policy programmes, the data to be constructed, and the design of the policy, 
are all closely interrelated issues which cannot be divorced from each other. Table 1 outlines some of the key 
principles in terms of the links between the project design and its impact evaluation potential via the use of 
indicators.  
 
In the Appendix in Table A2 we present a more detailed outline of the types of evaluation methodologies typically 
employed in different settings. Table A3 provides example of different types of policy monitoring and evaluation 
techniques and tools which are employed in different contexts and the table also outlines the major advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach. Table A4 presents examples of systems of indicators used in various cases for 
capturing the effects of innovation and entrepreneurship-related policies and Table A5 provides examples of good 
policy monitoring and evaluation practices employed by different European regions.  
 
What becomes clear from this inventory of innovation-related policies examples involving the use of: evaluation 
methodologies; different types of policy monitoring and evaluation techniques and tools; systems of indicators; 
along with some regional examples of good practice for evaluating innovation-related issues, is that there is no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ blueprint or template for the use of results indicators and for results-oriented policy evaluation, Rather, 
these results-orientation and policy monitoring and evaluation aspects have to be built into the policy design right 
from the beginning, exactly as the originators of the smart specialisation concept understood (David et al. 2009). 
Adopting a results oriented approach to policy making therefore imposes an analytical discipline on all aspects of the 
policy process which allows for agreement between different parties, actors and institutions on the basis of 
intentions, analysis and expectations, and works against a purely political logic to the policy process. The clarity of 
analysis and expectations introduced into the policy process also facilitates a policy transparency and accountability 
which is associated with an openness to measurement, monitoring and evaluating, and as far as possible the 
development of a culture of policy learning and institutional capability (Sedlacko and Martinuzzi 2012). 
 
4. Case analysis: Entrepreneurship and SME policy 
 
4.1. European Policy Background: Europe 2020, Small Business Act, “SME test” and the Entrepreneurship 2020 
Action Plan.  
 
SME and entrepreneurship policies fall under the Europe2020 economic growth strategy pillar of Smart Growth and 
under the Thematic Objective of the Operational Programmes for next programming period 2014-2020 titled 
“Enhancing the competitiveness of Small and Medium Entreprises (SMEs)”. They are linked with the ex ante 
conditionality: Specific actions that have been carried to underpin the promotion of entrepreneurship taking into 
account the “Small Business Act” for Europe (SBA). The rationale behind is that competitiveness and growth of SMEs 
and the starting steps of new companies is often hampered by a poor business environment that does not consider 
their financial, administrative and other specific needs. Without improvements in these fields, the investments 
devote to SMEs would risk not to deliver their expected impacts.   
 
The “Small Business Act” (SBA) reflects the Commission’s political will to recognize the central role of SMEs in the EU 
economy and for the first time puts into place a comprehensive SME policy framework for the EU and its Member 
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States. Annually, DG Enterprise (DG ENTR) produces the SBA country factsheets that serve as an additional source of 
information designed to improve evidence-based policy making, along ten established (COM(2008) 394 final) 
principles: (1) entrepreneurship, (2) second chance, (3) Think small first, (4) Responsive administration, (5) State aid 
and public procurement, (6) Access to finance, (7) Single market, (8) Skills and innovation, (9) Environment, and (10) 
Internationalization (European Commission, 2008 and 2011). 
 
The Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan is a blueprint for decisive action to reignite the  entrepreneurial spirit in 
Europe. This Action Plan acts as a follow up to the Small Business Act review of April 2011. The Entrepreneurship 
2020 Action Plan is built on three main pillars: entrepreneurial education and training to support growth and 
business creation; strengthening framework conditions for entrepreneurs by removing the existing structural 
barriers and supporting them at different stages of their business lifecycle and dynamising the culture of 
entrepreneurship in Europe by nurturing the new generation of entrepreneurs, additionally reaching out to specific 
groups whose entrepreneurial potential is not being tapped to its fullest extent or who are not reached by 
traditional outreach for business support is also under their priorities. The Communication on the Action Plan was 
preceded by a public consultation in July 2012. The consultation did not target any specific group as all citizens and 
organisations were welcome to participate. Among other conclusions, the public consultation showed that access to 
finance constitutes one of the most significant constraints on growth of SMEs and entrepreneurship in Europe. 
(European Commission, 2012). 
 
The investment priorities connected with this Thematic Objective under the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) are promoting entrepreneurship and supporting the capacity of European SMEs. In particular, promoting 
entrepreneurship by facilitating the economic exploitation of ideas and fostering the creation of new firms and 
supporting the capacity of SMEs to grow in regional, national and international markets and to engage in innovation 
processes. Among the specific actions that the European Commission envisages are measures to reduce the time 
and cost involved in setting-up a business or developing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess the 
implementation of the SBA. 
 
Regarding the impact assessment exercises, the European Commission has developed the “SME test”. It is a key 
action to implement the “Think Small First” principle, which is the core principle of the “Small Business Act for 
Europe. The SME test is part of the Commission’s regulatory impact assessment. The idea behind an SME test is to 
analyse the effects of a legislative proposal on SMEs. The SME test will be further discussed in following sections. 
 
 
4.2. SMEs and Entrepreneurship Policy  
 
SMEs, and in particular entrepreneurship, are an important factor in economic development because of its clear 
impact on the wealth generation in terms of innovation, productivity and economic growth, nurturing of new skills 
and capabilities, opening up of new markets, job creation and satisfaction (Van Praag and Versloot 2007; Feldman et 
al 2011; European Commission, 2012). They contribute to policy objectives such as job creation and economic 
growth but also sustainable development and social inclusion. These potentialities are recognized and supported by 
the governments, whose goal is to propel their economy forward. SME and entrepreneurship policies tend to be 
governmental initiatives that influence the formation, viability and commercial success of new and smaller scale 
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firms and tend to create an entrepreneurship-friendly environment. In the majority of the cases these policy 
initiatives seem to be developed at different governance levels – local, regional, national and supra-national. These 
aspects of entrepreneurship policies make their monitoring and evaluation systems harder than other more specific 
and concentrate policies.  
 
Storey (2008) identifies the following four market failures that justify the government intervention in the case of 
SME and entrepreneurship policy: 
- Individuals are unaware of the private benefits of starting a business. This is frequently used to justify 
“entrepreneurship policies” such as the raising of an entrepreneurial culture by including entrepreneurship courses 
at different levels of the education system. 
- Owners of small firms and self-employees do not fully appreciate the private benefits to their business of taking 
certain courses of action. This information imperfection is used to justify subsidies to promote SMEs to undertake 
workforce or management training or obtaining external advice from specialists or consultants or used to fund visits 
by SMEs to overseas trade fairs. 
- Financial institutions are unable to accurately assess the risk of lending to small firms so denying some (good) small 
firms access to funds and constraining their growth. To respond to this problem governments introduce Loan 
Guarantee Schemes in which the state agrees to reimburse defaults on bank loans made to SMEs with viable 
business plans but lacking the collateral that banks would expect to be available if they were making fully 
commercial loans. 
- Finally, a range of SME policies reflect the divergence between private and social benefits. The best examples relate 
to policies to promote innovation in small firms. Here it is argued that, without subsidies, there would be a socially 
sub-optimal formation and growth of technology-based firms. The potential presence of positive externalities is used 
to justify policies to promote Science Parks or public funding of seed equity programmes focused on technological-
based firms.    
Additionally, situations where market barriers affect particularly to certain groups of individuals is used to justify 
target group policies, such as women, young or senior people.   
The presence of market failure is, however, a necessary but not a sufficient condition for government intervention 
other policy rationale can be focused on information asymmetries, government failures, social equity or education 
failures (Stevenson and Lundström, 2007).   
 
Stevenson and Lundström (2002, p.60) identify four entrepreneurship policy typologies: extension policies, new firm 
creation policies, “niche” target group policies and “holistic” entrepreneurship policy. Entrepreneurship extension 
policies have as the main objective to improve the access and services to start-up supports through existing SME 
support structures. New firm creation policies focus in reduce the barriers to firm entry and exit, increase the start-
up rate and reduce the red tape and administrative burden. “Niche” target group policies are focused in the group 
that are underrepresented in entrepreneurship. Finally, the most comprehensive entrepreneurship policies are the 
“holistic” entrepreneurship policies that have as main objectives to increase the entrepreneurial culture showing 
entrepreneurship as a role model or a professional career option and create dynamic markets with better growth 
conditions.  
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Hart (2003) gives a good overview of different aspects in the area of entrepreneurship. Among these aspects are his 
definitions of the two distinct subjects of public policy and public governance. Whereas public policy includes actions 
taken by the government and institution, public governance focuses on more informal means of supporting 
entrepreneurs. These two aspects combined form a thorough base for strong entrepreneurial growth by providing 
official as well as communal support. Apart from these two types of interventions, there are a number of indirect 
aspects affecting entrepreneurial behavior, such as education policy or other economic policies. Regarding the level, 
there is no special consensus of which is the most appropriate policy level to implement successful entrepreneurship 
and SMEs support policies, however some authors have concluded that in general “macro” policies are more 
effective than “micro” policies. “Macro” policies are the ones linked with demand management, immigration policy, 
competition policy, tax and benefit regimes and regulation. While “micro” policies include: training, information, 
advice and management programmes for SME owners or potential owners; cultural change programmes such as 
enterprise education or access to finance programmes (Storey, 2008).   
 
In general there is a clear distinction between SME and Entrepreneurship policy. SME policy applies to existing 
enterprises whereas Entrepreneurship policy relates to policies seeking to enhance the creation of new enterprises. 
In Table 2 the main features of SME and Entrepreneurship policies are reported.  
 
 
Table 2. Features of SME and Entrepreneurship Policy Measures and Examples 
SME Policy Entrepreneurship Policy 
Reducing administrative and bureaucracy  
burden 
Reducing administrative and bureaucracy  burden 
Business taxes and fiscal incentives Business taxes and fiscal incentives (Social security 
benefits, including health care, pensions and 
unemployment benefits, etc.) 
Access to capital/financing (risk reduction tools 
including investment readiness and proof-of-
concept and the leveraging of public 
procurement, repayable short-term loans) 
e.g. Ensuring access to finance (Opolskie, PL) 
Access to micro loans and seed funds (support self-
finance, venture, grants, bank loans, corporate co-sharing 
funding, research grants, guarantee schemes, stock 
purchase warrants…) 
e.g. Lombardy Seed Fund (Lombardy, IT); Microfinance 
Institute (East-Mid Sweden, SE); Capital Investment Fund 
(Malopolska, PL) 
Provision of information services 
e.g. The 2000 SME Plan (Nord-Pas-de-Calais, FR); 
One southern Indiana Chamber (1SI) (New 
Albany, Indiana, US) 
Provision of information about start-up 
e.g. Barcelona Activa (Barcelona, ES);  
Export and marketing services (support the first 
client search, procurement, soft landing, 
technological showcasing, quality and design 
management, meet-the-buyer fairs, export 
Highlighting entrepreneurs as role models – 
communication about heroes 
e.g. mentoring support in Women’s Enterprise Agency 
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guarantee scheme) 
e.g. Chamber of Commerce of Prato (IT); State 
export initiative (Washington, US); Center for 
Trade Development (Pennsylvania, US). 
(Helsinki, FI); Endeavor Programme (County Kerry, IE); 
Business Plans competitions (Poitou-Charente and Midi-
Pyrénées, FR); entrepreneurship fairs  
Provision of training and consultancy (advice, 
coaching, mentoring, professional services, 
vocational training scheme) 
e.g. SPIT and CQMS (Bratislava, SK) 
Entrepreneurship education 
e.g. CASE-Centre for Amsterdam Schools for 
Entrepreneurship (Amsterdam, NL); Företagsamt Halland 
(SE); Endeavor Programme (County Kerry, IE); Solvay 
School and NEC (BE); IRCE (Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur, 
FR) 
Technology transfer (cluster, inter-clusters, 
university-enterprise partnerships, diaspora, 
technology centers, open innovation platforms) 
e.g. innovation voucher schemes: INDEX (West 
Midlands, UK); IVC (Estonia, EE). Poznan Science 
and Technology Park PPNT (Wielkopolska, PL); 
TOP Programme (Twente, NL) 
Facilitating network services 
e.g. Madrid Emprende’s business incubator network 
(Madrid, ES); Barcelona Activa (Barcelona, ES); Juneau 
County Economic Development Corporation’s (JCEDC) and 
Inventors and Entrepreneurs Club (Camp Douglas, US) 
Support of infrastructures (incubator, living labs, 
prototyping, design centers, science parks, fab 
labs) 
Support of infrastructures (incubator, living labs, 
prototyping, design centers, science parks, fab labs) 
e.g. Wallonia Space Logistics (Wallonia, BE); Cloud 
Incubator Hub (Murcia, ES) 
Sources: Lundström and Stevenson (2005); Hoffmann (2007); Stevenson and Lundström (2007); McCann and Ortega-
Argilés (2013); European Commission (2013b) 
 
Previous literature concludes that a country’s context matters greatly in the formulation of entrepreneurship policy. 
It could be logically assumed that policy makers would take their specific context conditions into consideration when 
assessing policy gaps and opportunities and developing their policy analysis. Given than contextual conditions will 
vary from one country or region to another it would also be logical to assume that governments will differ in their 
policy approaches. Having said that, the literature shows various ways to implement a national entrepreneurship 
policy strategy, among other examples, Bornefalk and Du Rietz (2009) discuss the cases of Denmark and Sweden in 
the light of EU Agendas that have been implemented to further entrepreneurship in the member countries. While 
Denmark defined a very ambitious strategy that involved substantial research, defining policy areas, and introducing 
policies to reach targets in improved entrepreneurship, Sweden has after an initial willingness to make policy 
changes ceased to focus on this issue (Bornefalk & Du Rietz, 2009). Denmark has since introduced various initiatives 
that target entrepreneurs in their country including the Danish Foundation for Entrepreneurship or the Global 
Entrepreneurship Week (Danish Business Authority, 2015). In Sweden, the Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum was 
founded that serves as a source of information and has a strong focus on research and on connecting the academic 
and the real life facets of entrepreneurship (Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum, 2015). There are many more 
examples of specific initiatives taken by governments to support the issue, not only at national but also at other 
levels. McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2013), for instance, mention a list of regional government initiatives, such as the 
Endeavor Programme in County Kerry, Ireland or Euregional start-up initiative in Rhein-Maas-Nord, Germany.            
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4.3. Evaluation of SME and Entrepreneurship Policies 
As we discussed previously, the evaluation of SME and Entrepreneurship policies can be a complicated exercise due 
to the broad scope of policy actions in different mainstream government policies such as tax, education or social 
policies like immigration or unemployment benefits, among others. These policies have a clear effect on 
entrepreneurship and SME development but rarely are taken into consideration in the evaluation of the impact of 
SME and Entrepreneurship policies. Additionally, we can also add the fact that SME owners, since they have a 
business to run, regard themselves as having little time to engage with the government in providing data to secure 
the monitoring and evaluation of their activities. Finally, any evaluation should ensure that all types of SMEs are 
taken into consideration (Gazelles, spin-offs, self-employees, micro-enterprises6, start-ups, etc. ). Having said that, 
the monitoring and evaluation of entrepreneurship and SME policies is extremely important task for the government 
not only to show the taxpayer and business community whether the programme is a cost-effective use of public 
funds or to achieve continued improvement in the design of the programmes but also to strengthen the government 
credibility and reputation.   
 
Table 3 presents a series of indicators used to analyse the entrepreneurial activity of a location. The table considers 
measures both in terms of the density (such as proportion of SMEs) and dynamics (such as annual growth in SMEs). 
A high level of the variables included in the table is considered positive for the entrepreneurial activity.  
 
 
Table 3 Indicators for Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurial vitality variables 
Density (static) measures Dynamic measures 
-Business ownership rate to labour force 
-TEA index 
-Nascent entrepreneur prevalence rate 
-Self-employment rate (% of total employment) 
-Female share of self-employment 
-SMEs per 1000 inhabitants 
-SME share of total employment 
-Solo firms (% of all firms) 
-Micro-firms < 10 employees (% of all firms) 
-Annual growth in num. of SMEs 
-Annual growth in SME employment 
-Annual entry rate (to total firms) 
-Start-up rate minus exit rate (net growth in 
firms) 
-Start-up rate plus exit rate (turbulence) 
                                                          
6 SMEs with less than 10 employees and a turnover or balance sheet total equal to or less than €2 million. 
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-Micro-firm share of employment 
-Venture capital deals per 1000 people 
 
Source: adaptation from Stevenson and Lundström (2007); Mayer (2011) 
 
Several organizations have developed attempts to develop a framework to evaluate and test Entrepreneurship and 
SME policies, among them, ‘the SME test” by European Commission, the application of the “C.O.T.E.” framework to 
SME policy in the case of OECD or the MILES framework in the case of the World Bank.  
 
The “SME test” of the European Commission 
 
The “Think Small First” principle requires that SMEs' interests are taken into account at the very early stages of policy 
making in order to make legislation more SME friendly. The Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines support its 
application, indicating that services should assess the impact of forthcoming legislation and administrative initiatives 
on SMEs (the ‘SME-test’), and take the results of this analysis into account when designing proposals, including 
through alternative mechanisms and using flexible approaches (European Commission, 2009). 
 
The “SME test” comprises four main steps (European Commission, 2009): 
1.Consultation with SMEs/SME representative organisations. The test establishes a minimum consultation period of 
12 including among other activities an Small Business Act follow-up meeting with stakeholders. The Commission has 
developed a number of tools which help to get the opinion of businesses.  These include the Enterprise Europe 
Network and the Network of SME Envoys. Among the examples of good practices for the consultation of 
stakeholders can be found: round table discussions with stakeholders, specific committees, on-line consultations, 
forums (European Commission, 2009). 
2.Preliminary assessment of businesses likely to be affected. In this step the government should establish whether 
SMEs are among the affected population. The characteristics of the businesses and sectors likely to be affected 
should be identified. Among other relevant sources of information to be explored we can found the number of 
businesses and their size, the proportion of employment concerned in the different categories of enterprises 
affected; the weight or presence of the different types of SMEs in the sectors and the links with other sectors and 
possible effect of subcontracting (European Commission, 2009).  
3.Measurement of the impact on SMEs. An exhaustive cost-benefit analysis should be performed in this step. The 
analysis should analyse the distribution of the potential costs ( financial costs, substantive costs of adoption of 
standards and regulation, and administrative costs) and of the benefits such as the improvement of working 
conditions, increase in competition, accessibility to more qualified staff. It would be of interest to run a comparative 
analyse between the costs and benefits of SMEs and large firms (European Commission, 2009).  
4. Use of alternative options or mitigating measures, if appropriate. Among others, it is understood as 
mitigating measures: the size-related exemptions from certain accounting requirements; temporary reduction 
or exemptions in some legislation; reduced fees; simplified reporting obligations for SMEs or specific 
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information campaigns or user guides, training and dedicated helpdesks or offices (European Commission, 
2009).  
 
The application of the COTE framework by the OECD (OECD 2007) 
 
The main objectives of the entrepreneurship policy following the COTE framework for policy formulation. C stands 
for clarity and coherence; O stands for objectives of policy; T stands for targets and E stands for Evaluation.  
 
In particular in the case of entrepreneurship and SME policies the objectives of policy should consider the following 
(OECD 2007): 
 Be a strong voice for small business at the heart of government – ensuring that government is aware of the 
needs of business 
 Strive for a regulatory framework which minimizes the burdens on business 
 Develop and maintain a world class business support service to enhance the competitiveness and 
profitability of small businesses 
 Champion the importance of entrepreneurship across society, particularly in under-represented and 
disadvantaged groups 
 
OECD (2007) identifies seven headings under which SME policies can be assessed. These are: Rationale, 
Additionality, Appropriateness, Superiority, Systemic Efficiency, Own Efficiency and Adaptive Efficiency.  
 
Additionality is defined as the true impact of the scheme/programme. In other words activity that would not have 
taken place without the programme but is attributable to the firm participating in the programme. Whilst it is not 
always easy to quantify, it is likely to be reflected in a measure such as additional output, employment, sales or 
export activity that can be attributed to the existence of the programme (OECD 2007).  
 
This implies that for any given outcome, that policy impact can be considered as the difference between the 
observed outcome with the intervention and what would have happened without the intervention (OECD 2007). This 
exercise could be very difficult for the following reasons (OECD 2007): 
- It is not always clear what changes might have occurred in the firms as a result of participation. Some 
programmes might be expected to lead to a greater likelihood of firm survival, other growth in sales, profits or 
employment, others to the greater likelihood of innovating or selling into overseas markets.  
- Participation in the programme will precede improvement. Some programmes will have a more immediate 
impact than others. 
- Another problem is linked with the diaspora of SME performance which is the results of different 
determinants internal and external to the firm (managerial skills and experience, sectoral belonging, geographical 
location, macro-economic conditions, etc.).  
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The “Six Steps to Heaven7” procedure has been defined to support the impact assessment of SME policies taking into 
consideration the potential problems that have been discussed above. 
- Step 1. Take up of schemes: count the number of participants 
- Step 2. Recipients’ opinions: assess client satisfaction 
- Step 3. Recipients’ views of the difference made by the assistance 
- Step 4. Comparison of the performance of the assisted with “typical” firms 
- Step 5. Comparison with match firms – “treated” against “non-treated” firms. 
-Step 6. Taking account of selection bias (self-selection, committee selection policy approaches) 
This is an approach that is mainly relevant to quantitative and ex post evaluations rather than to qualitative and ex 
ante evaluation. The steps are ordered according to the sophistication of the procedure. The Six Steps procedure 
considers steps 1 to 3 as monitoring and steps 4 to 6 as evaluation procedures. The difference between Monitoring 
and Evaluation in that the former relies exclusively upon the views of the recipients of the policy. Evaluation 
however seeks, by some means, to contrast these views or actions with those of non-recipients in order to present 
the “counter factual”. The difference between actual changes and the “counter factual” is viewed as the impact of 
the policy – or its “additionality”. 
 
The MILES framework (World Bank, 2007) 
 
Macroeconomic and political stability.  Entrepreneurs require a sound macroeconomic framework in which to 
expand their business and create new jobs. 
Investment climate, institutions and infrastructure.  Firms will expand and create formal sector jobs when the costs 
of doing business (from regulation, heavy tax burden, and poor infrastructure) are low and predictable. 
Labor market regulation and institutions. Sound regulations are crucial for both the employer and the worker to 
engage in a productive, long-term working relationship. 
Education and skills.  High productivity jobs are invariably based on good formal education and require appropriate 
skills for all age groups. 
Social protection. A strong and balanced social protection scheme protects the income of workers from shocks to 
employment. 
 
Some of the main conclusions that these attempts have found can be summarized as follows8: 
 
                                                          
7
 Storey (2000), reviewed and operationalized by Lenihan et al. (2007); Bonner and McGuiness (2007) and Ramsey and Bond 
(2007).  
8
 Sources: European Commission – DG Regional Policy (2012);  European Commission (2013); OECD (2007).  
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- The major concerns of entrepreneurs and SME owners is connected with financial constraints. Among the 
mechanisms to accelerate the access to finance the use of loans seems to be more effective than grants in 
supporting innovation. 
- Non-financial ‘soft” support such as business advice has been found also effective in business performance  
- A combination of financial and non-financial support in one package seems to have a positive effect in the impact 
of the policy 
- The most successful policy measures were the ones that target not just capital market failures but also information 
market failures. For medium-sized enterprises, innovation support, networking and innovation consortia proved 
effective at increasing long-term growth and productivity. For small and micro enterprises, basic business advice may 
be the single most cost effective form of support. For SMEs of all size, this may suggest a tailored package mixing 
appropriate financial and non-financial elements.  
- Evaluation approaches need to be developed that permit policy makers with SME and entrepreneurship 
responsibilities to be able to engage more fully in cross-government discussions on priority setting.  
- Policies focusing primarily on producing good general economic framework conditions are unlikely to be sufficient 
to produce a more entrepreneurial society. Governments with the highest commitment to improving the level of 
entrepreneurial dynamism adopt integrated poicy approaches, with efforts to promote fair and open competition, 
well-functioning capital markets and flexible labour markets as well as specific measures in key entrepreneurship 
policy areas to reduce administrative and regulatory procedures for star-ups, promote entrepreneurial values in 
society, increase opportunities to learn about entrepreneurship, and ensure all members of the population have 
access to the economic resources and supports necessary to become entrepreneurs and build viable businesses. 
(Stevenson and Lundström, 2007). 
- Evaluation needs to become more central to the policy-making process. It should not be undertaken solely as a 
historic accounting exercise to determine whether public money has been spent correctly. 
 
 
4.5.  Case example: Evaluation of Inclusive Entrepreneurship Policies  
 
Inclusive entrepreneurship policies work targeting specific populations such as youth, seniors, women, the disabled, 
ex-offenders, ethnic minorities and the unemployed. They are intended to offer equal opportunities in terms of 
entrepreneurship and self-employment regardless of different social backgrounds and to improve their labour 
market outcomes. They contribute to the economic growth pillar under Europe 2020 of inclusive growth.  
 
The main areas of intervention of these types of policies are: access to start-up financing, training, mentoring and 
consultancy; entrepreneurship education and awareness raising; network building; or improvements to social 
security and business regulatory systems. 
 
Evaluations in the case of these policies should be designed to assess policy actions against a range of key success 
criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability taking into consideration the targeted groups 
of individuals.  
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Table 5. Key Evaluation Criteria 
Measure Definition 
Relevance The extent to which the activity is suited to the priorities and policy of the target 
group, recipient and government (objectives versus needs). 
Effectiveness The extent to which the intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected 
to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance (outcomes versus 
objectives). 
Efficiency The outputs in relation to the inputs. Is the intervention using the least costly 
resources in achieving the desired results? (inputs versus outputs) 
Impact The positive and negative changes produced by a policy intervention, directly or 
indirectly, intended or unintended (objectives versus outcomes). 
Sustainability  Whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after funding has been 
withdrawn. 
Source: European Commission/OECD (2013) 
  
Given the focus on improving the live and work conditions of certain group of individuals, the analysis should start by 
assessing the local labor market and the market of goods and services. 
 
Labor market assessments seek to understand employment patterns and trends in the local economy. Common 
factors to analyze during such an assessment include the following (Asian Development Bank, 2007): 
- Labor Demand. Overall economic conditions; size of the formal and informal sectors; dynamic sectors or industries 
and geographic areas that have a demand for labor; industry trends and projections; expected number of jobs to be 
created; skill requirements by occupation; wage levels and earnings; working conditions; hiring practices; employer 
perceptions; barriers to employment based on gender, age, ethnicity, social status, religion, or other reasons; and so 
on. 
- Labor Supply. Size and structure of working age population; employment, under-employment, and unemployment 
by gender, age, education level, urban/rural areas, sector of the economy, occupation, formal/informal, and 
public/private sectors. 
- Institutional and Policy Environment. Existing labor market programmes, policies, laws, and institutions, including, 
for example, minimum wage regulations, employment protection laws, unionization, unemployment benefits, and 
the like. Other aspects of interest include sectoral economic priorities defined at the national, regional and local 
levels.  
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Assessing the market for goods and services helps determine the potential for small producers to engage in 
sustainable economic activities and the possible distribution of role (for example, for youth or women) in these 
markets (Penrose-Buckley 2007).Common market features to be analyzed include: 
- Market demands and value chains. Existing and future gaps in terms of consumer products and services; demand 
for commodities, processed products, and semifinished goods by retailers, wholesalers, or processing companies; 
identification of local, regional and export markets; identification of existing market players; and other factors.  
- Market stability. Market vulnerabilities to shocks, seasonality, and changing trends, potential restrictions to market 
access and the movement of people and products due to conflict and insecurity. 
- Market prices. Price volatility of end product and supplies; potential impact of additional producers on prices; 
inflation; transaction costs.  
 
Market assessments are usually carried out through a combination of analyzing existing data and surveying 
employers or small business holders. Interviewees can provide important insights about employment prospects in 
particular sectors, how hiring decisions are made, the main constraints formal and informal businesses are facing, 
their perceptions of young people, and more.  
 
The key indicators to be used to monitor and evaluate inclusive entrepreneurship need to be collected for each of 
the social inclusion groups targeted by policy (women, youth, seniors, ethnic minorities, the unemployed, the 
disabled, ex-offenders, etc.) .  
 
 
Table 6 Indicator Examples and the Questions Addressed 
 
Type of indicator Examples  Typical questions 
Baseline indicators for target 
groups 
Number of business owners 
Number of self-employed 
Business start-up rate 
Rate of entry to self-employment 
Is inclusive entrepreneurial activity 
growing? 
Where are the gaps? 
Policy activity indicators Number of people supported by 
policy 
Proportion of beneficiaries from 
target groups 
Are the activities relevant to 
beneficiaries’ perceived needs? 
Are the beneficiaries those with the 
greatest need? 
Customer satisfaction Participants’ views on quality of the 
programme 
Is the delivery method appropriate? 
Are there key barriers not addressed 
by the programme?  
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Policy output indicators Change in proportion of 
entrepreneurs accessing business 
loans 
Change in proportion of 
entrepreneurs with business training 
Change in attitudes to 
entrepreneurship and self-
employment 
How far is policy addressing barriers 
to entrepreneurship in the target 
group? 
Policy outcome indicators Rate of business start-up by policy 
beneficiaries 
Rate of entry to self-employment by 
policy beneficiaries 
Survival rate after 6 months, 1 year, 
3 years 
Employment in businesses created  
Does policy support lead to business 
creation?  
Are the businesses sustainable? 
Policy impact indicators Number of beneficiaries in 
employment after a period of time 
Income of beneficiaries after a 
period of time 
Even if the enterprises did not 
survive, has the experience benefited 
the beneficiaries of the programme?  
Source: European Commission/OECD (2013a) 
 
4.6 Evaluation of entrepreneurship education  
 
Indicators to assess a training course aimed at supporting people gain the skills they need for business start-up could 
include: 
- the number of people who attended the course (from project records or sign-in sheets) 
- the satisfaction of the attendees with the content and delivery of the course (from a survey immediately after the 
course), 
- what the attendees learned on the course (from a test after the end of the course or a review of the quality of 
business plans produced by participants); 
- whether the attendees’ behavior changed as a result of the course (from data on the number of enterprises 
established, their success in raising finance, etc.) 
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Table 7 Examples of Indicators for Youth Skills Training Projects 
Category Sample target Example of indicators 
Input Two trainers and facility within budget of 
€10,000 
Two trainers skilled, equipped and deployed 
Cost of programme in € within desired budget 
Activity Provide life skills training for youth (20 hours) Number of training hours delivered 
Number of youth participating by age, gender, 
level of education 
Date by which the training was provided  
Outputs 100 youth participating in training Number of youth who finished the training (by 
age, gender, level of education) 
Outcomes Increased knowledge of effective 
communication 
By the end of the programme: 
- Number and percentage of youth able to 
express ideas clearly measured against a 
predetermined test score card 
- Number and percentage of youth with 
improved verbal and non-verbal communication 
skills measured against a predetermined test 
score card 
-Number and percentage of youth who report 
feeling comfortable approaching employers 
Impacts Increased household income Years after, average monthly household income 
increased by 20% compared to baseline. 
Source: Hempel and Fiala (2012) 
 
 
 
Table 8 Examples of Indicators for Youth Enterprise and Entrepreneurship Projects 
Category Example of indicators 
Input - Budget allocation and expenditure (in €) 
- Amount and share of matching funds raised  
- Number of program staff by level 
-Number of local facilitators under contract 
-Number of local organizations who provide in-
 80 
kind contributions 
Activity - Number of hours for support services provided 
- Number of business plan competitions 
organized. 
- Average number of hours of mentoring 
provided per week/month  
Outputs Number of youth submitting a complete 
business plan 
-Number of youth enterprises supported 
annually. 
-Number and percentage of youth talking to 
their mentor at least once every two weeks 
Outcomes By the end of the programme: 
- Number and percentage of youth who started 
a business 
- Number and percentage of business registered 
-Total sales last week/month 
- Number of jobs created 
- Percentage of profits reinvented 
Impacts Years later: 
- Household income  
- Local youth unemployment rate (%) 
- Levels of individual/household food 
consumption (including fruit and vegetables) 
-Number and percentage of youth who report 
that their house/apartment has basic 
infrastructure (running water, electricity, etc.) 
- Number and percentage of youth who report 
reduced levels of conflict in the previous year 
Source: Hempel and Fiala (2012) 
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
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Given the fact that SME and entrepreneurs are an important driver of the regional socio economic system, they 
should be involved in the process of setting-up, implementation and evaluation of the RIS3. Public authorities and 
RIS3 penholders have to find a suitable way to ensure that the views of leading entrepreneurs and SME associations 
are not only taken into account but that these individuals and organisations become central to the whole process. In 
some regions the focus will tend to be on new firm start-ups, in other regions on growing the existing new firms, in 
others it will be on issues such as supply-chain developments. Whatever is the priority it is clear that the indicators 
used must well capture the levels of engagement, mobilization and dynamism of SMEs in the entrepreneurial search 
processes. As Jaffe (2015) argues, when it comes to evaluating the effects of public interventions, and especially 
where knowledge-related and innovation-related issues are at stake, not everything can be even approximately 
captured by metrics and a mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators is not only the best approach, but without 
such an approach a quantitative approach alone will produce biased results, as will a qualitative-only approach. Here 
we have argued on the basis of the literature plus numerous examples of best practice from around the world that 
the current state of the art points exactly this mixture being the best approach for both the monitoring and 
evaluation of smart specialisation interventions. 
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Table A1. Smart Outcomes and Impacts 
S Specific: Impacts and outcomes and outputs must use change language – they must describe a specific future 
condition. Put numbers on it, differentiate among target groups. Specify clear and unambiguous definitions of the 
selected indicators and objectives to avoid misunderstanding. 
M Measurable: Results, whether quantitative or qualitative, must have measurable indicators, making it possible to 
assess whether they were achieved or not. The measurable indicators clarify the policy objectives and make the 
monitoring process more useful as it easily shows in numbers whether the policy objectives are achieved or not: 
measuring in managing.  
A Achievable/Attainable: Results must be within the capacity of the partners to achieve. Be reasonable when putting 
target values for indicators. Unreachable targets can lead to an early abandoning of the monitoring system. Start with 
baseline measurements before setting the target values. Relative improvements are better for reporting as they 
support continuous improvement. 
R Relevant: Results must make a contribution to selected priorities of the national development framework. Avoid 
defining too many policy objectives and too many indicators. Focus on information relevant to the policy measures we 
want to evaluate. Examine each indicator carefully on its future use, if it cannot be linked directly to an objective or 
corrective action, better do not include it. 
T Time-bound: Results are never open-ended – there is an expected date of accomplishment. Monitoring is strictly 
bound with time of the policy objectives. Policy makers are rarely interested in what the effects will be of their policy 
decisions beyond the next elections.  
Sources: UNDP http://web.undp.org/evaluation/handbook/ch2-4.html and SCINNOPOLI www.scinnopoli.eu 
 
 
 
 Table A2. Suggested Measurement Methodologies by Innovation Program Type 
Aggregate behaviour Program type Suggested Measurement Methodology 
Knowledge Generation Direct Academic Support Regression Discontinuity Design 
Indicator-based frameworks (scorecards & benchmarking) 
Case studies 
Public and non-for-profit 
research organisations 
Indicator-based frameworks (scorecards & benchmarking) 
Case studies 
Innovation Facilitation Innovation Intermediaries Random field experiments 
Matching estimation 
Client-based surveys 
Direct Business Support Random field experiments 
Matching estimation 
Client-based surveys 
Indirect Business Support Regression discontinuity design 
Difference-in-difference estimation 
Demand Public Procurement Difference-in-difference estimation 
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Matching estimation 
Source: Adapted from: Innovation Impacts: Measurement and Assessment. The Expert Panel on the Socio-economic Impacts of Innovation Investments. Council 
of Canadian Academies, Ottawa, 2013 
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Table A3. Monitoring and Evaluation Techniques and Tools 
TYPE DEFINITION USEFUL for… ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES COST SKILL 
REQUIRED 
TIME REQUIRED 
Performance 
Indicators 
Measures of inputs, processes, 
outputs, outcomes and impacts 
for development projects, 
programs or strategies 
- Setting performance targets 
and assessing progress toward 
achieving them 
- Identifying problems via an 
early warning system to allow 
corrective action to be taken 
- Indicating whether an in-depth 
evaluation or review is needed 
-Effective means to 
measure progress toward 
objectives 
- Facilitates 
benchmarking 
comparisons between 
units 
- Poorly defined indicators are 
not good measures of success  
- Too many indicators or those 
without accessible data sources 
are costly, impractical and 
underutilized 
- Trade-off between choosing 
the optimal or desired 
indicators and having to accept 
the indicators which can be 
measured using existing data 
- It is related to the 
number of indicators 
collected, the 
frequency and quality 
of information sought 
and the 
comprehensiveness of 
the system 
Data 
collection, 
analysis and 
reporting 
skills, and 
management 
information 
system skills 
are required 
to implement 
performance 
monitoring 
systems 
Several days to 
several months, 
depending on the 
gathering and 
complexity of the 
indicator system.  
Logical 
Framework 
Approach 
Logframe helps to clarify 
objectives in any project, 
program or policy. It leads to 
the identification of 
performance indicators at each 
stage in this chain, as well as 
risks which might impede the 
attainment of the objectives 
- Improving quality of the 
project and program designs 
- Summarizing design of 
complex activities 
- Assisting the preparation of 
detailed operational plans 
- Providing objective basis for 
activity review, monitoring and 
evaluation 
- Ensures that decision-
makers ask fundamental 
questions and analyse 
assumptions and risks 
- Engages stakeholders in 
the planning and 
monitoring process 
- When used dynamically, 
it is an effective 
management tool to 
guide implementation, 
monitoring and 
evaluation 
- If managed rigidly, stifles 
creativity and innovation.  
- If not updated during 
implementation, it can be a 
static tool that does not reflect 
changing conditions. 
- Training and follow-up are 
often required.  
Low to medium, 
depending on extent 
and depth of 
participatory process 
used to support the 
approach 
Facilitation 
skills 
required for 
use in 
participatory 
planning and 
management  
Several days to 
several months, 
depending on scope 
and depth of 
participatory 
process. 
Theory-Based 
Evaluation 
Theory-based evaluation has 
similarities to the LogFrame 
approach but allows a much 
more in-depth understanding 
of the workings of a program or 
activity. It need not assume 
- Mapping design of complex 
activities 
- Improving planning and 
management 
- Provides early feedback 
about what is or is not 
working and why 
- Allows early correction 
of problems -Assists 
- can easily become overly 
complex if the scale of activities 
is large or if  an exhaustive list 
of factors and assumptions is 
assembled 
Medium – depends on 
the depth analysis and 
data collection 
Facilitation 
skills  
Can vary greatly, 
depends on the 
depth analysis, the 
duration of the 
program or activity 
and the depth of the 
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simple linear cause-and-effect 
relationships. By mapping out 
the determining or causal 
factors judged important for 
success and how they might 
interact, it can then be decided 
which steps should be 
monitored as the program 
develops, to see how well they 
are in fact borne out. This 
allows the critical success 
factors to be identified.  
identification of 
unintended side-effects 
of the program. 
-Helps in prioritizing 
which issues to 
investigate in greater 
depth, perhaps using 
more focused data 
collection or more 
sophisticated M&E 
techniques.  
-Provides basis to assess 
the likely impacts of 
programs  
- Stakeholders might disagree 
about which determining factor 
they judge important, which 
can be time-consuming and 
costly  
M&E work.  
Formal Surveys Formal surveys can be used to 
collect and standardized 
information from a carefully 
selected sample of individuals. 
Surveys often collect 
comparable information for 
target groups.  
-Providing baseline data against 
which the performance of the 
strategy, program or project 
can be compared. 
- Comparing different groups at 
a given point in time 
- comparing changes over time 
in the same group. 
- Comparing actual conditions 
with the targets established in a 
program or project design 
- Describing conditions in a 
particular community or group 
- Providing key input to a formal 
evaluation of the impact of a 
program or project 
- Findings from the 
sample of people 
interviewed can be 
applied to the wider 
target group or the 
population as a whole 
- Quantitative estimates 
can be made for the size 
and distribution of 
impacts  
- Results can often not be 
available for a long period of 
time 
- The processing and analysis of 
data can be a major bottleneck 
for the larger surveys  
- Many kinds of information are 
difficult to obtain through 
formal interviews.  
Cost will be 
significantly higher if 
there is no master 
sampling frame for 
the country 
Sound 
technical and 
analytical 
skills for 
sample and 
questionnair
e design, 
data analysis 
and 
processing 
Depends on the 
sample size. 
Rapid 
Appraisal 
Rapid appraisal methods are 
quick, low-cost ways to gather 
the views and feedback of 
- Providing rapid information 
for management decision-
making, especially at the project 
- Low cost 
- Can be conducted 
- Findings usually related to 
specific communities or 
localities – thus difficult to 
Low to medium, 
depending on the 
scale of the method 
Non-
directive 
interviewing, 
Four to six weeks, 
depending on the 
size and location of 
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Methods 
 
beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders, in order to 
respond to decision-makers’ 
needs for information 
or program level. 
-Providing qualitative 
understanding of complex 
socioeconomic changes, highly 
interactive social situations, or 
people’s values, motivations 
and reactions  
-Providing context and 
interpretation for quantitative 
data collected by more formal 
methods 
quickly 
- Provides flexibility to 
explore new ideas 
generalize 
- Less valid, reliable and 
credible than formal surveys 
adopted group 
facilitation, 
field 
observation, 
note-taking, 
and basic 
statistical 
skills. 
the population 
interviewed and the 
number of sites 
observed.  
Participatory 
Methods 
Participatory methods provide 
active involvement in decision-
making for those with a stake in 
a project, program or strategy 
and generate a sense of 
ownership in the M&E results 
and recommendations 
- Learning about local 
conditions perspectives and 
priorities to design more 
responsive and sustainable 
interventions.  
- Identifying problems and 
trouble-shooting problems 
during implementation 
- Evaluating a project, program 
or policy 
- Providing knowledge and skills 
to empower poor people. 
- Examines relevant 
issues by involving key 
players in the design 
process 
- Establishes partnerships 
and local ownership of 
projects 
- Enhances local learning, 
management capacity, 
and skills. 
- Provides timely 
formation for 
management decision-
making. 
 
 
 
- Sometimes regarded as less 
objective 
- Time-consuming if key 
stakeholders are involved in a 
meaningful way 
- Potential for domination and 
misuse by some stakeholders 
to further their own interests. 
Low to medium. Costs 
vary greatly, 
depending on scope 
and depth of 
application and on 
how local resource 
contributions are 
valued. 
Several days 
training for 
facilitators 
Varies greatly 
depending on scope 
and depth of 
application  
Public 
Expenditure 
Tracking 
PETS track the flow of public 
funds and determine the extent 
to which resources actually 
reach the target groups. The 
- Diagnosing problems in service 
delivery quantitatively. 
- Providing evidence on delays, 
- Supports the pursuit of 
accountability when little 
financial information is 
- Government agencies may be 
reluctant to open their 
accounting books. 
- Cost can be high 
until national 
capacities to conduct 
them have been 
Sound 
technical and 
analytical 
skills for 
Five to six months 
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Surveys surveys examine the manner, 
quantity and timing of releases 
of resources to different levels 
of government, particularly to 
the units responsible for the 
delivery of social services such 
as health and education.  
“leakage’ and corruption. 
  
available.  
- Improves management 
by pinpointing 
bureaucratic bottlenecks 
in the flow of funds for 
service delivery 
- Cost is substantial  established.  sample and 
questionnair
e design, 
data analysis 
and 
processing, 
and good 
understandin
g of sector to 
be assessed.  
Impact 
Evaluation 
Impact evaluation is the 
systematic identification of the 
effects – positive or negative, 
intended or not  - on 
individuals, households, 
institutions and the 
environment caused by a given 
development activity such as a 
program or a project.  
- Measuring outcomes/impacts 
of an activity and distinguishing 
these from the influence of 
external factors. 
- Helping to clarify whether 
costs for an activity are justified 
- Informing decisions on 
whether to expand, modify or 
eliminate projects, programs or 
policies 
- Comparing effectiveness and 
Strengthening accountability for 
results 
-Provides estimates of 
the magnitude of the 
outcomes and impacts for 
different demographic 
groups, regions or over 
time 
- Systematic analysis and 
rigor can give managers 
and policy-makers added 
confidence in decision-
making  
- Expensive and time-
consuming 
- Reduced utility when 
decision-makers need 
information quickly 
- Difficulties in identifying an 
appropriate counter-factual 
 
High, depending on 
project size, 
complexity and data 
collection 
requirements. 
Strong 
technical 
skills in social 
science 
research 
design, 
management
, analysis and 
reporting. 
Ideally, a 
balance of 
quantitative 
and 
qualitative 
research 
skills.  
Up to 2 years or 
more. 
Cost-Benefit 
and Cost-
Effectiveness 
Analysis 
They are tools for assessing 
whether or not the costs of an 
activity can be justified by the 
outcomes and impacts. Cost-
benefit analysis measure both 
inputs and outputs in monetary 
terms. Cost-effectiveness 
analysis estimates inputs in 
monetary terms and outcomes 
in non-monetary quantitative 
terms (such as improvements 
- Informing decisions about the 
most efficient allocation of 
resources. 
- Identifying projects that offer 
the highest rate of returns on 
investment 
- Good quality approach 
for estimating the 
efficiency of programs 
and projects 
- Makes explicit the 
economic assumptions 
that might otherwise 
remain implicit or 
overlooked at the design 
stage. 
- Useful for convincing 
- Fairly technical, requiring 
adequate financial and human 
resources 
- Data for cost-benefit 
calculations may not be 
available, and projected results 
may be highly dependent on 
assumptions made 
- Results must be interpret with 
care 
Varies greatly, 
depending on scope 
of analysis and 
availability of data 
Economic 
analysis and 
availability of 
relevant 
economic 
and cost data 
is required.  
Varies greatly 
depending on scope 
of analysis and 
availability of data. 
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Source: Based on Monitoring and Evaluation: some tools, methods and approaches, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 2002. 
 
in student reading scores).  policy-makers and 
funders that the benefits 
justify the activity 
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Table A4. Examples of Indicators used for Monitoring and Evaluating Outcomes 
  TYPE OF INDICATOR 
LEVEL OF 
MONITORING 
REGIONAL/NATIONAL EXAMPLE Input Output Outcomes 
 
Monitoring method 
Project level   Number of companies 
supported by funding 
Number of 
participants in a 
workshop 
 
Amount of new cooperation with 
other companies and/or R&D 
institutions 
Increase in turnover 
Increase in jobs 
 
Standardised 
questionnaire by the 
regional government 
distributed to the  
regional companies. 
Project level State Aid Schemes: R&D, investment, 
internationalization (Lower Austria, AU) 
 Collaboration,  
New innovation 
projects, 
patents 
Improvement of market position, 
Technological know-how and 
qualification of the employees and 
amount in turnover 
Newly created jobs. 
Two page ex-post 
questionnaire (3 to 6 
months after the 
project finishes). 
The feedback from the 
beneficiary is around 
80% response. 
Project level The Barometer   Supported companies performance 
compared against non-supported 
regional companies 
 
Programme 
level 
State aid Scheme `Innovation Assistant` (Lower 
Austria, AU) 
 New collaboration 
partners of the 
supported companies  
New 
products, 
Innovation culture, 
Strategy, and 
External ex-post 
evaluation by ex-post 
questionnaire 1 or 1.5 
years after the 
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New jobs, 
Additional 
investment 
volume of 
the 
supported 
companies 
Technological 
position of the 
supported 
companies 
completion of the 
programme. 
Programme 
level 
The Innovation Network Programme _ Denmark  Ability to Innovate 
Investments in 
private research 
Investments in 
innovation 
Regional 
distribution of 
activities 
Cooperation 
projects between 
companies and 
knowledge 
institutions 
Participation of 
small companies 
Number of 
companies  
Effect on employment 
in the companies 
Value-added in the 
companies 
Productivity per 
employee in the 
companies 
 
Increase of the innovation 
knowledge and production after 
the project.  
Increase of skills such as knowledge 
of market facts, understanding of 
user behaviour and value chains 
and collaboration and innovation 
concepts 
Increment of the period of 
collaboration between businesses 
and research institutions 
Increase in the role of knowledge 
institutions as an advisors and 
partners.  
A survey is carried out 
among the 
participating 
companies in the 
innovation networks.  
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The Innovation Consortium Programme_ Denmark Ability to Innovate 
Investments in 
private research 
Investments in 
innovation 
PhDs, patents, etc. 
Regional 
distribution of 
activities 
Cooperation 
projects between 
companies and 
knowledge 
institutions 
Participation of 
small companies 
Number of 
companies  
Effect on employment 
in the companies 
Value-added in the 
companies 
Productivity per 
employee in the 
companies 
Individual salary 
effect  
 
Gross profits (firm’s value creation) 
and employment (number of 
employees)  
Impact assessment 
exercises have been 
already carried out. 
With the use of registry 
data that follows the 
firms that have already 
participated in one or 
more consortia during 
the period of the 
programme.  
The growth of firms is 
evaluated by means of 
two indicators: gross 
profits and 
employment which are 
followed before and 
after the onset of the 
consortium. The 
growth of firms 
participating in the 
programme is 
compared to a control 
group of firms not 
involved in a 
consortium but similar 
with regards to size, 
industry, age and 
region.  
The Knowledge Coupon Programme_ Denmark Ability to Innovate Effect on employment New collaborations with firms 
involved in a knowledge coupon 
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Investments in 
private research 
Investments in 
innovation 
Regional 
distribution of 
activities 
Cooperation 
projects between 
companies and 
knowledge 
institutions 
Participation of 
small companies 
in the companies 
Value-added in the 
companies 
Productivity per 
employee in the 
companies 
Survival rate of 
companies 
project and knowledge institutions 
Specific products, process, market 
and organizational innovations 
developed by the firms involved in 
a knowledge coupon project 
The Open Funds Programme_ Denmark Ability to Innovate 
Investments in 
private research 
Regional 
distribution of 
activities 
Cooperation 
projects between 
companies and 
knowledge 
institutions 
Effect on employment 
in the companies 
Value-added in the 
companies 
Productivity per 
employee in the 
companies 
 
Creation of new knowledge from 
abroad on business innovation in 
the firms involved in the 
programme. 
Creation of new activities involving 
open innovation, employee-driven 
innovation, service innovation and 
or public innovation.  
Creation of new ways of strengthen 
cooperation between businesses 
and research institutions  
The assessment 
methodology uses an 
approach that includes 
control groups. The 
assessment is based 
with a variety of data 
sources including 
databases, official 
statistics, evaluations 
and impact assessment 
reports.   
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Number of 
companies  
Regional level RIS SCOREBOARD – Regional Innovation 
Observatory, 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur – PACA (FR) 
http://www2.mediterranee-
technologies.com/missions/laboratoire/observatoire-
regional-de-l%E2%80%99innovation-orion 
PACA region has developed the Regional Innovation 
Observatory as part of its RIS3. 
Support to fact-driven decision-making process by 
collecting, organizing and analyzing innovation 
related data, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region, 
France 
     
Regional level Impact Scan, Flanders (BE)      
Regional level Moderna Plan, Navarra (ES)      
Regional level Ontario Innovation Ecosystem Higher education 
expenditure on 
R&D (HERD) 
Highly cited 
scientists 
Public-sector R&D 
personnel 
Business enterprise 
S&T outputs 
(publications and 
patents) 
University graduates 
College graduates 
R&D outputs (patents 
and publications) 
Aggregate productivity 
Employment growth 
Economic well-being (GDP) 
Regression 
discontinuity design 
(direct academic 
support and public and 
not-for-profit research 
organizations program 
type)  
Random field 
experiments, matching 
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expenditure on 
R&D (BERD) 
Industry R&D 
personnel 
Venture capital and 
angel funds 
Leveraged funds 
Tax credits 
Creative economy 
Contracts and 
intellectual property 
agreements  
Spinoffs 
Rate of new venture 
creation 
Leading R&D firms 
New or improved 
products   
High-wage 
employment 
Firm entry and firm 
exit 
estimation, client-
based surveys 
(innovation facilitation 
programs) 
Difference-in-
difference estimation 
for public procurement 
schemes 
Crepon-Duguet and 
Mairesse model for 
firm innovation impact. 
National level Finland’s  Tekes: Hierarchy of Phenomena Related 
to economic Recovery and renewal 
Investments in 
R&D&I 
Human resources 
for R&D&I 
General conditions 
and incentives for 
R&D&I 
Strengthening of 
intangible assets 
Position in global 
value networks 
National prosperity 
Productivity of the economy  
Job creation 
High growth enterprises 
Foreign direct investment 
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Sources: Innovation Impacts: Measurement and Assessment. The Expert Panel on the Socio-economic Impacts of Innovation Investments. Council of Canadian Academies, Ottawa, 2013.  Scinnopoli: Scanning 
Innovation Policy Impact INTERREG IVC Capitalisation project with Fast Track Support by the European Commission. EPISIS – European policies and instruments to support service innovation. Service Innovation: 
Impact analysis and assessment indicators. (Pro Inno Europe INNONETS EPISIS). 
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 Table A5. Examples of Good Practices in Monitoring and Evaluation Systems  
Regions involved Methodology  Description 
LOWER AUSTRIA (AT) The I-AM Lower Austria result 
indicators.   
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) methodology 
is the monitoring process of the RIS Nö 
strategy in Lower Austria. Since 2008 is 
systematically rolled-out for all innovation 
services and the respective intermediaries 
as service providers.  The results of the 
monitoring process serve to have an 
indication of the development of the region 
in relation to other provinces in Austria as 
well as to the Austrian average. In 
combination with the program BSC shows 
the contribution of the regional economic 
and innovation policy to the regional 
development.  
The data is gather externally but treated 
internally by the regional government.    
STATE AID SCHEME: EXTERNAL 
EX-POST EVALUATION 
The target group of monitoring are 
companies supported by the state aid 
scheme: “Innovation Assistant”. The ex post 
evaluation is evaluating the whole 
programme “Innovation Assistant” by 
aggregating the results of the individual 
projects. The evaluation consists in sending 
an ex-post questionnaire (1 or 1.5 years 
after completion of the funding project). 
The processing of gathering, analyzing and 
evaluating the data is done externally. The 
results of the analysis serve to the regional 
government to see whether the regional 
state aid scheme fulfils its targets. 
Additionally, the insights of the analysis 
help to identify potentials for further 
improvement and further need adaptation 
of the existing scheme.    
LARGE SCALE QUESTIONNAIRE The aim of the questionnaire is to help in 
the monitoring of Lower Austria regional 
strategy. It is addressed to approximately 
5000 companies with a response rate of 
approx 10 to 14%. It monitors future 
perspectives of the companies like strategic 
key activities and need for innovation 
support, knowledge, usage, etc. It is used to 
identify gaps and overlaps. Further issues 
are the relevance of innovation partners, 
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transparency of offered services and 
companies´ economic and innovative 
performance. With these data the Regional 
Government of Lower Austria can draw 
conclusions about the impact of regional 
innovation policy and the importance of 
service providers.  
PUGLIA (IT) 
NAVARRA (ES) 
WESER EMS (DE) 
LODZ (PL) 
TYROL (AT) 
IASMINE PROJECT –  provide 
useful tools and methods for 
characterizing the regional 
innovation policies, analyzing 
the expected policy influence 
on the regional innovation 
system, monitoring policy 
implementation and evaluating 
impacts. It is a system view that 
emphasizes the importance of 
the interplay among different 
subjects and the mutual 
exchanges of “ ideas, skills, 
knowledge, information and 
signals of any kind” 
  
 
IABM – Impact, assessment, benchmarking– 
Methodology  
 
Steps: 
1) Characterization of the regional 
innovation policies (low complexity and 
risk) 
2)Characterization of the regional 
innovation system& ex-ante policy 
evaluation(medium complexity and risk) 
3)Assessment of the regional innovation 
policies impact on the Regional Innovation 
System (high complexity and risk) 
 
BRITTANY (FR) Shared Indicator Set (SIS): Long 
term experiences 
The SIS – activity indicators- was conceived 
in 2007, it is a monitoring system at 
program level. The activities and indicators 
monitored, 
are dependent of the general 
mission of the Innovation and 
Technology Centers. Their mission can be 
briefly described, they have 
two main roles: assisting companies of their 
relevant industry in the development of 
technology based 
innovation projects, and coordinating 
business networks and relations between 
industries and research. It includes 
indicators 
such as:  
• number of innovation projects 
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assisted 
• number of companies visited 
• number of network oordination 
events organized 
• number of network oordination 
events in which the ICT has participated. 
It allows comparisons from year to year, to 
calculate mediums and understand the 
variations according to the economic 
situation of Bretagne region. As an 
example, in 2007, the choice of indicators 
lasted 9 month and involved decision 
makers and intermediaries and BDI as back-
up. The number of available/ correctly used 
indicators for comparison went from 25% of 
the initial set on the first year to 75% on the 
fourth year. The remaining 25% seem hard 
to use.   
Face to Face Interviews The face to face interviews were designed 
to monitor the impact of the services 
provided by the intermediaries on the 
beneficiary businesses. 
More precisely, the monitoring was focused 
on the impact of the services provided on 
innovation capacity of the businesses. This 
was 
done by the means on the impact analysis 
of 12 “Innovation enablers”. 
Innovation enablers can be described as 
determinant  organizational skills that make 
a business innovation savvy: 
1. Strategy 
2. Structure and organization 
3. Innovation culture 
4. Financial resources 
5. Human resources and skills 
6. Access to information 
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7. Network reinforcement and cooperation 
culture 
8. Access to and acquisition of 
knowledge and technologies 
9. Creativity process 
10. Innovation implementation 
11. Marketing orientation 
12. Exploitation of innovation 
The target group is composed of 81 
businesses: 
• 31 % Information and 
Communication Technology 
• 25 % services to business 
• 15 % food processing 
Not proportionally representative of the 
regional economic fabric, the key regional 
sectors were represented. 50 % have 
less than 10 employees; most of the 
regional fabric is made up of such 
businesses. Very large range of turnover: 
from 100 K € to 5000 K € in similar 
proportions. 
The main aim is to have a global view of the 
impact of the services of intermediaries on 
the businesses.  
Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur – PACA (FR) 
The Barometer In PACA, the barometer is run by the 
regional innovation observatory, ORION, 
piloted by Méditerranée Technology, 
coordinator of the innovation support 
organisations regional network. 
Quantitative survey: External 
data are gathered by a Quantitative 
questionnaire addressed to regional 
innovative companies coupled 
by financial data available for 
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companies publishing the balance sheets 
(possible on for countries where balance 
sheets data are public). 
A number of different profiles are then 
drawn on the base of a number of crossed 
critical variables. This allows a first 
segmentation of the innovation support 
supply targets. 
Qualitative survey: A qualitative 
survey is subsequently conducted through a 
panel of 30 selected companies in order to 
deepen the interpretation of the 
quantitative survey. The companies 
included in the panel could also be used as 
“test” clients to test a customized service 
offer based on data collected and a in-
depth diagnosis. 
The monitoring is done in two points of 
time: “Ex ante”: to define the regional 
innovation strategy and design the regional 
innovation service supply. “In process”: to 
monitor on a regular basis the policy impact 
and the companies’ needs evolution in 
order adjust the support system response 
every two years.   
Innovation INDEX The Region innovation performance 
and positioning compared 
with other similar regions as well as 
its evolution over time. Thus, indirectly, 
the scoreboard measures the 
overall innovation policy impact. 
The index is composed of 11 categories 
of indicators: 
1. Demography and macroeconomic 
data 
2. Regional Innovation Performances 
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3. Economic activities’ structure 
4. Companies‘ Profile 
5. Innovation and business 
6. Clusters 
7. Human Capital, Education 
and training 
8. Public R&D 
9. Key Innovation projects 
10. Patent and publications 
11. Export 
The objectives of this monitoring process 
are: 
 To draw a global picture of the regional 
situation: 
 To have a synthetic background 
diagnosis for the Regional Innovation 
Strategy  
 To support regional marketing 
 To assess the overall impact of the 
regional innovation policy over time. 
RIS SCOREBOARD It monitors the regional innovation strategy 
(RIS) 
and the underlining actions implementation 
and compliance with the overall objectives 
set, through inputs, outputs and 
outcomes/impacts indicators. 
The main objective of this monitoring 
process is to assess the follow up of the 
regional innovation strategy: management 
of the funding and the innovation actors. 
With a set of indicators at programs, 
projects/intermediaries’ activities level on a 
continuous process through a robust data 
collection system – data gathered and 
treated internally. 
 
FLANDERS (BE) Innovation Audit Project level monitoring of a group of 
intermediaries in the regional innovation 
system. The intermediaries (e.g. regional 
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innovation centres) perform the innovation 
audit in a group of companies. The 
innovation audit makes as snapshot of the 
current innovation status of the company 
and compares it with 49 best practices in 8 
different domains. The main and direct 
results of the audit is an innovation action 
plan for the company. The monitoring 
collects data of the impact, all innovation 
support that the company received and 
assesses the impact of the policy mix as it 
tries to capture the evolution of the 
innovation status over time.  
Impact Scan  The aim here is to monitor the regional 
innovation budget. The level of monitoring 
is the region. It is needed to have 
information on the total amount spent on 
regional innovation as well as a thorough 
knowledge of the distribution of this money 
over the policy objectives, intermediaries 
and services.  
To describe the innovation context 31 
indicators are used: size and density of the 
policy context, regional innovation policy 
governance, innovation support supply and 
demand side. The target monitoring group 
are companies (impact of services), 
intermediaries (services and budgets) and 
policy itself (budgets assigned to policy 
objectives). Based on the results of 
IMPACTSCAN partners have: improved the 
evaluation of Regional Innovation Support 
System and gathered elements for design of 
regional consulting and monitoring tool for 
intermediaries. 
Web based activity reporting of 
innovation support services  
Ex-post project level monitoring. The level 
of monitoring is single project level 
however the data can be aggregated on 
program level. The target group is the 
management of the innovation service 
providing organization. The standard 
activities to be monitored are: information 
actions, publications, seminars, etc. The 
activities and the financial support used are 
monitor in order to verify if the project is 
still on track.   
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SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 
(DE) 
CRM-SYSTEM The Business Development and technology 
Transfer Corporation of Schleswig-Holstein 
(WTSH) manage parts of the regional public 
support system. The WTSH documents all of 
the activities with their customers in a 
central Customer-Relationship-
Management (CRM) database. The CRM 
system monitors activities of the 
intermediaries and it is not specialized on 
the project, program or strategy level.  
Strategic Controlling The strategic controlling of the WTSH 
measures the impact of the intermediaries 
and programs. The Strategic Controlling 
tool is an ex-post statistical data analysis 
from 2009, which analysed the support 
activity panel-data from 2000. The Strategic 
Controlling of WTSH 
measured services/support activities of the 
WTSH like the impact of innovation-
consultancy, property-rights-consultancy, 
R&D subsidies, innovation-audit, foreign 
trade consultancy, trade 
fair support, the promotion of 
foreign trade and the support 
for the companies in the Schleswig- 
Holstein Business Centers 
NAVARRA (ES)  Balanced Score Card of the 3
rd
 
technology plan of Navarra  
The Balanced Score Card (BSC) of the Third 
Technology Plan of Navarra monitors 
outputs: results of the activities carried out 
in each of 
the 41 action lines included in the 
Technology Plan. 
The outputs monitored depend on the 
specific action line of the Technology Plan, 
but some examples are: number of projects 
funded, 
total budget of the projects, total funding 
granted, number of project proposals 
submitted to FP7 calls, number of 
international research visits, etc… The 
indicators selected 
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as output are thus a direct measurement 
of the running activities (number of projects 
funded); or a measurement of an expected 
behaviour (number of project proposals 
submitted to FP7) as a result of the actions 
lines of the Third Technology Plan. 
The impact of these action lines on the 
stakeholders in terms of increase of 
turnover, number of new jobs, increase of 
R&D budget, etc. is not measured by the 
BSC as impact 
indicators, and were not defined for the 
Third Technology Plan.  
DENMARK Innovation Network 
Programme 
(Innovationsnetvӕrk) 
The monitoring process is carried out at the 
project level. A survey is carried out among 
the participating companies in the 
innovation networks documents the effect 
of the projects.   
Innovation Consortium 
Programme 
(Innovationskonsortier) 
The Innovation Consortium programme 
provides a flexible framework for 
collaboration between companies, research 
institutions and non-profit 
advisory/knowledge dissemination parties.  
The Danish Government has carried out 
impact assessments of the programme with 
the use of registry data of the growth of the 
companies that have taken part in one or 
two consortia during the period of the 
program.  
….   
   
   
Sources: Scinnopoli: Scanning Innovation Policy Impact INTERREG IVC Capitalisation project with Fast Track Support by the European 
Commission. EPISIS – European policies and instruments to support service innovation. Service Innovation: Impact analysis and assessment 
indicators. (Pro Inno Europe INNONETS EPISIS) 
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Table A6. SBA Framework 
 
I. Entrepreneurship VI. Access to finance 
Self-employment rate 
Entrepreneurship rate 
Entrepreneurial intention 
Opportunity-driven entrepreneurship  
Preference for self-employment 
Feasibility of becoming self-employed 
Share of adults who agree that school education helped 
them to become entrepreneurs 
Share of adults who think that successful entrepreneurs 
receive a high status in the society 
Media attention for entrepreneurship 
Rejected loan applications and loan offers 
Access to public financial support including 
guarantees 
Willingness of bank to provide a loan 
Relative difference in interest rate levels between 
loans up to EUR 1 million and loans over EUR 1 
million. 
Total duration to get paid (# days) 
Lost payments (% turnover) 
Venture capital investments – early stage (% GDP) 
Strength of legal rights 
Depth of credit information index 
II. Second chance  VII. Single market 
Time to close a business (years) 
Cost to close a business (cost to recover debt as % of 
debtor’s estate) 
Degree of support for a second chance (%) 
SMEs in intra-EU imports (%) 
SMEs in intra-EU exports (%) 
Single market directives not transposed or notified 
(%) 
Number of directives overdue by 2+ years 
Average transposition delay-overdue directives 
(months) 
III. Think small first VIII. Skills and Innovation 
Communication and simplification of rules and procedures 
(0=best, 6=worst) 
Burden of government regulations (1=worst, 7=best) 
Licenses and permits systems (0=best, 6=worst) 
SMEs introducing process or product innovations 
(%) 
SMEs introducing marketing or organizational 
innov. (%) 
SMEs innovating in-house (%) 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others (%) 
New-to-market or new-to-firm innovation sales (% 
turnover) 
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EU funded research SMEs’ participation (per 
100.000 SMEs) 
SMEs selling online (% of SMEs) 
SMEs purchasing online (% of SMEs) 
Enterprises providing training to their employees 
(%) 
Employees participation rate in education and 
training (% of total number of employees in micro 
firms) 
IV. Responsive administration IX. Environment 
Time to start a business (calendar days) 
Cost to start a business (% income per capita) 
Paid in minimum capital (% income per capita) 
Time required to transfer property (calendar days) 
Cost required to transfer property (% prop. Value) 
Number of tax payments per year 
Time required to comply with major taxes (hr/y) 
Cost to enforce contracts (% of claim) 
Online availability of the basic public services to businesses 
Innovations with environmental benefits 
SMEs that have introduced resource-efficiency 
measures (%) 
SMEs that have benefitted from public support 
measures for resource-efficiency actions (%) 
SMEs that offer green products or services (%) 
SMEs with more than 50% turnover generated by 
green products or services (%) 
SMEs that have benefitted from public support 
measures for production of green products (%) 
V. State aid and Public Procurement X. Internationalization 
SME’s share in total value of public contracts awarded (%) 
State aid for SMEs (% of total aid for SMEs) 
Average delay in payments from public authorities (days) 
e-Procurement availability (pre-award) 
EU regional funds for entrepreneurship and SMEs in 2007-
2013 (% total allocation by Member State) 
EU funds for business creation and development in 2007-
2013 (% of EAFRD total allocation) 
SMEs importing from outside the EU (% of SMEs) 
SMEs exporting outside the EU (% of SMEs) 
Cost required to import (in USD) 
Time required to import (in days) 
Number of documents required to import 
Cost required to export (in USD) 
Time required to export (in days) 
Number of documents required to export 
 
 
113 
 
The contribution of peer reviews to smart specialization strategies 
Claire Nauwelaers
9
 
ABSTRACT 
The experimental character of smart specialization strategies reinforces the need for reliable 
and detailed assessments, addressing design and implementation issues. This paper argues 
that peer review methods, when used appropriately, can provide valuable contributions to 
support S3. These methods include elements that address the need for these strategies to be: 
open, well-informed, integrated, differentiated, shared and impact – oriented. Peer reviews 
are seen as effective mechanisms to lift policy learning, relying on a user-driven approach. 
Comparing the peer review experiences run by the OECD and the European Commission, the 
paper identifies success conditions such as: strong political endorsement, wide stakeholders 
participation, quality of peer review panel composed of a balanced mix of peers and experts, 
attention to all stages in the three-step/six stages peer review process. The analysis 
underlines the specific value of this technique, that combines tacit and codified knowledge in 
a purpose-oriented exercise ending up in applicable and realistic policy recommendations. 
The conclusion underlines the potential, but also the limits of peer reviews to help this new 
wave of policies reaching their ambitious goal. It suggests a model for peer review which is 
adapted to the emerging needs of S3 in the near future. 
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Introduction 
The problem of assessing the effectiveness of regional innovation policies is receiving 
increased attention along with the upsurge in popularity of these policies, combined with 
enhanced requests for accountability of public spending. Faced with a large spectrum of 
demands possibly leading to conflicting priorities, governments need evidence that investing 
in innovation contributes to economic growth and jobs creation. The question of evaluation 
has also become prominent in the 2014-2020 programming period of Cohesion policy at 
European level. The new wave of this policy is characterized by a 10-points reform, one of 
them being: “Fixing clear, transparent, measurable aims and targets for accountability and 
results”. To meet these goals, policy-makers respond in defining indicators, setting targets 
and implementing monitoring systems to follow-up the implementation of policies. The 
information, collected through well-designed monitoring systems, forms the basis on which 
the evaluation of outcomes, results and impacts of policies can be worked out. 
In most European regions, responses to this important demand for monitoring and evaluation 
of regional innovation policies are still in their infancy. The availability of relevant, accurate 
and measurable indicators, along with appropriate methods and capacities to exploit them to 
enhance policy learning and influence policies, are still too limited. One issue in particular is 
a key stumbling block for policy-makers: moving from evaluation of individual policies to 
evaluation of policy mixes, i.e. sets of interacting policies which together contribute to certain 
goals (such as raising innovation performance of a region). Existing evaluation methods use 
quantitative and qualitative approaches (or mix both) but they are mostly geared towards the 
evaluation of individual programmes or organisations. To date, there are still no fully-fledged 
methods for undertaking the systemic evaluations that would address the double question of 
relevance and effectiveness of policy mixes. 
Smart specialization strategies (S3), which we qualify as a new wave of regional innovation 
policies with specific characteristics intended to enhance their effectiveness, deserve in-depth 
appraisal. Their experimental character reinforces the need for reliable and detailed 
assessments, addressing both design and implementation issues. This paper argues that peer 
review methods, when used appropriately, can contribute to address two questions of 
particular importance for S3: 
1. Are the orientations of the strategy relevant, given the situation and perspectives of 
the regional economy? 
2. Is the policy mix effective to reach the intended goals of the strategy? 
This paper is organized in two parts. In a first part, the paper discusses the concept of peer 
reviews and its components, and examines how this method has been implemented in the 
field of research and innovation policy. It draws conclusions on the key elements that 
contribute to the value of this method. In a second part, lessons from experience in policy 
peer reviews are confronted with the assessment needs for smart specialization strategies 
(S3). The conclusion underlines the potential, but also the limits of this technique to help this 
new wave of policies reaching their ambitious goal. 
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1. Peer Review approaches and methods: a comparative and critical analysis 
1.1.The origins of the peer review method 
The peer review method originates from the science policy domain, where funding of 
scientific research ultimately depends on the assessment of the quality of research carried out 
by qualified scientists from the same discipline, i.e. the “peers”. The main task of the latter is 
to verify that the research relies on the state-of-the-art in the field and brings elements of 
novelty, while using appropriate sources and methods so that the research is likely to succeed. 
The peer review process lies at the heart of the selection procedure for publications, which is 
the main output indicator for scientific research. Institutions such as research laboratories or 
entire university faculties are also assessed by independent peer reviewers and the result of 
such evaluations may impact on the extent of public funding sources allocated to these 
institutions.  
The need to avoid conflicts of interest in peers judgment, and the codified and trans boundary 
nature of science, result in peer reviews that often have an international character: the use of 
peers from other countries than applicants for research funding increases neutrality in 
judgment and potentially raises the level of excellence by extending knowledge of the state-
of-the-art beyond national research traditions. The selection of research projects for funding 
by the European Union Framework research programmes is notably largely based on 
international peer reviews mechanisms.  
Peer reviews of scientific activity, which have a long history, is a topic that has been the 
subject of important research, justified by the crucial role of this mechanism for the 
orientation of scientific research. Issues such as conservatism of peers, which tend to favour 
established researchers and research lines rather new ones; the difficulty to evaluate trans-
disciplinary research, or the changes to be brought to the method in order to include criteria 
of research relevance, are key discussion points in this literature (and key practical issues for 
managers of research funding agencies). 
This paper addresses another type of peer review, that does not benefit from such as strong 
tradition: peer reviews applied to policies. In this type of peer review the target of the review 
consists of policies rather than research projects or institutions; the peers are, logically, 
policy-makers rather than scientists; and the expected results are effective policies rather than 
high level and high impact publications and research results.  
The OECD was pioneering the application of peer reviews for the benefit of better policy-
making, already in the 60s. Such a process corresponds to the core mission of the 
international organization, which is an inter-governmental forum where senior officials from 
the member countries meet and exchange to improve their policies through benchmarking 
and learning from each other. Voluntary peer reviews of policies are at the essence of the 
OECD working method (OECD 2003). Peer reviews apply to its key product, the OECD 
economic surveys, but also to other policy fields such as environment, energy, labour market, 
as well as research and innovation. The European Union and other international organizations 
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such as the International Monetary Fund, also use policy peer reviews, even if those do not lie 
at the core of their procedures. 
The next sections in this part provide, first, a definition and a discussion of key elements of 
the concept of policy peer review, applied to the field of research and innovation. Next, they 
analyse how the method has been used in practice under the leadership of international 
organisations (OECD and European Union) or by regions and countries in the framework of 
inter-regional cooperation programmes. The conclusion enlightens similarities and 
differences between the various applications of the methods, as well as success factors. 
1.2.Definition and key elements of policy peer reviews 
Definition of policy peer reviews in research and innovation 
Peer reviews of research and innovation policies are policy learning exercises, whereby 
governmental authorities in charge of designing and implementing these policies in one 
country or region decide to submit themselves to the scrutiny of peers from other 
countries/regions, with the aim to improve their own policies thanks to peers’ advice and the 
incorporation of lessons from foreign practices. 
There is an important difference in the expected result of policy peer reviews, compared to 
scientific peer reviews: the results consist in improved policies for the former, and in 
selection or rejection of research projects (binary decisions) or change in funding for 
institutions for the latter. This means that the expected results are less easy to capture for 
policy peer reviews than for scientific peer reviews: benefits of policy peer reviews may be 
dispersed between a variety of actors, target broad orientations as well as concrete structures 
or organisations, and may only occur in the medium- and long-term.  
Key characteristics of policy peer reviews 
Policy peer reviews methods display the following characteristics: 
1. A three-steps method (Figure 1): a first step concerns the preparation of the work 
through gathering codified information on the reviewed country/region and 
mobilizing key actors (in the reviewed country/region and from peer 
countries/regions); in a second step the actual peer review analysis takes place 
involving both remote analyses of the information collected in the first step and 
face-to-face interactions within the reviewed country/region; the third step 
consists in elaborating and communicating the findings of the peer review in a 
suitable way (usually through a report including analysis and policy 
recommendations) in the reviewed country/region and in preparing endorsement 
in actual policy-making. 
2. A voluntary initiative: both the reviewed country/region and the peers embark into 
such exercises on a voluntary basis. This implies, for the former, an openness to 
critical views and the mobilization of relevant stakeholders to communicate 
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information needed for the peer review, and for the latter, the willingness to 
devote efforts to study the specific situation of the reviewed country/region and 
reflect on the suitability of own experience to this situation. The output of the peer 
review exercise includes recommendations without compulsory character and 
without any sanction attached to compliance. The main mechanism to generate 
change in policies is “peer pressure”, i.e. the influence exercised by the peers on 
the reviewed country/region.  
3.A participatory process: key stakeholders in the reviewed country/region need to 
be mobilized and be willing to cooperate to the peer review exercise. This is 
necessary during the preparation and implementation phases, where the 
stakeholders communicate information and opinions on the research and 
innovation system and on actors’ strategies, and also at implementation phase 
where the stakeholders endorse and translate the recommendations into their own 
practice and strategies. This endorsement is facilitated by the dialogue that takes 
place between peers and stakeholders during the implementation phase: formal 
analyses and recommendations are supplemented by peers’ influence exercised 
through informal dialogue with stakeholders. 
4. A method combining tacit and codified knowledge (Nauwelaers and Wintjes 
2008): the method relies foremost on the tacit knowledge held by the external 
peers and stakeholders in the reviewed country/region, but the process also 
incorporates codified knowledge (e.g. in the form of a benchmarking exercise 
based on comparable data) during the preparatory and analytical tasks. 
Figure 1. The three-steps process of policy peer reviews 
 
Key issues for policy peer reviews 
Several important (and interlinked) issues need to be addressed to ensure effectiveness of 
policy peer reviews. 
First, the choice of the peer reviewing countries/regions. Should the countries or regions 
acting as peers come from countries and regions similar to the examined one? And on which 
elements to assess the degree of similarity between countries or regions? Who should select 
the peer countries/regions? Since the learning process naturally suggests that less advanced 
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countries/regions learn from the more advanced ones, does it mean that only the first category 
has the opportunity to benefit from peer reviews? And what could be the motivation then to 
engage in peer reviews for the most advanced ones? The question of number of peer review 
countries or regions needs also to be solved: a good balance needs to be struck between, one 
the one hand, diversity and complementarity of views which is favoured by a large group of 
reviewers, and, on the other hand, the manageability and costs of the exercise, that should 
remain reasonable pointing to a limitation in the number of peers.  
Second, the definition of the analytical framework. In line with the above remark on the 
elusiveness of benefits to be expected from policy peer reviews, the peer review faces a 
subject which is quite complex: research and innovation systems and policies are multi-
dimensional and the analytical models to be applied to support the peer reviews are tentative 
rather than robust. There is a limited parallel to be made between “selection criteria” used by 
peer reviewers of science, on the one hand, and quality criteria for policies supporting 
research and innovation systems, on the other hand. This also raises the question whether the 
review should cover all possible questions, taking a broad, exploratory, but also necessarily 
more superficial stance, or whether pre-defined and narrower issues should be the topic of the 
peer review, with the risk of focusing on wrong questions or missing important ones. 
Third, the issue of transferability of practices from one environment to another. That issue 
lies at the heart of the peer review model. How to make sure that what works well in one 
environment will also work well in another environment and how to disentangle the elements 
of success that are universal and transferable, from those that are context-specific? Here a 
consensus is forming on the point that there are no universal best practices in research and 
innovation policies, but rather context-dependent good practices. How and who should 
conduct the adaptation process from one environment to the other – the “de-
contextualisation” process - and should this task be part of the peer review itself? 
Fourth, the selection of the peer panel. The selection of individual peers links to the 
conservatism issue, found in scientific peer reviews: namely, selecting experienced peers may 
increase the risk of favouring existing, tried and tested practices, rather than developing 
relevant new practices that are only emerging and may not be familiar to the peers. The 
complexity of research and innovation systems also implies that a range of peers with 
different backgrounds may fit the exercise: the particular combination of expertise displayed 
by the peers will influence the focus, and the results of the peer review. The selection of 
experts is another issue: they should both display specific expertise relevant to the (often 
unknown in advance) critical questions of the review, and the capacity to compare and “de-
contextualise” country-specific experiences brought by peers. The balance between peers and 
experts in a peer review panel is a third critical issue. 
Fifth, reaping benefits. How to make sure that the lessons and findings from peer reviews 
are successfully incorporated in the existing system and deliver the expected benefits? This is 
the essence for having a third step in the peer review process, but there may also be elements 
in the first and second steps to ensure that the whole exercise does not remain at the level of 
exchanges of experiences, with little impact on actual policies. 
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Sixth, defining methods and involving actors. A range of important and concrete issues 
need to be decided, in order to ensure the delivery of full benefits from this method. This 
covers: the duration of the exercise, the access to relevant country/region-specific data and 
information; the organization of the work of the peer review panel; the potential role of 
facilitating organisations such as OECD Secretariat or European Commission; the means to 
involve stakeholders from the reviewed country/region; the balance between remote work 
and on-site visits; the diffusion methods of the results, etc. 
Seventh, managing costs. What is the reasonable budget for such review? In particular, 
should the peers work on a free basis or get paid for their work? And even if the peers work 
for free, what is the opportunity costs for senior officials working on such assignments in 
addition to their main job assignment?  
The next sections investigate the responses that have been given to those core issues in 
OECD practice, first, and in the European Union, next. The final section compares the two 
types of experiences and draws lessons. 
1.3.OECD experience in policy peer reviews 
The OECD is engaged since the sixties in the production of “Science Policy Reviews”. From 
the early sixties until the mid-nineties, over 60 country reviews were carried out by the 
OECD (Aubert 1997). During this period the reviews focused initially on the science 
systems, following a linear view under which economic benefits from scientific activities 
would flow seamlessly to the economy and the main issue was to optimize the functioning of 
the science system. During the 70s the reviews were called “Science and Technology 
Reviews” to reflect the attention to industrial innovation and government measures in support 
to it. During the 80s “Innovation Policy Reviews” were proposed with a broader scope, 
extending beyond the narrower S&T policies and endorsing the “innovation system” concept. 
However, these were not popular amongst member countries, due to institutional 
configurations that were not ready to accommodate the type of horizontal reviews extending 
beyond the frontiers of science and research policies. Hence the reviews were renamed at the 
end of the 80s “Science, Technology and Innovation Reviews”.  
By the end of the 90s and in the first years of the new millennium, innovation gained 
progressively more recognition as a policy domain and governments became ready to learn 
and work on this issue. In 2006 a new series of OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy, 
focusing on innovation systems, was launched. The aim of these Reviews is to produce 
independent and well-informed critical assessments of the innovation system and to provide 
policy recommendations for improvement based on experience from other countries/regions. 
Between 2006 and 2014, 19 countries were subject to a review (Table 1). These reviews are 
produced by the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Directorate (STI) under the 
auspices of the Committee for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP). The countries are 
identified following requests from their governments while the peer reviewer countries 
consist of volunteers from the CSTP. In parallel, since 2007, the OECD launched a series of 
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Reviews of Regional Innovation, produced by the Directorate of Public Governance, under 
the auspices of the Territorial Development Policy Committee (TDPC). Between 2007 and 
2014, 7 regions or groups of regions have been reviewed along a similar method. That 
Directorate also publishes Territorial Reviews at city, region and country levels, focusing on 
regional development issues, and some of those reviews include a whole chapter on 
innovation (e.g. Skane 2012 and Switzerland 2011)
10
.  
Table 1. OECD Country and Regions Reviews of innovation policy 2006-2014 
Peer Reviewed Country Peer Reviewers mentioned in reports and co-funding 
Switzerland 2006  
Luxembourg 2007  
New Zealand 2007  
South Africa 2007 Belgium, Norway  
Chile 2007 Finland, New Zealand  
Norway 2008 Australia, UK 
China 2008 Mobilisation of a large number of experts from Austria, Australia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden, US  
(Co-funding from US and Japan) 
Hungary 2008  
Korea 2009  
Mexico 2009 Spain, Switzerland 
Russian Federation 2011  
Peru 2011 In collaboration with Inter-American Development Bank 
Slovenia 2012  
Sweden 2012 Australia, Netherlands 
Croatia 2013 Ireland, Austria (co-funding by European Union) 
Columbia 2014 Spain, Finland 
Netherlands 2014 Belgium 
                                                          
10
 The OECD also carried out a series of “Peer Reviews of Higher Education and role in regional 
development”, along the same principles, but of shorter duration. 
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Vietnam 2014 Co-funded by World Bank 
France 2014  
Peer Reviewed Region Peer Reviewers mentioned in report  
North East England 2008 New Zealand, Netherlands 
Piedmont 2009 Germany, France 
15 Mexican States 2009 United States, Spain 
Catalonia 2010 Italy, Belgium 
Basque country 2010 France, Germany 
Southern and Central 
Denmark 2012 
Norway, United Kingdom 
Wallonia 2013 Scotland, France, Switzerland 
The OECD reviews involve the following steps during a period that extends generally over 
one year: 
 The reviews are requested officially to OECD by the governments of the interested 
countries/regions, who pay for the review’s costs; 
 In many cases, a preparatory mission is made at the start to determine the scope and 
schedule of the review; 
 A background report is prepared by the reviewed country/region (by authorities 
and/or experts), following instructions from the OECD Secretariat; 
 Interviews take place in the country/region (generally during one week, sometimes 
followed by a second shorter mission) by the OECD Team (OECD Secretariat and 
experts, in some case peer reviewers join). These visits are organized and facilitated 
by the reviewed country’s officials; 
 A report is drafted by the OECD Secretariat and external experts (one or two but in a 
few cases many more). In some cases an interim conference helps to fine-tune the 
final report while in many others a draft of the overall assessment and 
recommendations is discussed with the reviewed country/region; 
 A special session of the CSTP or TDPC is devoted to the discussion of the report and 
some members of these Committee act as peer reviewers; 
 A public event is organized in the reviewed country/region with high-level attendance 
and involvement of media, in order to diffuse the results, ensure public scrutiny and 
support involvement of key stakeholders in further discussing implementation of the 
recommendations. 
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This process displays some variations: the China Review was most extensive as it involved a 
large number of experts from China and from OECD countries as well as additional activities 
such as multiple thematic fact-finding missions and workshops; some reviews like China, 
Peru, Croatia and Vietnam (non OECD members) were co-funded by other bodies than the 
OECD and the reviewed country; additional activities took place in a few countries such as 
surveys and focus groups in Croatia; national and regional reviews are generally disconnected 
(because the decisions to engage in a review rest on national and regional authorities 
respectively and those do not necessarily coordinate) with the exception of the Mexican 
reviews; and the scope of the reviews are more focused for certain countries like France 
where the analysis of a large governmental programme (“Future Investments”) was 
prioritized over an all-encompassing review of the research and innovation system. 
The OECD reviews adopt the national innovation system framework with a focus on 
knowledge flows in the system, and take, in principle, a broad perspective on policies, 
incorporating education, research, technology transfer, innovation and business policies 
(Figure 2). Among the key topics covered by the reviews (see Box 1), the governance of the 
system is given a particular attention. Qualities such as coherence and coordination, 
efficiency, adaptability, legitimacy and stability are investigated over the various phases of 
the policy cycle: agenda setting; implementation and reflexivity (OECD 2009). In addition, 
the multi-level dimension in governance is covered in the regional reviews. 
Some lessons can be drawn from this long OECD experience of peer reviews of innovation 
policy. 
First, the comparative and benchmarking dimension is brought in the reviews thanks to both 
experts (including members of the OECD Secretariat) and peers. The balance between the 
two types of contributions differs in each case, but in general the experts have a strong 
influence, notably thanks to the exploitation of knowledge accumulated in earlier reviews. 
The (self-)selection of peers coming from countries/regions that were subject to earlier 
reviews contribute to this diffusion of good practices. An enquiry towards beneficiaries of the 
reviews indicated that more intense involvement of peers in the reviews is seen as a path for 
improvement (OECD 2009). 
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Figure 2. OECD Country Reviews of innovation policy: the framework 
 
Source: OECD 2014 
Box 1. OECD Country Reviews of innovation policy: key topics 
1. Human resources for innovation: analysis of the matching between education system 
and current and future needs of economy 
2. Public sector research: assessment of quality of public research and relevance to needs 
of society and economy; effectiveness of the organizational structure 
3. Relations between science and industry: intensity of transfer through various channels 
and assessment of the quality of the transfer 
4. Corporate innovation: contribution of innovation to business sector’s productivity and 
competitiveness; assessment of effectiveness of public support mechanisms to 
corporate innovation; relevance of government strategies  
5. Business entrepreneurship: extent of entrepreneurial activity and role of policy and 
structural factors 
6. System governance: assessment of the relevance of the principles and strategies and 
the contribution of various governmental bodies to system governance  
Source: OECD 2014 
Second, the selection of peers does not follow a systematic procedure. Rather, it depends on 
the interest of other countries/regions to participate in the exercise. A scrutiny of Table 1 
124 
 
generates several hypotheses for these motivations: a “neighboring” effect (adjacent countries 
are prone to look at and learn from their neighbors’ system); proximity in terms of 
institutional context (e.g. centralized versus decentralized countries), a “peer community” 
effect also may happen where countries that have been part of a review volunteer to 
participate as peers in a subsequent review. In practice, the availability of persons with 
suitable knowledge and an inclination towards such comparative exercises, members of the 
CSTP of TDPC, plays an important role in the final composition of peer panels. 
Third, the preparation of the background document by the reviewed country/region has 
proven to be a valuable exercise in itself, and for some countries/regions, this document 
constitutes an important attempt to document their STI system. 
Fourth, the wide mobilization in the reviewed country, at all stages (preparation of the 
background document, interviews and interactions with OECD team, and discussion of the 
draft conclusions) is an important outcome of the review. This method helps to address the 
danger of externalized analyses which are subsequently not endorsed by policy-makers and 
key actors. 
Fifth, an in-depth knowledge of the situation of the reviewed country/region needs to be 
acquired if the recommendations are to impact on policies. Proposed solutions to address 
identified weaknesses in the innovation system should indeed not only be relevant, but also 
be acceptable and implementable in the particular context of the reviewed country/region. 
The concept of “best practice”, which may have been in fashion in the past, is now outdated 
with a better recognition of the complex web of place-specific influences on an innovation 
system. 
Sixth, a difficult issue relates to the nature of the recommendations: there is a balance 
between the width and the depth of these recommendations. This points to the necessity, at 
preparation stage, to reach a consensus on the focus (broad or narrow) of the review. In the 
future, and especially for countries/regions with a more mature system and advanced policies, 
more focused reviews may be more appropriate than overall system analyses . 
Seventh, the type of impacts expected from the reviews are generally felt as having a long-
term character and being of a structural and fundamental nature, rather than giving more 
concrete and immediate suggestions (Box 2), thus differentiating them from consultancy or 
evaluation reports. The timing of the review with respect to the political cycle is an important 
pre-condition for maximizing impacts (OECD 2009). The impacts also depend on the 
underlying rationale for engaging in a review: the review can legitimize and provide external 
support for orientations already taken by the government, as well as generate a shift in 
underlying principles or in actual implementation of policies. The latter case depicts a more 
profound influence, which can only be achieved when the reviewed country/region is open to 
criticisms and ready to change.  
Eight, the follow-up of the reviews in the mid- and longer-term is not systematically 
organized. This would however help improving the method based on an improved 
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understanding of the features enhancing policy learning and incorporation of 
recommendations into policies. 
Finally, the key comparative advantages for the success of reviews carried out under the 
auspices of the OECD are: reputation, objectivity (absence of conflict of interest) and 
competences (accuracy and analytical quality) (OECD 2009). The last point encompasses the 
exploitation of earlier work at OECD and the availability of tried-and-tested practices from 
other OECD countries. The idea of “peer pressure” does not seem to be at the heart of the 
learning process, as national/regional conditions still are the dominant forces influencing 
policy changes. 
Box 2. OECD Country Reviews of innovation policy: impacts expected 
1. Raising awareness of the importance of STI and STI policy at the highest level of 
government and with a broader set of actors in the economy and society 
2. Facilitating the integration of STI in mainstream economic and social policy 
3. Contributing to the debate on the scope of STI policy, its direction and its priorities 
4. Informing the reform of STI governance arrangements, for example, in terms of 
improving institutional coordination (e.g. between ministries) and steering (e.g. of 
PROs) and policy implementation 
5. Informing the STI strategies of specific ministries, agencies and research performers 
6. Influencing STI budgetary processes 
7. Improving the design and effectiveness of STI policy tools and the overall policy mix 
8. Stimulating dialogue between innovation system actors 
9. Fostering the learning and adaptation of international good practices 
Source: OECD 2009 
1.4.European Union experiences in policy peer reviews 
CREST and ERAC peer reviews 
The European Union has a shorter history than OECD in using peer reviews in the field of 
RDTI policy. Peer review processes in this field were launched within the framework of the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC), established by the European Council of Lisbon in 
March 2000. The OMC is an inter-governmental mode of governance, which rests on 
voluntary participation by Member States, and on “soft law”, non-binding mechanisms such 
as guidelines and indicators, benchmarking and sharing of best practice. The expected 
strength of this method lies on the power of peer pressure, since the European Union has no 
legal power to impose policy changes in this field on Member States. 
The OMC has been applied in the field of research and innovation since 2003 under the aegis 
of the consultative body for research and innovation, CREST (European Union Scientific and 
Technical Research Committee), acting as the forum for the exchange of experience and 
mutual learning. The objective of the OMC is to foster the implementation of the European 
Research Area by facilitating: 1) enhanced mutual learning and peer review; 2) identification 
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of good practices and of their conditions for transferability; 3) development of joint policy 
initiatives among several Member States and regions and 4) identification of areas where 
Community initiatives could reinforce actions at Member State level. Four cycles have been 
implemented between 2003 and 2008, during which several specialized groups exchanged 
knowledge and practices on topics of importance for RDTI policy, and peer reviews took 
place under the CREST “policy mix” group. 
In the period 2005-2008, 11 EU countries were peer reviewed: three (Romania, Spain and 
Sweden) in a pilot operation during the second cycle (2005-2006), six (Belgium, Estonia, 
France, Lithuania, Netherlands, United Kingdom) in the third cycle (2006-2007), and two 
(Austria and Bulgaria) in the fourth cycle (2007-2008). In 2010 CREST was renamed ERAC 
(European Research Area Committee) in order to better align its role with the new emphasis 
given to the ERA by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Seven countries 
(Cyprus, Latvia, Estonia, Denmark, Belgium, Iceland and Spain) were peer reviewed under 
ERAC until 2014 (Table 2). The list of reviewed countries shows a wide diversity of country 
sizes and levels of development.  
Table 2. EU - CREST and ERAC Peer Reviews of innovation policy 2005-2014 
Peer Reviewed 
Country 
Peer Reviewers mentioned in reports  
CREST Peer Reviews 2005-2008 
Romania Netherlands, Belgium, Slovenia 
Spain Slovak republic, Norway, Ireland 
Sweden France, Netherlands, UK, Estonia 
Belgium Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Spain 
Estonia Slovenia, Netherlands, Norway 
France Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
Lithuania UK, Netherlands, Denmark, Slovenia 
Netherlands Sweden, UK, Poland 
United Kingdom Austria, Romania, Denmark, Finland, France 
Austria France, Sweden, Netherlands, UK 
Bulgaria UK, Ireland, Estonia, Norway 
ERAC Peer Reviews 2010-2014 
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Cyprus Malta, Greece, UK, Ireland, Austria 
Latvia UK, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, Norway 
Estonia Denmark, Slovenia, Finland, Israel 
Denmark Germany, Finland, Austria, Netherlands 
Belgium Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Spain 
Iceland Finland, Ireland, Netherlands 
Spain Sweden, France, Germany, Belgium, Estonia 
The method used for CREST/ERAC peer reviews adopts the three-step process as in the 
OECD method, but shows several differences: 
 The peer review team is composed of an independent expert (lead consultant), peers 
from the Member States and a representative from the European Commission. The 
same countries are acting both as peer reviewers and reviewers in subsequent 
exercises; 
 A background report is prepared either by the European Commission (Joint Research 
Centre IPTS) or the lead consultant. The peer reviewed country prepares a self-
assessment report, focusing on key elements of the innovation system (Figure 3), 
covering the interrelated domains of human resources, science base, business R&D 
and innovation, economic and market development and governance. The report uses 
the EU “Self-Assessment Tool” (SAT) (Box 3), and defines the crucial issues 
amongst this 10-points framework, on which the review should focus. An analysis of 
the use of the SAT tool enlightened the following benefits (Halme 2012): 1) 
Increasing the efficiency of the review exercise: the SAT provides an essential 
guidance and short-cut to the key issues that should to be addressed in the peer-
review; 2) Providing an important ‘insider view to the national policy’, revealing 
useful tacit information; 3) Engaging national stakeholders early on into the peer-
review process; 4)Increasing the chances to meet the end-client’s expectations. 
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Figure 3. Conceptual framework for OMC peer reviews 
 
Source: Guy and Nauwelaers 2003 
Box 3. Innovation Union Self-Assessment Tool for STI peer reviews 
The Innovation Union Self Assessment Tool (SAT) intends to capture the systemic 
dimension of the “knowledge triangle”. It includes the following features of well performing 
national and regional research and innovation Systems: 
1. Promoting research and innovation is considered as a key policy instrument to enhance 
competitiveness and job creation, address major societal challenges and improve quality of 
life and is communicated as such to the public 
2. Design and implementation of research and innovation policies is steered at the highest 
political level and based on a multi-annual strategy. Policies and instruments are targeted at 
exploiting current or emerging national/regional strengths within an EU context ("smart 
specialisation") 
3. Innovation policy is pursued in a broad sense going beyond technological research and its 
applications 
4. There is adequate and predictable public investment in research and innovation focused in 
particular on stimulating private investment 
5. Excellence is a key criterion for research and education policy 
6. Education and training systems provide the right mix of skills 
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7. Partnerships between higher education institutes, research centres and businesses, at 
regional, national and international level, are actively promoted 
8. Framework conditions promote business investment in R&D, entrepreneurship and 
innovation 
9. Public support to research and innovation in businesses is simple, easy to access, and high 
quality 
10. The public sector itself is a driver of innovation 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/innovation-union-
communication_en.pdf COM(2010) 546 
 The exercise is quicker (around 6 months) and has a more limited scope than the 
OECD exercises: it is characterized as a “light’ exercise to encourage the sharing of 
information about policy-related issues between senior policymakers and to generate 
generic lessons for the formulation and implementation of effective policy mixes” 
(CREST 2007). ERAC peer reviews “provide quick professional views for a selected 
focus area” (Halme 2012); 
 The contribution of peers is comparatively more important than the contribution from 
experts. According to a synthesis report of CREST peer reviews: “A key benefit is 
widely held to flow from the two-way learning that occurs at the personal level, i.e. 
between the peers and their interlocutors during the missions to the review country. 
This interactive dialogue and networking dimension helps to distinguish the CREST 
policy mix exercise from the more strictly objective and analysis-based OECD type of 
country review” (CREST 2007); 
 One of the expectations from the OMC was the evolution towards better coordination 
of policies across Member States: this aspect has been underdeveloped in practice. 
As the experiences accumulated with more countries covered under the ERAC peer reviews, 
three key success conditions were identified.  
First, policy commitment at the highest level, along with the choice of the right timing for 
conducting the exercise taking due consideration of the policy cycle, is a first necessary 
condition. This commitment supports the three stages of the peer review process: it ensures a 
well-thought definition of focus for the peer review, access to relevant information sources, 
technical support for the preparation of missions and mobilization of stakeholders, and, above 
all, it raises the likelihood of actual incorporation of recommendations into the policy-
making.  
Second, wide stakeholders participation from the reviewed country is also seen as a key 
success factor that also benefits the three phases: this helps improving the depth of the 
analysis of the review panel, eliciting tacit information and actors’ agendas that need to be 
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taken into account to prepare realistic recommendations, and preparing the actors to 
implement changes flowing from the recommendations. 
Third, the quality of members and of the peer review panel as whole, composed of a mix of 
experts and peers, is an essential element of success. The selection of this panel should be 
part of the preparatory phase, allowing a good match between the peers and experts and the 
more focused questions of the exercise. 
Interreg IVC inter-regional learning experiences  
In addition to these centrally-managed EU-wide peer review exercises, a number of ad hoc 
initiatives have been taken by regions and countries in the EU, often facilitated by the 
availability of EU funds dedicated to support trans-national learning( in particular the Interreg 
C programme). 
The Assembly of European Regions (AER) promotes peer reviews amongst its members. 
Their aim is for regions to identify, exchange and transfer good practices in terms of regional 
policy instruments for innovation policies at the regional level. An example of the application 
of the appr oach sketched out in Figure 4, is described in Box 4, the SMART EUROPE 
project, funded by Interreg IVC. In this kind of model, the peer review visit and peer-to-peer 
reciprocal learning are the central elements, since each region acts as both reviewer and 
reviewed partner within the same partnership of regions. The main advantage of this 
methodology that is heavily focused on the role of peer-reviewer is that “the selection of 
experts, who are practitioners in the field of assessment, means that the recommendations 
given by them after the review will be practical and realistic” (quote from Tampere region, 
subject to peer review in SMART EUROPE). 
Many Interreg IVC projects have focused on “exchanges of good practices”. This has resulted 
in a bulk of material, such as “good practices databases or brochures” which tend to be used 
only sporadically beyond the partners of the projects that produced them. To remedy this lack 
of diffusion, the Interreg IVC programme funded “capitalization exercises” including 
reflections on the transferability of good practices. 
These bottom-up initiatives differ from the EU peer reviews described above, in two main 
respects: 
1. Their focus is on transfer of individual good practices rather than on overall systems 
assessments; 
2. They are not part of a series of similar exercises and are not placed under the aegis of 
broad political Committees (such as the ERAC). Hence, the diffusion of results is in 
practice restricted to projects’ participants. 
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Figure 4. Assembly of European Regions Peer Review methodology 
 
Source : www.aer.org 
Box 4. Inter-regional peer reviews under Interreg IV C: the example of SMART 
EUROPE 
SMART EUROPE is based on the concept that smart and targeted regional policies and 
interventions can be designed to boost the employment directly in the regional innovation-
based sectors. With this aim, a consortium of 13 partners, representing 11 EU regions, 
exchanged policies and instruments for identifying and supporting the main regional 
economic actors that can generate job opportunities in the innovation based sectors of their 
economy. In support of this overall purpose, the project activities address the following sub-
objectives:  
 Collecting and exchange of good practices and possible policy improvements in the field 
using a Peer Review methodology;  
 Setting up of the SMART EUROPE Toolkit, a customized package of policy instruments 
and measures to facilitate the creation of innovation-based jobs;  
 Development of concrete implementation plans for each partner region to achieve the 
main objective; 
 Dissemination of the tested measures towards other interested EU Regions. 
 
The methodology standardises the relevant aspects that need to be measured, in order to 
enable experts with different background, to assess the regional situation in an objective way. 
By this, they will be able to give appropriate recommendations on the field of innovation-
based job creation in the host region. Relevant local stakeholders are involved since the 
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beginning with the aim to collect the needs and demands for the territory and to define 
specific focus of action. 
Eleven Peer Reviews took place, one in each SMART EUROPE partner region, allowing to 
build on the knowledge of peers, experts and practitioners dealing with employment 
strategies in different European countries, selected by the partners. A Peer Review team 
consists of 10-12 highly experienced experts from the Partner Regions (2 experts per region). 
Background information is provided to the review team prior to the Peer Review. The host 
region sets the agenda with interviews, study trips and workshops allowing the experts to 
identify strengths and weaknesses in its innovation and employment policies. 
A checklist is the common tool used by the peers to assess the host region's policy regarding 
its innovation anchor. After the visit, the review team prepares a report with a series of 
recommendations on how to improve the region's policy design and delivery. 
Based on the feedback of the experts, the host region prepares its Action Plan setting out the 
concrete steps to follow up to the recommendations. An Implementation Plan defines a 
longer-term strategy and explains how the recommendations will be included in future 
regional policies. 
Source: www.smart-europe.eu 
1.5.Conclusion 
There are several commonalities, but also differences in the way policy peer reviews have 
been deployed at the OECD and in the European Union. Table 3 indicates the content of the 
various phases and activities within them, and Table 4 summarises the OECD and EU 
approaches (here the focus is on the CREST-ERAC peer reviews) according to the key issues 
identified at the start of this section. 
The two types of peer reviews follow broadly a similar three-step pattern, with an important 
focus on interactions with stakeholders in the reviewed country/region, at the heart of the 
peer review process, but the OECD peer reviews are longer, more in-depth exercises than EU 
peer reviews, which are quicker and less analytical. The respective roles of peers and experts 
differ: the balance places more weight on peers in the EU model and on experts in the OECD 
model. Both models do not include a systematic follow-up of consequences of the peer 
reviews in the reviewed country. 
The response to the issue of transferability of good practice is similar in both cases: the 
adoption of a broad and systemic conceptual framework for the peer review enlightens the 
context-dependent character of policies, and puts the emphasis on policy mixes rather than on 
individual policy instruments working in isolation (Nauwelaers and Wintjes 2008). Hence in 
both cases, the aim of the peer review is not to find and replicate “best practices” but to learn 
from successful foreign experience. The work of “de-contextualizing” good practices needs 
the intervention of external experts. Combination of peers and experts is hence a necessary 
feature of these exercises. 
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In both cases the continuity of the exercises and the learning between exercises is not 
systematically organized. This can be considered as a missed opportunity to create 
“communities of practice” between policy-makers supporting continuous policy learning. 
The benefits of OECD and EU peer reviews are that the results are tailor-made to the need of 
the peer reviewed country. There is indeed a lot of information available on good practices 
for any fields of RDTI policy, which is not used by governments. Peer review is a mean to 
put these at use for the purpose of national policy learning: a key characteristic of the peer 
review method is that recommendations are likely to be more credible and applicable due to 
the fact that they have been screened by peers from the real policy-making world (fuelling the 
“peer pressure”), and checked against the reality of the reviewed country/region thanks to 
interactions with stakeholders. 
Table 3. Content of phases and tasks in OECD and EU policy peer reviews models 
Main phases and tasks Key elements OECD model Key elements EC model 
Phase 1 
PREPARATION 
Self-assessment 
Preparatory mission to define 
scope 
Background report by the 
reviewed country/region 
Background report prepared by 
EU-appointed external expert  
Phase 1 
PREPARATION 
Mobilization 
Mobilization under 
responsibility of the review 
country/region  
Mobilization under 
responsibility of the review 
country/region 
Phase 2 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Analysis 
In-depth analysis, using OECD 
knowledge base 
More limited analysis 
Phase 2 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Interactions 
One or two visits in the 
country/region, peers not 
systematically attending 
Discussion of draft report with 
country/region 
Discussion of draft report at 
OECD with peers 
One or two visits in the 
country/region, peers 
systematically attending 
Informal, not systematic 
discussion of draft report with 
country/region 
Phase 3 
INCORPORATION 
Communication 
OECD launch event - visibility Presentation of report at ERAC 
committee with peers 
Presentation of report in 
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country/region 
Phase 3 
INCORPORATION 
Endorsement 
No systematic follow-up of 
policy changes 
No systematic follow-up of 
policy changes 
Table 4. Differences and commonalities between OECD and EU policy peer reviews 
models 
 OECD policy peer review 
model 
EU policy peer review model 
Choice of peer 
reviewing 
countries/regions 
Small number of peer 
countries/regions 
Self-selection based on interest 
in and proximity with the 
reviewed country/region 
Larger number of peer 
countries/regions 
Self-selection based on interest 
in and proximity with the 
reviewed country/region 
“Community of practice “ with 
cross-participations in several 
exercises 
Definition of the 
analytical 
framework 
OECD analytical framework 
Coverage of broad research and 
innovation system, focus on 
flows and governance 
Exploitation of earlier OECD 
work 
CREST model and EU Self-
Assessment Tool 
Coverage of broad research and 
innovation system 
Transferability of 
practices 
Emphasis on overall framework, 
context-dependent good practices  
Emphasis on overall framework, 
context-dependent good practices 
Selection of peer 
panel 
Experts-dominated Peers-dominated 
Reaping benefits Focus on analytical findings, 
mediated by peers views 
Credibility and applicability of 
recommendations 
Focus on mutual learning process 
Coordination and alignment of 
policies across EU  
Credibility and applicability of 
recommendations 
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Defining methods 
and involving actors  
Typical duration: one year 
Relying on codified more than 
tacit knowledge 
Typical duration: six months 
Relying more on tacit than 
codified knowledge 
Managing costs Cost borne by reviewed country Cost borne by reviewed country, 
EC funding for experts and travel 
for peers 
2. The contribution of Peer Reviews to Smart Specialisation Strategies  
2.1.The specific requirements of S3 for policy-making 
Smart Specialization Strategies, which started to be designed in 2012 in the wake of the 
preparation of Structural funds programme for the period 2014-2020 (the presence of such 
strategies was set as a formal condition for accessing the funds), are new types of policies for 
knowledge-based regional development, displaying the following six characteristics (as 
defined by the SMARTSPEC project): 
1. Open: the identification of a region’s smart specialisation potential takes place within 
an international context, is based on a functional definition of the region (extending 
over administrative borders), and incorporates a trans-regional dimension; 
2. Informed: based on a robust evidence base, on iterative and learning-based process, 
thus calling for a lot of policy intelligence and evolving over time; 
3. Integrated: fostering synergies between different sectors, innovation actors, policy 
domains and policy levels; 
4. Differentiated: starting with the identification of the region’s specific competitive 
advantages, which necessarily differ according to the stage of development and the 
characteristics of the regional innovation system; 
5. Shared: based on a synergistic, collective, politically-endorsed process, where private 
actors play an important role as main actors of the “entrepreneurial discovery 
process”; 
6. Impact – oriented: goal-orientated exercise expressed in terms of concrete and 
measurable goals and targets and adapted according to impacts achieved. 
Clearly, Smart Specialization Strategies place new requirements for policy-making. The 
observation of the first years of practice indicates that all six features pose considerable 
challenges on regional policy-makers. The two most immediate challenges to which policy-
makers have been confronted with are: first, the identification of (emerging) areas of 
specialization for the region; and second, the assessment of contribution of policy to 
enhancing the transformation capacity of the regional productive fabric towards new 
specialization domains. 
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2.2.Joint Research Centre S3 Platform Peer Reviews 
The European Commission, in charge of checking the presence and quality of smart 
specialization strategies in the context of the negotiations for the use of Structural Funds, has 
acknowledged that this requirement is highly demanding: policies implemented in the wake 
of smart specialization strategies would represent, for most regions, a step change compared 
to the current situation. To respond to this difficulty, the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission (the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies in Seville, IPTS) 
has been given the task to support regional authorities (and national authorities in Member 
States where the regions have little relevant powers) to develop such strategies. The IPTS has 
established a S3 Platform in 2011: peer reviews, started in 2012, soon became the flagship 
activity of the S3 Platform. Between January 2012 and February 2015, 18 “informal peer 
review workshops” have taken place within this Platform. 
The S3 Platform peer reviews consist in one- to two-day workshops, during which four 
regions present their situation and questions with respect to S3 development, and the other 
regions act as peer reviewers, named “critical friends”. The participants switch roles 
alternatively between reviewers and reviewees. The conceptual framework relates to the S3 
process rather than the innovation system analysis. The core of the peer review workshops 
consists in this interactive process between peers, which is supplemented by various experts’ 
contributions acting in a plenary session, and commenting on peers’ exchanges. The results 
of the debates are gathered in a report produced by the staff of the S3 Platform. While the S3 
Platform peer review workshops follow a three-phase process like the other peer reviews, the 
weight of the exercise is on “interactions” in the second phase. The success factors for these 
interactions have been identified as: 1) value sharing; 2) level of commitment; 3) mutual trust 
and 4) credibility (Midtkandal and Rakhmatullin 2014).  
Due to their approach which favors reactions on the spot, these particular types of peer 
reviews are more successful in eliciting tacit rather than codified knowledge in policy-
making. They are also more geared towards policy learning processes than actual policy 
changes. 
The key characteristics of these particular types of peer reviews are depicted in Tables 5 and 
6 below, including the same items as the ones developed for the OECD and EU models above 
(Midtkandal and Hegyi 2014, Midtkandal and Rakhmatullin 2014).  
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Table 5. Content of phases and tasks in JRC-IPTS S3 Platform policy peer reviews 
model 
Main phases and tasks S3 Platform Peer Reviews 
Phase 1 
PREPARATION 
Self-assessment 
Peer reviewed region prepares slides on S3 status and questions, a 
short summary of regional situation, and fills a self-assessment 
questionnaire covering the key S3 characteristics. 
Phase 1 
PREPARATION 
Mobilization 
No specific mobilization in peer reviewed region, beyond 
participation of 3-5 representatives to the workshop. The preparation 
of the workshop might act as a momentum for mobilization of actors 
at home. 
Phase 2 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Analysis 
Peer reviewers read peer reviewed region’s short background 
document and S3 slides and presentation before the workshop.  
Phase 2 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Interactions 
The core of the activity consists in interactions during the workshop, 
between 4 peer reviewed regions, which change roles and act both as 
reviewers (“critical friends”) and reviewees. 
Phase 3 
INCORPORATION 
Communication 
Results of the interactions are made public on the S3 Platform 
website, and brought home as “lessons learned” by participants of the 
peer reviewed region 
Phase 3 
INCORPORATION 
Endorsement 
The workshop participants are invited to draw up list of “follow up 
actions” from the exchanges. 
Table 6. Key characteristics of S3 Platform policy peer reviews model 
 S3 Platform Peer Reviews 
Choice of peer 
reviewing 
countries/regions 
On voluntary basis. 
Coordinating role by S3 Platform plays for matching peer reviewees and 
reviewers. Key factors are: timing of voluntary submission of demand, the 
interest placed on the hosting region, some commonalities (e.g. some 
workshops focused on national level authorities in centralized Member 
States). 
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Definition of the 
analytical 
framework 
The method starts from the key issues from the RIS3 methodological 
guide, namely: stakeholder engagement, analytical work, shared vision, 
priority definition, action plan, policy mix, outward looking dimension, 
synergies between policies and funding sources, governance and 
monitoring. Each peer reviewed region defines its own priority questions 
within the list. 
Transferability of 
practices 
The issue of transferability of practices proposed by the peers is discussed 
in the workshop sessions. 
Selection of peer 
panel 
Peers dominated, experts are peripheral. 
 
Reaping benefits Exchanges amongst peers and creation of a community of practice; 
understanding of S3 concept. 
Defining methods 
and involving actors  
Typical duration: one month around the workshop. 
Relying on tacit knowledge. 
Managing costs Cost borne by reviewed and reviewer regions; animation costs by the EC 
(JRC-IPTS). 
An enquiry targeting participants in the first 12 S3 Platform workshops revealed a few 
interesting points (Midtkandal and Hegyi 2014): 
 Despite the focus of the workshops on exchanges between peers, participants tend to 
value inputs from experts more than inputs from peers. This unexpected result is 
thought to be linked to better preparation from experts than peers, before the 
workshop; 
 Self-preparation seems to bring as much value as peers’ contributions (especially 
when peers come from less advanced regions); 
 Repeated participations to workshops is seen as valuable for policy learning and for 
the creation of “communities of practice” supporting policy learning; 
 Post-workshop reports are positively evaluated but not systematically shared; 
 The positive feedback from participants on the workshops relates to the awareness 
and understanding of the S3 concept, but less to the actual work on S3.  
The key benefits of these very light models of peer reviews lie in: 
1. the exchanges between peers and the practical and real-life character of the lessons 
learned. The possibility that is given to regions to expose their achievements and 
questions with respect to S3 and get a “mirror effect” from peers’ reaction is expected 
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to spur a policy learning process. The mutual character of this peer learning process 
helps to create a right environment to activate learning processes; 
2. the wide awareness-raising across Europe thanks to the large number of regions and 
countries participating to these exercises (“community of practice” effect). 
The main limitations of this type of peer reviews are: 
1. the impossibility for all peer reviewed regions to get a “mirror effect” from stronger 
regions, due to the “switching role” method; 
2. the limited understanding of peer reviewers of situation of the peer reviewed region 
(limited analytical task during implementation phase), which results in “light” 
comments. This is to be related to a complete reliance on voluntary contributions from 
peer reviewers during the sessions of limited duration; 
3. the lack of capitalization from the whole range of peer reviews carried out under the 
same framework. 
2.3.The role of Peer Reviews for assessing S3 
A matching between the key features of S3 and of “full” Peer review models as developed in 
the OECD and EU
11
 (columns 1 and 2 respectively in Table 7) underlines the potential of the 
latter technique for supporting this new type of policies. 
Table 7. S3 features and Peer Review characteristics 
S3 Peer Review 
Open International policy learning support the opening of 
the policy process beyond own borders. 
Informed Peer reviews start with a preparation phase where 
evidence is used to fuel the implementation phase. 
Iterative and learning-based process. 
Integrated Peer reviews tend to target innovation systems as a 
whole, rather than parts of them.  
Differentiated Interactions with peers and experts help understand 
the diversity of practices, “de-contextualise” and “re-
contextualise” practices, and avoid the adoption of 
“one-size-fits-all” solutions. 
Shared Participatory approach used in peer reviews support 
the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in 
strategies. 
                                                          
11
 The focus is here on the EU models as implemented under the ERAC aegis rather than the S3 Platform. 
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Political endorsement is a necessary component. 
Participation of private actors might be missing. 
Impact – oriented Peer reviews are goal-oriented exercises: they are 
aiming at policy changes, not just at producing 
analyses. 
They may raise the appetite for indicators and targets 
setting, but not go as far as needed for concrete 
implementation of these.  
Peer reviews are by definition an opportunity to look at regional innovation systems from an 
outsider perspective, hence facilitating the “opening up” of policies. Peer reviews can also 
provide an opportunity to identify other regions and countries with complementary areas of 
specialization, as potential collaborating partners.  
During preparation phase, peer reviews help create a robust information base, which is 
completed during the implementation phase by additional evidence as a basis for the S3. The 
iterative and learning-based process of peer reviews helps to upgrade the basis on which 
strategies are built. The above analysis has made clear that peer reviews exercises, rather than 
aiming at “transferring good practices”, endeavor to enlighten the diversity of responses to 
similar policy challenges in order to fuel policy thinking in the reviewed region. This is well 
in line with the exploratory character of S3, which requires a lot of policy intelligence. 
Peer reviews adopt an innovation system model as underlying framework, where interactions 
and relationships between all components of the system are scrutinized. This helps 
developing strategies extending beyond individual policy domains, and to identify 
opportunities for synergies between actors. Meetings organized under the peer review 
exercises may offer opportunities for de-fragmenting the dialogue between actors in the 
reviewed region.  
A differentiated approach lies at the heart of S3: regions should be able to develop strategies 
that are adapted to their specific situation and comparative advantages, rather than replicating 
so called “best practices” or following fashions. This is a notoriously difficult task: a puzzling 
recent analysis of innovation policies across the EU has found that innovation policy mixes 
tend to be similar across countries, spurred by diffusion of best practices through 
transnational policy learning (Izsak et al. 2014). Arguably such a process should not be called 
“transnational learning” but rather simple “copy and paste” practices. When carried out 
properly, peer reviews should avoid such a syndrome and helps regions “de-contextualise” 
and “re-contextualise” existing foreign practices.  
The stakeholders involvement, which is an essential component of the OECD and EU peer 
review models, underlines the value of a “participatory approach” as a key device for raising 
the effectiveness of evaluations (Diez 2001). All peer review experiences have concluded on 
the importance of strong political endorsement for the success of the last step of peer review, 
namely, the incorporation of peer review recommendations into actual policies. 
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Finally, the main goal of peer reviews is to produce effective, realistic and acceptable policy 
recommendations. Hence the challenge these exercises face in developing recommendations 
is to deliver concrete ideas in terms of measurable targets, indicators and monitoring 
mechanisms which are needed for S3 as goal-orientated strategies. 
Conclusion 
Policy peer reviews is a method that rests on the hypothesis that policy-makers learn best 
through exchanges with their peers. This is because:1) part of the knowledge needed for 
policy-making process cannot be codified, and is hence embedded in people; and 2) peers can 
deliver policy recommendations that are realistic and closer to practice than other types of 
recommendations from experts’ work. This starting point makes sense, considering the large 
amount of policy-relevant material available from academic work, international organizations 
publications, evaluation reports, databases, etc. which remain under-used for the purpose of 
improving policies. Organizing peer reviews of policies is an appropriate way to adopt a 
“living lab” approach for innovating in policy-making. This method involves a more user-
driven approach to studying policies, than what is found in existing knowledge bases. By 
focusing the work on the actual needs of the reviewed country/region the existing knowledge 
base is put in motion, and tailor-made to the needs of the examined country/region. The value 
of the method lies in the combination of large amounts of both codified and tacit knowledge 
that is used in a purpose-oriented exercise. Rather than relying on “peer pressure” for 
changing policies, the method fosters “peer learning” to that purpose. 
The main conclusion of this paper is that policy peer reviews are relevant tools to support 
smart specialization strategies, for which policy learning requirements are particularly high. 
The impact of such a method will be maximized by combining the valuable aspects of the 
experience gained so far in peer review exercises conducted under the aegis of the OECD and 
the European Union. 
Thanks to a comparison between the various peer review models implemented in practice, 
and a reflection around the specific needs of policy-makers involved in S3, this paper has 
enlightened the success conditions for such a method to deliver its full potential. These pave 
the way towards models for “S3-relevant peer reviews”, with the following features. 
First, peer reviews for S3 should work according to a balanced three-phases/six tasks 
models: the analysis found that the three phases of preparation, implementation and 
incorporation are not only relevant, but also necessary for the method to yield full benefits. 
The six tasks of Self-assessment, Mobilization, Analysis, Interactions, Communication and 
Endorsement all need proper attention. In practice different emphasis has been placed on 
these tasks, with e.g. the S3 Platform peer review method placing a priority focus on 
“Interactions” in the implementation phase and much less on the other phases and tasks. 
Within the Implementation phase, the OECD model is strongest on the “Analysis” task, while 
the EU peer reviews are more geared towards the “Interactions” task. The latter two models 
have a much more developed preparation phase than the S3 Platform method does. All 
methods have in common a comparatively lower attention to the incorporation phase, which 
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is difficult to act upon since it lies almost totally in the hands of the peer reviewed region. 
The high visibility of OECD reviews in many cases is a good feature of this method for the 
“Communication” task. The EU idea of launching light “pre- and post- peer reviews” 
exercises is a good idea to ensure a better attention to the two ends of the peer review cycle, 
ensuring clearer definition and supporting effective incorporation of recommendations. 
Second, getting a balanced mix of experts and peers is an important point of attention. The 
analysis has shown that both types of contributors provide relevant, yet complementary types 
of expertise. Broader expertise, more conceptual understanding of issues and wider 
international views are mode developed with experts, while peers bring more realistic, 
credible and effective solutions based on tried practice. While the OECD model tends to be 
dominated by experts, the S3 Platform model is dominated by peers. A domination by experts 
is likely to weaken the “mutual learning” benefits among peers and result in too generic 
recommendations. A domination by peers may affect the comprehensiveness and depth of 
recommendations: “de-contextualising” good practices in one environment needs an external 
eye. A good mix of the two types of contributors, as endeavored in the more recent EU peer 
reviews, is likely to be the most suitable combination to obtain the full range of expected 
benefits, provided that the panel is able to develop good synergies between the two types of 
people. Getting the most of the two types of contributors can be fostered by giving reference 
to profiles of experts that have a close acquaintance with practice, and to peers who have a 
good international exposure and a broad understanding of issues beyond their personal 
experience. 
Third, costs and timing issues are, in practice, a determining factor to make peer reviews 
work for S3 design and implementation. Models with an in-depth coverage of all phases and 
tasks, and involving a good variety of peers and experts, are costly. Experts need fees in line 
with their investment, and deep and extended interactions between large peer review panels 
and groups of stakeholders raise travel and accommodation costs. In addition, full-blown peer 
review exercises with in-depth self-assessment and analytical phases such as in the OECD 
model take time (one year at least) and this might not be compatible with the policy cycle. 
Compromises need to be searched between timeliness and depth of peer reviews, starting 
from a fine understanding of the reviewed country/region’s need. 
Fourth, the content coverage of peer reviews is a rather new issue. Most peer review models 
have taken so far a wide coverage of all aspects of research and innovation systems, but there 
are signs that this approach is now reaching its limits. All models are evolving towards a 
more focused definition of policy reviews: this is visible in the S3 Platform model where the 
workshops start by re-formulating the questions from the peer reviewed region, or in the EU 
model which is now evolving towards a two-stages model with a first phase devoted to a first 
exploration of the focus of the review. After three years of peer reviews of the S3 Platform, 
which so far have benefitted more on awareness raising and understanding of the S3 concept, 
the current focus is now shifting on more substantial issues of content. These light peer 
reviews may act as preparatory phases for more in-depth peer reviews as carried out under 
EU-ERAC or OECD. 
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Fifth, the choice of peer regions remains an open issue. In most of the reviewed models, this 
choice is not made on a systematic manner, relying e.g. on analyses of similarities or 
differences between regions or countries. The association of peers to a particular exercise 
relies partly on the ad hoc availability of country/regions representatives having an interest 
(and staff resources) to study the peer reviewed country/region. Proximity in policy 
approaches and tradition of cooperation is an important driving force, and similarity in 
overall context (country size, institutional context (federal, unitary), overall level of 
development) is another common reason for associating regions/countries in a peer review 
exercise. In the future, in line with an identified need for more focused peer reviews, the 
choice of peer regions or countries would need to be fine-tuned according to the more 
specific focus of the review. This focus will provide a screening tool to identify those regions 
and countries that share a similar interest in the issue and have found a variety of responses to 
that issue. Still the fact that policy-makers have a higher inclination to work with 
representatives of countries/regions with higher “policy-making maturity”, as identified e.g. 
by the S3 Policy learning platform, will remain and further fuel the “policy learning 
paradox”: namely the problem that regions/countries that are more advanced in the policy 
learning cycle are also more likely to be involved – and benefit from – policy learning 
exercises. Those regions/countries most in need of lessons from peer reviews are those that 
show highest deficiencies in the pre-conditions for undertaking these exercises, in particular: 
a weak high-level policy commitment, deficit in innovation culture, and shortages of skilled 
staff and strategically-minded stakeholders.  
Finally, peer reviews for S3 would benefit from capitalization exercises and continuity. 
Learning from each other is a continuous process, as demonstrated by the S3 Platform 
methodology which is effective in creating “communities of practice”. Mutual or multilateral 
learning is an interesting feature to avoid a “one-size-fits-all” and “best practice copy” 
temptation. Mechanisms should be associated to the peer reviews to capitalizes on lessons 
learned from the various exercises and use them in subsequent peer reviews, as the OECD 
models endeavors to do. 
The main limitation of peer reviews is that it is very demanding on the side of reviewed 
country/region. The first pre-requisite for this method to deliver expected results in terms of 
policy improvement, is the presence of an evaluation culture, an openness to learn from 
outside and the willingness to change. The second pre-requisite, which is a corollary of the 
first, is that adequate capacities exist in the country/region to contribute to the three phases of 
the exercise with adequate competences. The lack of strategically-minded persons to interact 
with peers is a main limiting factor and absence of evaluations of existing policies (both in 
reviewed and reviewer country/region) is a main limiting factor for the learning process. 
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i
 Indeed, while it remains common to refer to ‘policy makers’ as a distinct group of agents responsible for 
designing public policies, the blurred boundaries between politicians, policy technicians, policy administrators 
and a whole range of other agents that may be involved in the policy design process, including beneficiaries, 
mean that the notion of there being a unique ‘policy maker’ is inappropriate. 
ii
 That the market-government failure perspective still dominates public policy debate can be seen clearly in 
responses to the 2007 financial crisis, which has been almost exclusively analysed in terms of market failures 
and corresponding regulatory (or government) shortcomings that have failed to address or exacerbated these 
failures (Branston et al., 2012). 
iii
 In practice it is very difficult to arrive at complete and objective measures of innovation outcomes. See Klette 
et al. (2000) for a critical review of several evaluation studies and reflections on the analytical difficulties in 
making these evaluations. See also Streicher et al. (2004), Cerulli and Potí (2008) and Magro (2012) for a 
selection of more recent innovation policy evaluation studies in the Austrian, Italian and Basque Country 
(Spain) contexts. 
iv
 In the context of these evolutionary rationales Edquist (2008) pleads for a substitution of the term ‘failure’ for 
‘problem’, arguing that failure is a neoclassical concept. 
v
 Highlighting the scope of the innovation system concept, Lundvall (2007: 1-2) has argued: “Without a broad 
definition of the national innovation system encompassing individual, organizational and inter-organizational 
learning, it is impossible to establish the link from innovation to economic growth. A double focus is needed 
where attention is given not only to the science infrastructure, but also to institutions/organisations that support 
competence building in labour markets, education and working life.” 
vi
 This is reflected in the growth of popularity of theory-based evaluation approaches (Chen and Rossi, 1983; 
Chen, 1990), including realist evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997), which seek to understand the intervention 
logic of policies alongside the real-life mechanisms and processes that determine their effective implementation 
in practice.  
vii
 For more information see www.ciw.ca.  
viii
 We should note that the policy mix only reflects the governmental interventions that steer towards territorial 
priorities and leaves apart the actions of other stakeholders; this is why we suggest that it is only part of the how, 
albeit a very significant part. 
